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Re: [IPsec] Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-09: (with COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Tue, 27 September 2016 19:32 UTC

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To: Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2016 20:31:58 +0100
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection@ietf.org, david.waltermire@nist.gov
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ddos-protection-09: (with COMMENT)
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On 27/09/16 20:07, Valery Smyslov wrote:
> 
> The attacker can however gain some benefits if he/she waits some time
> until the half-open SA is expired on Responder and chooses the same SPI
> and nonce for the next connection request. He/she will receive the same
> puzzle
> if the Responder doesn't change value of secret yet. Note that RFC7296
> recommends
> changing secret frequently if under attack (RFC7296, Section 2.6):
> 
>   The responder should change the value of <secret> frequently, especially
>   if under attack.
> 
> I think we can add some words to the draft that will recommend
> to generate cookie in such a manner, that the cookie is not repeated
> even if the same IP, SPI and nonce are used by Initiator.

Good one. Yeah I think it'd be fine to add that.

All the rest of your and Yoav's responses are good too.

Thanks,
S.

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