allocation of key material into keys

Ran Atkinson <rja@cisco.com> Mon, 28 October 1996 23:39 UTC

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From: Ran Atkinson <rja@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 1996 11:21:23 -0800
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Subject: allocation of key material into keys
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I'm not sure what other folks think, but I've been persuaded by various people
that we need some standard and clearly stated way of transforming a "blob" of
key material generated by key management (e.g. the D-H exponentiation) into
one or more actual session keys.

I'd like to propose that the key management protocol specifications only
be responsible for generating a "blob" of key material with sufficient
bits of entropy.  

Each transform would need to specify how many bits of entropy are needed from
key management for an SA and precisely how to transform a single "blob" of key
material into one or more session keys.

Does this seem OK to people ?

Ran
rja@cisco.com


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