Re: allocation of key material into keys

Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com> Mon, 28 October 1996 21:58 UTC

Message-Id: <199610282203.RAA03227@thunk.orchard.medford.ma.us>
To: "C. Harald Koch" <chk@border.com>
Cc: Ran Atkinson <rja@cisco.com>, ipsec@TIS.COM
Subject: Re: allocation of key material into keys
In-Reply-To: chk's message of Mon, 28 Oct 1996 16:36:06 -0500. <96Oct28.163421est.18437-1@janus.border.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 1996 17:03:45 -0500
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@apollo.hp.com>
Sender: ipsec-approval@neptune.tis.com
Precedence: bulk

> As has been discussed, this is a key management layer issue. I'd modify your
> statement to include that somehow, the "blobs" handed to different
> transforms or algorithms must be 'independent' (i.e. it's cryptographically
> hard to derive one key from another). They can still be generated from the
> same key exchange, as long as the key manager runs an intermediate step to
> obscure the source keying material.

Agreed.  Each SA/SPI instantiated by the key mgmt protocol needs to
get a different, independant, blob of entropy.

					- Bill

allocation of key material into keys Ran Atkinson
Re: allocation of key material into keys Bill Sommerfeld
Re: allocation of key material into keys C. Harald Koch
Re: allocation of key material into keys Bill Sommerfeld
Re: allocation of key material into keys Naganand Doraswamy
Re: allocation of key material into keys David Carrel