Re: Slicing and dicing
jim@mentat.com (Jim Gillogly) Fri, 12 September 1997 16:50 UTC
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Date: Fri, 12 Sep 1997 09:56:27 -0700
From: jim@mentat.com
Message-Id: <9709121656.AA16604@mentat.com>
To: karn@qualcomm.com, tytso@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: Slicing and dicing
Cc: karl@Ascend.COM, rodney@sabletech.com, ipsec@tis.com
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Phil Karn sez: > How likely are we to generate a weak key by random accident? Is it > worth worrying about? Ted T'so responds: ... > Note that this is also only a problem if we some how end up > re-encrypting the encrypted packet again, such as in applications where > you might be using two layers of ESP for some reason. In those cases, > the probability of trouble would be (20 * 2**-56 * 2**-56 * 20**-64), or > (20 * 2**-176), or 2 * 10**-52. Putting this in perspective, there are about pi * 10^7 seconds per year, so if everybody on earth (10^10, in round numbers) were changing keys 10^10 times per second, somebody would expose a stream once in 10^25 years. I think I can live with that. Jim Gillogly
- Slicing and dicing Rodney Thayer
- Slicing and dicing Karl Fox
- Re: Slicing and dicing Dave Mason
- Re: Slicing and dicing Phil Karn
- Re: Slicing and dicing Karl Fox
- Re: Slicing and dicing Theodore Y. Ts'o
- Re: Slicing and dicing Jim Gillogly
- Re: Slicing and dicing Cheryl Madson
- Re: Slicing and dicing Michael C. Richardson
- Re: Slicing and dicing Dan McDonald
- Re: Slicing and dicing Cheryl Madson
- Weak DES keys Michael C. Richardson
- Re: Slicing and dicing Karl Fox
- Weak DES keys Karl Fox
- Re: Slicing and dicing Stephen Kent
- Re: Slicing and dicing Theodore Y. Ts'o
- Re: Slicing and dicing Daniel Harkins
- Re: Slicing and dicing Ran Atkinson