Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple?
Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com> Thu, 12 September 1996 19:04 UTC
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To: Germano Caronni <caronni@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Cc: Robert Moskowitz <rgm3@chrysler.com>, HUGO@watson.ibm.com, skrenta@osmosys.incog.com, ipsec@TIS.COM
Subject: Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple?
In-Reply-To: caronni's message of Thu, 12 Sep 1996 19:03:02 +0200. <199609121703.TAA22432@kom30.ethz.ch>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 15:08:42 -0400
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com>
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> How do you plan to handle certificate expiry without shared time? There are many different grades of shared time out there. I don't think you need NTP-grade shared time (or even kerberos-grade shared time -- ~5minute accuracy) to enforce expirations of certificates which last over a month ... getting the day right is probably good enough. By the way, when engineering timeouts and grace periods, you also have to think about clock frequency errors, network latency, and processing latency in addition to absolute accuracy. I butted heads with this issue when doing the DCE RPC security protocol (though for that, we do require shared time). In the general case, you don't *ever* want to send a packet which the reciever will reject because the SPI just expired. SPI timeouts should probably be expressed with a relative TTL after which the sender should not send to the SPI; the receiver should continue to honor packets received on the SPI for a (short) grace period after the published TTL expires, the grace period being a function of the TTL (to allow for clock frequency errors) and the worst-case end-to-end latency between the systems.. - Bill To: Rich Skrenta <skrenta@osmosys.incog.com> Cc: ipsec@TIS.COM Subject: Re: Using SKIP as inspiration, not as gospel In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 12 Sep 1996 10:17:32 PDT." <199609121717.KAA18752@miraj.incog.com> Reply-To: perry@piermont.com X-Reposting-Policy: redistribute only with permission Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 14:54:34 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com> Sender: ipsec-approval@neptune.tis.com Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <9609121513.aa28910@neptune.TIS.COM> Rich Skrenta writes: > The fact that the SKIP camp is not willing to open up a solidified, mature > design to rewhack it into something that looks just like Photurus does not > make us "hamstrung". To suggest that we change SKIP to make it "more like > every other key management protocol" misses the point of this entire > debate. Rich; Other people don't think of SKIP as a solidified, mature design. To many of the rest of us, it is very unclear that SKIP has any advantages over other protocols -- the claims to the effect that it is lower overhead are illusory. Some of us don't like the fact that SKIP does not play nicely with the IPSec model. It has improved in certain respects with respect to the requirements, but the fact remains that it just isn't, to many of us, what the doctor ordered. You and everyone else at Sun's Internet Commerce group are necessarily going to disagree, I'm sure. I don't think this is going to be resolved by discussion. I believe that intransigence has definitively set in. Perry Message-Id: <199609121907.MAA21082@denwa.incog.com> X-Mailer: exmh version 1.6.4 10/10/95 To: HUGO@watson.ibm.com Cc: skrenta@osmosys.incog.com, ipsec@TIS.COM Subject: Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 12 Sep 1996 12:03:11 EDT." <199609121619.MAA529798@mailhub1.watson.ibm.com> X-Url: http://www.incog.com/~stoltz Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 12:07:26 -0700 From: Ben Stoltz <stoltz@denwa.incog.com> Sender: ipsec-approval@neptune.tis.com Precedence: bulk HUGO@watson.ibm.com said: > My personal vote here is against co-existence. That will postpone > global success (inter-operability) even more. There will be time to > tune the one chosen protocol later with experience. But there should > be one basis for all. > > Hugo Although the decision of IPSEC is important, I don't think it will have the effect that you desire. IMHO, each of the IPSEC proposals have gone past the point of being buried or marginalized. Additional IPSEC requirements are going to come into being through evolution of the existing implementations. Even if IPSEC completely drops one proposal, the installed customer base will need to be migrated to the final IPSEC implementation and many existing and new customers will find substantial value in the original product offerings. People seem to be burning a lot more calories arguing and fretting over these "issues" than is healthy. What if the argument were "Should we implement TCP or UDP?", "Should we implement IPX or IP?", "Should we manufacture cargo planes or box cars?", "Run Windows NT or MVS or maybe even Unix?" For any single customer there might very well be a correct answer, but would be a real feat if it applied to all. A single standard is a beguiling goal, but it is not always relevant or as economical as it may seem. Swiss army knifes are great, but if I spend all my time driving nails, I don't need one. Ben
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? Rich Skrenta
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? Robert Moskowitz
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? Robert Moskowitz
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? pau
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? Germano Caronni
- Re: SKIP in IPSEC: is it really simple? Bill Sommerfeld