Re: [IPsec] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis-05: (with COMMENT)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 19 June 2017 15:42 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1706191120050.6995@bofh.nohats.ca>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 11:35:13 -0400
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis@ietf.org, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, IETF IPsec <ipsec@ietf.org>, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, david.waltermire@nist.gov
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Ben Campbell's Yes on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis-05: (with COMMENT)
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> On Jun 19, 2017, at 11:26 AM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 19 Jun 2017, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> 
>>      If manual keying is used anyway, AEAD algorithms MUST NOT be used,
>>      as these algorithms require additional input provided by IKE and
>>      are compromised if a counter is accidentally re-used, such as when
>>      a counter overflows, or when a device reboots without remembering
>>      the previously used counters. As of publication of this document,
>>      ENCR_AES_CBC is the only non-AEAD Mandatory-To-Implement encryption
>>      algorithm suitable for Manual Keying.
>> It's not AEAD that's the problem here. After all, it's perfectly possible to do AEAD
>> with CBC-HMAC. Rather, it's CTR mode.
> 
> 
> Hmm, of course we only have CTR based AEAD's :P
> 
> Ok, NEW NEW last paragraph:
> 
>       If manual keying is used regardless, Counter Mode AEAD algorithms
>       MUST NOT be used, as these algorithms require additional input
>       provided by IKE and are compromised if a counter is accidentally
>       re-used, such as when a counter overflows, or when a device reboots
>       without remembering the previously used counters. As of publication
>       of this document, ENCR_AES_CBC is the only Mandatory-To-Implement
>       encryption algorithm suitable for Manual Keying.

The Security Considerations in RFC 3686 point out the problems with using AES-CTR with static keys, which is what I think you mean by manual in this paragraph.  I think you need to delete “AEAD” from the first sentence or explain that CCM and GCM encompass counter mode.

Russ