[IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06.txt
internet-drafts@ietf.org Fri, 16 November 2018 22:41 UTC
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietf.org
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AEE00130E36; Fri, 16 Nov 2018 14:41:08 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.88.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: ipsec@ietf.org
Message-ID: <154240806866.599.13215261386511762527@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 14:41:08 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/h3HlD795HvnDi-9KAFXnOqlZWBs>
Subject: [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06.txt
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipsec/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 22:41:09 -0000
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the IP Security Maintenance and Extensions WG of the IETF. Title : Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Authors : Daniel Migault Tobias Guggemos Yoav Nir Filename : draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06.txt Pages : 8 Date : 2018-11-16 Abstract: Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each packet. The size of IV depends on the applied transform, being usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined by the time this document is written. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce. This avoids sending the nonce itself, and saves in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 8 octets per packet. This document describes how to do this. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-06 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
- [IPsec] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-i… internet-drafts