Re: [IPsec] AD review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-08

Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru> Wed, 06 November 2019 07:55 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru>
To: 'Paul Wouters' <paul@nohats.ca>, 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: ipsec@ietf.org, draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2.all@ietf.org
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Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 10:55:44 +0300
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] AD review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-08
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Hi Paul,

> >>>                                    <--  HDR, SK {AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr
> >>>                                         [, N(PPK_IDENTITY)]}
> >>>
> >>> Am I missing something subtle as to why N(PPK_IDENTIFY) is listed as
> >>> optional here in the EAP case but not in the previous diagram for the
> >>> non-EAP case?
> >>
> >> In the previous diagram we consider only the case when using
> >> PPK is agreed upon, so N(PPK_IDENTITY) is not optional.
> 
> This btw, is a little weird. I think it is better to have the "generic"
> exchange documented, and in the text write specific examples of when
> payloads are or aren't t there. I think the figures/diagrams should be
> drawn to represent the generic case, where it should be optional because
> if it does not know the right PPK_ID, it will not send the notify.

Do you think the current diagrams are confusing?

> That is, the diagrams should represent the state machine, not an
> example of the state machine.

Hmmmm... It's an open question :-) Aa a counter-example,
the EAP and non-EAP case of IKEv2 are not shown
on the same diagrams - these are different diagrams,
however the state machine for IKE_AUTH is the same.

I think diagrams (at least in IKE) don't replace state machine
description and are mostly used for clarity.

Regards,
Valery.

> 
> Paul