Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 15 February 2017 17:12 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2017 09:11:44 -0800
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>, draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis@ietf.org, IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments on draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis
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I would use "complementary" rather than corresponding.

-Ekr


On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 9:10 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> One correction
>
> On 15 Feb 2017, at 19:05, Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Nit: You need only one of the public values and the complementary
> private value from the other side.
>
>
> Right.
>
>
>
>
> Instead of this:
>
>    exchange provides keys for the session.  If an attacker can retrieve
>    one of the private numbers (a, or b) with the corresponding public
> values (g***a**,* or g***b*),
>    then the attacker can compute the secret and the keys used and
>
>
> I suggest this:
>
>    exchange provides keys for the session.  If an attacker can retrieve
>    one of the private numbers (a or b) with the corresponding public
> values (g***b* or g***a*),
>
>    then the attacker can compute the secret and the keys used and
>
>
> This way it’s more corresponding (and without the comma)
>
> Yoav
>
>
>