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Re: [IPsec] replacing PSKs: CFRG and PAKE

"Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 11 December 2018 12:49 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: 'Paul Wouters' <paul@nohats.ca>, 'Nico Williams' <nico@cryptonector.com>, ipsec@ietf.org
References: <25207.1544136532@localhost> <026601d49061$8809ad30$981d0790$@gmail.com> <29587.1544482818@localhost> <20181210231958.GC15561@localhost> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1812101846010.29141@bofh.nohats.ca> <20181211001622.GD15561@localhost> <alpine.LRH.2.21.1812102042330.22448@bofh.nohats.ca> <035701d49149$71640f10$542c2d30$@gmail.com> <2503.1544530985@localhost>
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Date: Tue, 11 Dec 2018 15:48:52 +0300
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] replacing PSKs: CFRG and PAKE
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> > I think that using PAKE for road warriors is more important than for
> > site-to-site VPNs. In the latter case the SGWs are usually administered
> > by (presumably :-)) experienced administrators, who can select a high-entropy
> > PSK, and these PSKs need not to be memorable by users. So, generally
> > speaking,
> > it is more secure to use good PSK than passwords (since any PAKE defends
> > only
> 
> If we assume highly competent administrators, then we don't need a PAKE
> at all.   

For remote access where certificates or raw public key cannot
be used, PAKE is extremely useful.

> What I heard from the IPsecME record was that many in the room
> felt that this was where ther was a weakness.

I see this as a social issue, not a technical one. We can't prevent
administrators from being careless, either with PSKs or with passwords.

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