Re: [IPsec] Mandatory Public Key based authentication with EAP

[Yaron Sheffer <[e-mail]>]

Hi Valery,

Thanks for popping up :-)

You are right of course. The EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION notification is 
mandatory in this case. I just didn't think of it as an additional 
condition.

Best,
	Yaron

On 09/11/2014 09:15 AM, Valery Smyslov wrote:
> Hi Rahul, Yaron,
>
>> Hi Rahul,
>>
>> I am not aware of any additional conditions.
>
> Sorry to pop up, but doesn't text from RFC5998 apply only
> to EAP-only authentication? Isn't it an additional condition?
>
> I mean, that if you perform EAP authentication, as described
> in RFC5996, i.e. when responder does send AUTH payload
> in its first reply to IKE_AUTH, then even if you use
> EAP method with mutual authentiaction, the responder
> must use public signature to compute this AUTH payload.
>
> So, from my reading, RFC5998 updates RFC5996 in the sense,
> that responder is not needed to send this AUTH payload
> (and therefore, to use PK signature to compute it)
> if (and only if) it receives EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION and honors it.
>
> Regards,
> Valery.
>
>> EAP-AKA is actually listed in the table in RFC 5998, Sec. 4.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Yaron
>>
>> On 09/11/2014 08:44 AM, Rahul Vaidya wrote:
>>> Thanks for the quick reply, Yaron,
>>>
>>> So does it mean that if an EAP method provides mutual authentication
>>> (e.g., EAP-AKA), then this particular text from 5996 does not apply? Or
>>> are their further conditions which are not mentioned in 5998 where still
>>> the public key based authentication is required?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Rahul
>>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:05 AM, Yaron Sheffer <[e-mail]
>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Hi Rahul,
>>>
>>>     This is why RFC 5998 is listed as "updates 5996". So RFC 5998 does
>>>     apply here. Note that it only applies in specific cases, and for
>>>     specific EAP methods.
>>>
>>>     Yes, we should have updated the text in RFC 5996 to refer to 5998,
>>>     but we forgot. Sigh.
>>>
>>>     Thanks,
>>>              Yaron
>>>
>>>
>>>     On 09/11/2014 06:56 AM, Rahul Vaidya wrote:
>>>
>>>         Dear IPsec Experts,
>>>
>>>         In RFC 4306, 5996 as well as
>>>         draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-__rfc5996bis,
>>>         there is a statement:
>>>
>>>         "An implementation using EAP MUST also use a public-key-based
>>>         authentication of the server to the client before the EAP
>>> exchange
>>>         begins, even if the EAP method offers mutual authentication."
>>>
>>>         RFC 5998 which updates 5996 says:
>>>         "This document specifies how EAP methods that provide mutual
>>>         authentication and key agreement can be used to provide
>>> extensible
>>>         responder authentication for IKEv2 based on methods other than
>>>         public
>>>         key signatures."
>>>
>>>         The 2 statements are contradictory, given the 'MUST'
>>> requirement for
>>>         public -key based authentication in RFC 5996.
>>>
>>>         I request a view from the IPsec community on whether public key
>>>         based
>>>         authentication can be avoided without impacting the security
>>> of the
>>>         connection/network.
>>>
>>>         Regards,
>>>         Rahul Vaidya
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>
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