question about PFS SA duration
Eric Scoredos <rio@cup.hp.com> Wed, 18 March 1998 00:15 UTC
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From: Eric Scoredos <rio@cup.hp.com>
Message-Id: <199803180029.QAA29721@hpindlm.cup.hp.com>
Subject: question about PFS SA duration
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Date: Tue, 17 Mar 1998 16:29:55 -0800
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I have a question about PFS that came up at the RTP Interop. The IKE drafts define the conditions for identity protection and non-derivability of keying material necessary for PFS. However, neither the Architecture nor IKE drafts mention how the lifetime of the PFS SA is controlled so that multiple, unrelated messges are not sent using the same QM PFS SA. In the kernel, we can tell when to start a PFS session if there is no pre-existing SA for the appropriate selectors; however, it is not clear how we terminate this SA and prevent its re-use by another message using similar selectors after the original session as terminated. The SKIP documents talk about establishing a specific timeout for the PFS key and establishing new keys if more data needs to be send. A pre-established timeout seems fairly non-specific and I wonder if there are other architectural methods for establishing the duration of the PFS SA. In any case, I think the IPSEC drafts should offer direction here. Thanks for your help (and sorry if I missed the previous resolution of this issue). Salute, erik
- question about PFS SA duration Eric Scoredos