Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret
Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org> Tue, 09 July 1996 04:57 UTC
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Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 21:59:44 -0700
Message-Id: <199607090459.VAA14902@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>
To: ho@earth.hpc.org
Cc: smb@research.att.com, ipsec@TIS.COM
In-Reply-To: <199607011355.JAA04896@earth.hpc.org> (message from Hilarie Orman on Mon, 1 Jul 1996 09:55:13 -0400)
Subject: Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret
Reply-To: karn@qualcomm.com
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How critical is the particular hash method used to produce the key from the shared secret? Too critical to just specify a particular hash method for fear that it might become compromised (e.g., MD5)? Phil
- deriving keying material from the shared secret Steve Bellovin
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… pau
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Hilarie Orman
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Uri Blumenthal
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Bill Sommerfeld
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Phil Karn
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Uri Blumenthal