Re: SOI: identity protection and DOS

Radia Perlman - Boston Center for Networking <Radia.Perlman@sun.com> Tue, 20 November 2001 19:18 UTC

Received: from lists.tislabs.com (portal.gw.tislabs.com [192.94.214.101]) by above.proper.com (8.11.6/8.11.3) with ESMTP id fAKJIg817970; Tue, 20 Nov 2001 11:18:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: by lists.tislabs.com (8.9.1/8.9.1) id NAA13414 Tue, 20 Nov 2001 13:36:29 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <200111201845.NAA21833@bcn.East.Sun.COM>
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2001 13:45:49 -0500
From: Radia Perlman - Boston Center for Networking <Radia.Perlman@sun.com>
Reply-To: Radia Perlman - Boston Center for Networking <Radia.Perlman@sun.com>
Subject: Re: SOI: identity protection and DOS
To: ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-MD5: PUqXyIC4n+0ct7fH0Z+5dQ==
X-Mailer: dtmail 1.3.0 @(#)CDE Version 1.3.5 SunOS 5.7 sun4u sparc
Sender: owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
Precedence: bulk

Derek said:
>>I happen to agree with Radia's point that you should try to protect
>>the initiator's identity before the responder's identity (which
>>implies the responder should authenticate to the initiator first).

Actually, Dan and Charlie changed my mind about that. The problem with
the responder revealing identity information first is that ANYONE can
initiate an IPsec connection to an IP address and find out who is there
without ever divulging their identity.

If it's the initiator that reveals identity first then the only threat is
from an active attacker impersonating the responder's IP address and lying
in wait. (the initiator's ID is hidden from an eavesdropper and revealed
only to whatever is sitting at the IP address the initiator connected to).
If it's the responder that reveals identity first, then (assuming
it's not a strict client/server model where the nodes that need identity
protection never respond to IPsec connect initiates and only initiate
them) it is trivial to find out who is at an IP address.

Radia