Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
"Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org> Tue, 26 July 2011 14:56 UTC
Return-Path: <dharkins@lounge.org>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54F9321F863A for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:56:00 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.265
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.265 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=-0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J5tyEfl+M4EN for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:55:59 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from colo.trepanning.net (colo.trepanning.net [69.55.226.174]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1CE4821F8890 for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:55:55 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from www.trepanning.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by colo.trepanning.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAF02A888108; Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:55:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from 130.129.103.10 (SquirrelMail authenticated user dharkins@lounge.org) by www.trepanning.net with HTTP; Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:55:54 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <c43f2432c72d92b6293425e537694474.squirrel@www.trepanning.net>
In-Reply-To: <B97B134FACB2024DB45F524AB0A7B7F203ED2CEA@XMB-BGL-419.cisco.com>
References: <20013.29623.491247.654466@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <B97B134FACB2024DB45F524AB0A7B7F203ED2B05@XMB-BGL-419.cisco.com> <90AEF529-7273-4695-BA31-4F221A4ACF45@checkpoint.com> <4E2EA248.70708@gmail.com> <B97B134FACB2024DB45F524AB0A7B7F203ED2CEA@XMB-BGL-419.cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 07:55:54 -0700
From: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Prashant Batra (prbatra)" <prbatra@cisco.com>
User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.14 [SVN]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
Importance: Normal
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 14:56:00 -0000
Hello, On Tue, July 26, 2011 6:03 am, Prashant Batra (prbatra) wrote: > Thanks Yoav and Yaron for the suggestions. > > Even I was thinking and tried generating and storing the key pair well > in the beginning,. This helped to some extent. > > > > The secret calculation is also very expensive, but this has to be done > in midst of the exchange only. You could pick one secret x and then for IKE exchanges do this: 0th exchange: y = g^x mod p 1st exchange: y = g^(x+1) mod p 2nd exchange: y = g^(x+2) mod p . . . nth exchange: y = g^(x+n) mod p Getting from exchange i to exchange i+1, then, is just a single modular multiply, which should be "cheaper" for you. Knowing n, y, g and p and that y = g^(x+n) mod p does not really give an advantage (above the discrete logarithm problem) in finding x. That said, I still would not suggest doing many more than a few of these (and I am not qualified to quantify that statement) but for a few-- i.e. keep n small and after n choose a new x and repeat-- it should be OK. Maybe this technique will allow you to "cheapen" your exchange a bit. I think throwing hardware at this problem is your best bet though. regards, Dan.
- [IPsec] New Version Notification for draft-kivine… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Prashant Batra (prbatra)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Vishwas Manral
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Prashant Batra (prbatra)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Dan Harkins
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Hugo Krawczyk
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- [IPsec] IPSec implementation query. Prashant Batra (prbatra)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Naveen B N (nbn)
- [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in ike… ramaswamy
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [IPsec] DH keys calculation performance Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] Perfect Forward secrecy Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] Perfect Forward secrecy Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Perfect Forward secrecy Dan Harkins
- Re: [IPsec] Tokes = Session key + lifetime Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] Perfect Forward secrecy Stephen Kent
- Re: [IPsec] Avoid multiple authentication's Naveen B N (nbn)
- Re: [IPsec] Avoid multiple authentication's Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [IPsec] Avoid multiple authentication's Naveen B N (nbn)
- [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in ike… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in… ramaswamy
- Re: [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in… ramaswamy
- Re: [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in… ramaswamy
- Re: [IPsec] New method to resist replay attack in… ramaswamy