ID: draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-03.txt

Derrell Piper <piper@cisco.com> Thu, 31 July 1997 23:05 UTC

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Network Working Group                                      Derrell Piper
INTERNET-DRAFT                                             cisco Systems
draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-03.txt                          July 31, 1997


      The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP
                  <draft-ietf-ipsec-ipsec-doi-03.txt>


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet Drafts.

   Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.''

   To learn the current status of any Internet Draft, please check the
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   munnari.oz.au (Australia), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
   ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited. This draft will expire six
   months from date of issue.


1. Abstract

   The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
   (ISAKMP) defines a framework for security association management and
   cryptographic key establishment for the Internet.  This framework
   consists of defined exchanges and processing guidelines that occur
   within a given Domain of Interpretation (DOI).  This document details
   the Internet IP Security DOI, which is defined to cover the IP
   security protocols that use ISAKMP to negotiate their security
   associations.

   For a description of how the IPSEC DOI fits into the overall IP
   Security Documentation framework, please see [ROADMAP].







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2. Introduction

   Within ISAKMP, a Domain of Interpretation is used to group related
   protocols using ISAKMP to negotiate security associations.  Security
   protocols sharing a DOI choose security protocol and cryptographic
   transforms from a common namespace and share key exchange protocol
   identifiers.  They also share a common interpretation of DOI-specific
   payload data content, including the Security Association and
   Identification payloads.

   Overall, ISAKMP places the following requirements on a DOI
   definition:

     o  define the naming scheme for DOI-specific protocol identifiers
     o  define the interpretation for the Situation field
     o  define the set of applicable security policies
     o  define the syntax for DOI-specific SA Attributes (phase II)
     o  define the syntax for DOI-specific payload contents
     o  define additional mappings or Key Exchange types, if needed

   The remainder of this document details the instantiation of these
   requirements for using the IP Security (IPSEC) protocols to provide
   authentication, integrity, and/or confidentiality for IP packets sent
   between cooperating host systems and/or firewalls.

3. Terms and Definitions

3.1 Requirements Terminology

   In this document, the words that are used to define the significance
   of each particular requirement are usually capitalized.  These words
   are:

   - MUST

      This word or the adjective "REQUIRED" means that the item is an
      absolute requirement of the specification.

   - SHOULD

      This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there might
      exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this
      item, but the full implications should be understood and the case
      carefully weighed before taking a different course.

   - MAY

      This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is



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      truly optional.  One vendor might choose to include the item
      because a particular marketplace requires it or because it
      enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the
      same item.















































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4.1 IPSEC Naming Scheme

   Within ISAKMP, all DOI's must be registered with the IANA in the
   ``Assigned Numbers'' RFC [STD-2].  The IANA Assigned Number for the
   Internet IP Security DOI is one (1).  Within the IPSEC DOI, all
   well-known identifiers MUST be registered with the IANA under the
   Internet IP Security DOI.  Unless otherwise noted, all tables within
   this document refer to IANA Assigned Numbers for the IPSEC DOI.

   All multi-octet binary values are stored in network byte order.

4.2 IPSEC Situation Definition

   Within ISAKMP, the Situation provides information that can be used by
   the responder to make a policy determination about how to process the
   incoming Security Association request.  For the IPSEC DOI, the
   Situation field is a four (4) octet bitmask with the following
   values.

       Situation                   Value
       ---------                   -----
       SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY           0x01
       SIT_SECRECY                 0x02
       SIT_INTEGRITY               0x04

   All other values are reserved to IANA.

4.2.1 SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY

   The SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY type specifies that the security association
   will be identified by source identity information present in an
   associated Identification Payload.  See Section 4.6.2 for a complete
   description of the various Identification types.  All IPSEC DOI
   implementations MUST support SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY by including an
   Identification Payload in at least one of the phase I Oakley
   exchanges ([IO], Section 5) and MUST abort any association setup that
   does not include an Identification Payload.

   If an initiator supports neither SIT_SECRECY nor SIT_INTEGRITY, the
   situation consists only of the 4 octet situation bitmap and does not
   include the Labeled Domain Identifier field (Figure 1, Section 4.6.1)
   or any subsequent label information.  Conversely, if the initiator
   supports either SIT_SECRECY or SIT_INTEGRITY, the Labeled Domain
   Identifier MUST be included in the situation payload.

4.2.2 SIT_SECRECY

   The SIT_SECRECY type specifies that the security association is being



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   negotiated in an environment that requires labeled secrecy.  If
   SIT_SECRECY is present in the Situation bitmap, the Situation field
   will be followed by variable-length data that includes a sensitivity
   level and compartment bitmask.  See Section 4.6.1 for a complete
   description of the Security Association Payload format.

   If an initiator does not support SIT_SECRECY, SIT_SECRECY MUST NOT be
   set in the Situation bitmap and no secrecy level or category bitmaps
   shall be included.

   If a responder does not support SIT_SECRECY, a SITUATION-NOT-
   SUPPORTED Notification Payload SHOULD be returned and the security
   association setup MUST be aborted.

4.2.3 SIT_INTEGRITY

   The SIT_INTEGRITY type specifies that the security association is
   being negotiated in an environment that requires labeled integrity.
   If SIT_INTEGRITY is present in the Situation bitmap, the Situation
   field will be followed by variable-length data that includes an
   integrity level and compartment bitmask.  If SIT_SECRECY is also in
   use for the association, the integrity information immediately
   follows the variable-length secrecy level and categories.  See
   section 4.6.1 for a complete description of the Security Association
   Payload format.

   If an initiator does not support SIT_INTEGRITY, SIT_INTEGRITY MUST
   NOT be set in the Situation bitmap and no integrity level or category
   bitmaps shall be included.

   If a responder does not support SIT_INTEGRITY, a SITUATION-NOT-
   SUPPORTED Notification Payload SHOULD be returned and the security
   association setup MUST be aborted.

4.3 IPSEC Security Policy Requirement

   The IPSEC DOI does not impose specific security policy requirements
   on any implementation.  Host system policy issues are outside of the
   scope of this document.

   However, the following sections touch on some of the issues that must
   be considered when designing an IPSEC DOI host implementation.  This
   section should be considered only informational in nature.

4.3.1 Key Management Issues

   It is expected that many systems choosing to implement ISAKMP will
   strive to provide a protected domain of execution for a combined



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   ISAKMP/Oakley key management daemon.  On protected-mode multiuser
   operating systems, this key management daemon will likely exist as a
   separate privileged process.

   In such an environment, a formalized API to introduce keying material
   into the TCP/IP kernel may be desirable.  The PF_KEY API [PFKEY] is
   an example of one such API that provides an abstracted key management
   interface.  The IP Security architecture does not place any
   requirements for structure or flow between a host TCP/IP kernel and
   its key management provider.

4.3.2 Static Keying Issues

   Host systems that implement static keys, either for use directly by
   IPSEC, or for authentication purposes (see [IO] Section 5.3), should
   take steps to protect the static keying material when it is not
   residing in a protected memory domain or actively in use by the
   TCP/IP kernel.

   For example, on a laptop, one might choose to store the static keys
   in a configuration store that is, itself, encrypted under a private
   password.

   Depending on the operating system and utility software installed, it
   may not be possible to protect the static keys once they've been
   loaded into the TCP/IP kernel, however they should not be trivially
   recoverable on initial system startup without having to satisfy some
   additional form of authentication.

4.3.3 Host Policy Issues

   It is not realistic to assume that the transition to IPSEC will occur
   overnight.  Host systems must be prepared to implement flexible
   policy lists that describe which systems they desire to speak
   securely with and which systems they require speak securely to them.
   Some notion of proxy firewall addresses may also be required.

   A minimal approach is probably a static list of IP addresses, network
   masks, and a security required flag or flags.

   A more flexible implementation might consist of a list of wildcard
   DNS names (e.g. '*.foo.bar'), an in/out bitmask, and an optional
   firewall address.  The wildcard DNS name would be used to match
   incoming or outgoing IP addresses, the in/out bitmask would be used
   to determine whether or not security was to be applied and in which
   direction, and the optional firewall address would be used to
   indicate whether or not tunnel mode would be needed to talk to the
   target system though an intermediate firewall.



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4.3.4 Certificate Management

   Host systems implementing a certificate-based authentication scheme
   will need a mechanism for obtaining and managing a database of
   certificates.

   Secure DNS is to be one certificate distribution mechanism, however
   the pervasive availability of secure DNS zones, in the short term, is
   doubtful for many reasons.  What's far more likely is that hosts will
   need an ability to import certificates that they acquire through
   secure, out-of-band mechanisms, as well as an ability to export their
   own certificates for use by other systems.

   However, manual certificate management should not be done so as to
   preclude the ability to introduce dynamic certificate discovery
   mechanisms and/or protocols as they become available.

   When an ISAKMP/Oakley exchange is authenticated using certificates
   (of any format), any ID's used for input to local policy decisions
   SHOULD be contained in the certificate used in the authentication of
   the exchange.

4.4 IPSEC Assigned Numbers

   The following sections list the Assigned Numbers for the IPSEC DOI
   Security Protocol Identifiers, Transform Identifiers, and Security
   Association Attribute Types.

4.4.1 IPSEC Security Protocol Identifiers

   The ISAKMP proposal syntax was specifically designed to allow for the
   simultaneous negotiation of multiple security protocol suites within
   a single negotiation.  As a result, the protocol suites listed below
   form the set of protocols that can be negotiated at the same time.
   It is a host policy decision as to what protocol suites might be
   negotiated together.

   The following table lists the values for the Security Protocol
   Identifiers referenced in an ISAKMP Proposal Payload for the IPSEC
   DOI.

       Protocol ID                         Value
       -----------                         -----
       RESERVED                            0
       PROTO_ISAKMP                        1
       PROTO_IPSEC_AH                      2
       PROTO_IPSEC_ESP                     3
       PROTO_IPCOMP                        4



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   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 5-248 are reserved
   to IANA.  Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

4.4.1.1 PROTO_ISAKMP

   The PROTO_ISAKMP type specifies message protection required during
   Phase I of the ISAKMP protocol.  The specific protection mechanism
   used for the IPSEC DOI is described in [IO].  All implementations
   within the IPSEC DOI MUST support PROTO_ISAKMP.

   NB: ISAKMP reserves the value one (1) across all DOI definitions.

4.4.1.2 PROTO_IPSEC_AH

   The PROTO_IPSEC_AH type specifies IP packet authentication.  The
   default AH transform provides data origin authentication, integrity
   protection, and replay prevention.  For export control
   considerations, confidentiality MUST NOT be provided by any
   PROTO_IPSEC_AH transform.

4.4.1.3 PROTO_IPSEC_ESP

   The PROTO_IPSEC_ESP type specifies IP packet confidentiality.
   Authentication, if required, must be provided as part of the ESP
   transform.  The default ESP transform includes data origin
   authentication, integrity protection, replay prevention, and
   confidentiality.

4.4.1.4 PROTO_IPCOMP

   The PROTO_IPCOMP type specifies IP packet compression.

4.4.2 IPSEC ISAKMP Transform Values

   As part of an ISAKMP Phase I negotiation, the initiator's choice of
   Key Exchange offerings is made using some host system policy
   description.  The actual selection of Key Exchange mechanism is made
   using the standard ISAKMP Proposal Payload.  The following table
   lists the defined ISAKMP Phase I Transform Identifiers for the
   Proposal Payload for the IPSEC DOI.

       Transform                           Value
       ---------                           -----
       RESERVED                            0
       KEY_OAKLEY                          1
       KEY_MANUAL                          2
       KEY_KDC                             3




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   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 4-248 are reserved
   to IANA.  Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

4.4.2.1 KEY_OAKLEY

   The KEY_OAKLEY type specifies the hybrid ISAKMP/Oakley Diffie-Hellman
   key exchange as defined in the [IO] document.  All implementations
   within the IPSEC DOI MUST support KEY_OAKLEY.

4.4.2.2 KEY_MANUAL

   The KEY_MANUAL type specifies that a shared secret key mechanism is
   to be used in lieu of a dynamic key mechanism.  Specific details of a
   static key establishment protocol will be described in a future
   document.

4.4.2.3 KEY_KDC

   The KEY_KDC type specifies that a secret-key based Key Distribution
   Center will be used to provide dynamic key exchange through a
   Kerberos-like ticket protocol.  Specific details of a KDC-based key
   establishment protocol will be described in a future document.

4.4.3 IPSEC AH Transform Values

   The Authentication Header Protocol (AH) defines one mandatory and
   several optional transforms used to provide authentication,
   integrity, and replay detection.  The following table lists the
   defined AH Transform Identifiers for the ISAKMP Proposal Payload for
   the IPSEC DOI.

       Transform ID                        Value
       ------------                        -----
       RESERVED                            0
       AH_MD5_KPDK                         1
       AH_MD5                              2
       AH_SHA                              3

   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 4-248 are reserved
   to IANA.  Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

4.4.3.1 AH_MD5_KPDK

   The AH_MD5_KPDK type specifies the AH transform (Key/Pad/Data/Key)
   described in RFC-1826.  This mode MAY be negotiated for compatibility
   with older implementations.  Implementations are not required to
   support this mode.




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4.4.3.2 AH_MD5

   The AH_MD5 type specifies a generic AH transform using MD5.  The
   actual protection suite is determined in concert with an associated
   SA attribute list.  A generic MD5 transform is currently undefined.

   All implementations within the IPSEC DOI MUST support AH_MD5 along
   with the HMAC(MD5) attribute.  This suite is defined as the HMAC-
   MD5-96 transform described in [HMACMD5].

4.4.3.3 AH_SHA

   The AH_SHA type specifies a generic AH transform using SHA-1.  The
   actual protection suite is determined in concert with an associated
   SA attribute list.  A generic SHA transform is currently undefined.

   All implementations within the IPSEC DOI are strongly encouraged to
   support AH_SHA along with the HMAC(SHA) attribute.  This suite is
   defined as the HMAC-SHA-1-96 transform described in [HMACSHA].

4.4.4 IPSEC ESP Transform Identifiers

   The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) defines one mandatory and
   many optional transforms used to provide data confidentiality.  The
   following table lists the defined ESP Transform Identifiers for the
   ISAKMP Proposal Payload for the IPSEC DOI.

       Transform ID                        Value
       ------------                        -----
       RESERVED                            0
       ESP_DES_IV64                        1
       ESP_DES                             2
       ESP_3DES                            3
       ESP_RC5                             4
       ESP_IDEA                            5
       ESP_CAST                            6
       ESP_BLOWFISH                        7
       ESP_3IDEA                           8
       ESP_DES_IV32                        9

   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 10-248 are reserved
   to IANA. Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

4.4.4.1 ESP_DES_IV64

   The ESP_DES_IV64 type specifies the DES-CBC transform defined in
   RFC-1827 and RFC-1829 using a 64-bit IV.  This mode MAY be negotiated
   for compatibility with older implementations.  Implementations are



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   not required to support this mode.

4.4.4.2 ESP_DES

   The ESP_DES type specifies a generic DES transform using DES-CBC.
   The actual protection suite is determined in concert with an
   associated SA attribute list.  A generic transform is currently
   undefined.

   All implementations within the IPSEC DOI MUST support ESP_DES along
   with the HMAC(MD5) attribute.  This suite is defined as the [DES]
   transform, with authentication and integrity provided by HMAC MD5.

4.4.4.3 ESP_3DES

   The ESP_3DES type specifies a generic triple-DES transform.  The
   actual protection suite is determined in concert with an associated
   SA attribute list.  The generic transform is currently undefined.

   All implementations within the IPSEC DOI are strongly encourage to
   support ESP_3DES along with the HMAC(MD5) attribute.  This suite is
   defined as the [3DES] transform, with authentication and integrity
   provided by HMAC MD5.

4.4.4.4 ESP_RC5

   The ESP_RC5 type specifies the RC5 transform defined in [RC5].

4.4.4.5 ESP_IDEA

   The ESP_IDEA type specifies the IDEA transform defined in [IDEA].

4.4.4.6 ESP_CAST

   The ESP_CAST type specifies the CAST transform defined in [CAST].

4.4.4.7 ESP_BLOWFISH

   The ESP_BLOWFISH type specifies the BLOWFISH transform defined in
   [BLOW].

4.4.4.8 ESP_3IDEA

   The ESP_3IDEA type is reserved for triple-IDEA.

4.4.4.9 ESP_DES_IV32

   The ESP_DES_IV32 type specifies the DES-CBC transform defined in



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   RFC-1827 and RFC-1829 using a 32-bit IV.  This mode MAY be negotiated
   for compatibility with older implementations.  Implementations are
   not required to support this mode.

4.4.5 IPSEC IPCOMP Transform Identifiers

   The IP Compression (IPCOMP) transforms define optional compression
   algorithms that can be negotiated to provide for IP compression
   before ESP encryption.  The following table lists the defined IPCOMP
   Transform Identifiers for the ISAKMP Proposal Payload within the
   IPSEC DOI.

       Transform ID                        Value
       ------------                        -----
       RESERVED                            0
       IPCOMP_OUI                          1
       IPCOMP_DEFLAT                       2
       IPCOMP_LZS                          3
       IPCOMP_V42BIS                       4

   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 5-248 are reserved
   to IANA. Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

4.4.5.1 IPCOMP_OUI

   The IPCOMP_OUI type specifies a proprietary compression transform.
   The IPCOMP_OUI type must be accompanied by an attribute which further
   identifies the specific vendor algorithm.

4.4.5.2 IPCOMP_DEFLATE

   The IPCOMP_DEFLATE type specifies the use of the "zlib" deflate
   algorithm.

4.4.5.3 IPCOMP_LZS

   The IPCOMP_LZS type specifies the use of the Stac Electronics LZS
   algorithm.

4.4.5.4 IPCOMP_V42BIS

   The IPCOMP_V42BIS type specifies the use of V42bis compression.

4.5 IPSEC Security Association Attributes

   The following SA attribute definitions are used in phase II of an
   ISAKMP/Oakley negotiation.  Attribute types can be either Basic (B)
   or Variable-Length (V).  Encoding of these attributes is defined in



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   the base ISAKMP specification.

       Attribute Types

             class               value           type
       -------------------------------------------------
       SA Life Type                1               B
       SA Life Duration            2               B/V
       Group Description           3               B
       Encapsulation Mode          4               B
       HMAC Algorithm              5               B
       Key Length                  6               B
       Key Rounds                  7               B
       Compress Dictionary Size    8               B
       Compress Private Algorithm  9               B/V

   The size of this field is two octets, with the high bit reserved for
   the ISAKMP B/V encoding.  The values 10-32000 are reserved to IANA.
   Values 32001-32767 are for experimental use.

       Class Values

         SA Life Type
         SA Duration

           Specifies the time-to-live for the overall security
           association.  When the SA expires, all keys negotiated
           under the association (AH or ESP) must be renegotiated.
           The life type values are:

           RESERVED                0
           seconds                 1
           kilobytes               2

           Values 3-61439 are reserved to IANA.  Values 61440-65535
           are for experimental use.  For a given Life Type, the
           value of the Life Duration attribute defines the actual
           length of the component lifetime -- either a number of
           seconds, or a number of Kbytes that can be protected.

           When the initiator and responder offer different SA life
           times, the shortest duration offered MUST be chosen.

           If unspecified, the default value shall be assumed to be
           28800 seconds (8 hours).

         Group Description
           RESERVED                0



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           default group           1

           Values 2-61439 are reserved to IANA.  Values 61440-65535
           are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

           This attribute is used for PFS Phase II negotiations.

           If unspecified, the default value shall be assumed to be
           the default Oakley group ([IO], Section 5.7.1).

         Encapsulation Mode
           RESERVED                0
           Tunnel                  1
           Transport               2

           Values 3-61439 are reserved to IANA.  Values 61440-65535
           are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

           If unspecified, the default value shall be assumed to be
           unspecified (host-dependent).

         HMAC Algorithm
           RESERVED                0
           MD5                     1
           SHA-1                   2

           Values 3-61439 are reserved to IANA.  Values 61440-65535
           are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

           There is no default value for HMAC Algorithm, as it
           must be specified to correctly identify the applicable
           AH or ESP transform.

         Key Length
           RESERVED                0

           There is no default value for Key Length, as it must be
           specified for transforms using ciphers with variable key
           lengths.

        Key Rounds
           RESERVED                0

           There is no default value for Key Rounds, as it must be
           specified for transforms using ciphers with varying
           numbers of rounds.

        Compression Dictionary Size



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           RESERVED                0

           Specifies the log2 maximum size of the dictionary.

           There is no default value for dictionary size.

        Compression Private Algorithm

           Specifies a private vendor compression algorithm.  The
           first three (3) octets must be an IEEE assigned company_id
           (OUI).  The next octet may be a vendor specific compression
           subtype, followed by zero or more octets of vendor data.

4.5.1 Required Attribute Support

   To ensure basic interoperability, all implementations MUST be
   prepared to negotiate all of the following attributes.

           SA Life Type
           SA Duration
           HMAC Algorithm

4.5.2 Attribute List Parsing Requirement

   To allow for flexible semantics, the IPSEC DOI requires that a
   conforming ISAKMP implementation MUST correctly parse an attribute
   list that contains multiple instances of the same attribute class, so
   long as the different attribute entries do not conflict with one
   another.

   To see why this is important, the following example shows the binary
   encoding of a four entry attribute list that specifies an Encryption
   Key Lifetime of either 100MB or 24 hours.  (See Section 3.3 of
   [ISAKMP] for a complete description of the attribute encoding
   format.)

     Attribute #1:
       0x80030001  (AF = 1, type = Enc Key Life Type, value = seconds)

     Attribute #2:
       0x00040004  (AF = 0, type = Enc Key Duration, length = 4 bytes)
       0x00015180  (value = 0x15180 = 86400 seconds = 24 hours)

     Attribute #3:
       0x80030002  (AF = 1, type = Enc Key Life Type, value = KB)

     Attribute #4:
       0x00040004  (AF = 0, type = Enc Key Duration, length = 4 bytes)



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       0x000186A0  (value = 0x186A0 = 100000KB = 100MB)

   If conflicting attributes are detected, an ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED
   Notification Payload SHOULD be returned and the security association
   setup MUST be aborted.

   4.5.3 Attribute Negotiation

   If an implementation receives a defined IPSEC DOI attribute (or
   attribute value) which it does not support, an ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORT
   SHOULD be sent and the security association setup MUST be aborted,
   unless the attribute value is in the reserved range.

   If an implementation receives an attribute value in the reserved
   range, an implementation MAY chose to continue based on local policy.

4.6 IPSEC Payload Content

   The following sections describe those ISAKMP payloads whose data
   representations are dependent on the applicable DOI.

4.6.1 Security Association Payload

   The following diagram illustrates the content of the Security
   Association Payload for the IPSEC DOI.  See Section 4.2 for a
   description of the Situation bitmap.

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !  Next Payload !   RESERVED    !        Payload Length         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !                Domain of Interpretation (IPSEC)               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !                       Situation (bitmap)                      !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !                    Labeled Domain Identifier                  !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !  Secrecy Length (in octets)   !           RESERVED            !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                        Secrecy Level                          ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! Secrecy Cat. Length (in bits) !           RESERVED            !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                    Secrecy Category Bitmap                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! Integrity Length (in octets)  !           RESERVED            !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                       Integrity Level                         ~



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   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ! Integ. Cat. Length (in bits)  !           RESERVED            !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                  Integrity Category Bitmap                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

               Figure 1: Security Association Payload Format

   The Security Association Payload is defined as follows:

     o  Next Payload (2 octets) - Identifier for the payload type of
        the next payload in the message.  If the current payload is
        the last in the message, this field will be zero (0).

     o  RESERVED (1 octet) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Payload Length (2 octets) - Length, in octets, of the current
        payload, including the generic header.

     o  Domain of Interpretation (4 octets) - Specifies the IPSEC DOI,
        which has been assigned the value one (1).

     o  Situation (4 octets) - Bitmask used to interpret the
        remainder of the Security Association Payload.  See Section
        4.2 for a complete list of values.

     o  Labeled Domain Identifier (4 octets) - IANA Assigned Number
        used to interpret the Secrecy and Integrity information.

     o  Secrecy Length (2 octets) - Specifies the length, in octets,
        of the secrecy level identifier.

     o  RESERVED (2 octets) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Secrecy Category Length (2 octets) - Specifies the length, in
        bits, of the secrecy category (compartment) bitmap, excluding
        pad bits.

     o  RESERVED (2 octets) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Secrecy Category Bitmap (variable length) - A bitmap used to
        designate secrecy categories (compartments) that are
        required.  The bitmap MUST be padded with zero (0) to the
        next 32-bit boundry.

     o  Integrity Length (2 octets) - Specifies the length, in
        octets, of the integrity level identifier.




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     o  RESERVED (2 octets) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Integrity Category Length (2 octets) - Specifies the length,
        in bits, of the integrity category (compartment) bitmap,
        excluding pad bits.

     o  RESERVED (2 octets) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Integrity Category Bitmap (variable length) - A bitmap used
        to designate integrity categories (compartments) that are
        required.  The bitmap MUST be padded with zero (0) to the
        next 32-bit boundry.

4.6.1.1 Labeled Domain Identifier Values

   The following table lists the assigned values for the Labeled Domain
   Identifier field contained in the Situation field of the Security
   Association Payload.

       Domain                              Value
       -------                             -----
       RESERVED                            0

   The values 1-0x7fffffff are reserved to IANA.  Values 0x8000000-
   0xffffffff are reserved for private use.

4.6.2 Identification Payload Content

   The Identification Payload is used to identify the initiator of the
   Security Association.  The identity of the initiator SHOULD be used
   by the responder to determine the correct host system security policy
   requirement for the association.  For example, a host might choose to
   require authentication and integrity without confidentiality (AH)
   from a certain set of IP addresses and full authentication with
   confidentiality (ESP) from another range of IP addresses.  The
   Identification Payload provides information that can be used by the
   responder to make this decision.

   The following diagram illustrates the content of the Identification
   Payload.

    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !  Next Payload !   RESERVED    !        Payload Length         !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   !   ID Type     !  Protocol ID  !             Port              !
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                     Identification Data                       ~



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   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                  Figure 2: Identification Payload Format

   The Identification Payload fields are defined as follows:

     o  Next Payload (2 octets) - Identifier for the payload type of
        the next payload in the message.  If the current payload is
        the last in the message, this field will be zero (0).

     o  RESERVED (1 octet) - Unused, must be zero (0).

     o  Payload Length (2 octets) - Length, in octets, of the
        identification data, including the generic header.

     o  Identification Type (1 octet) - Value describing the
        identity information found in the Identification Data field.

     o  Protocol ID (1 octet) - Value specifying an associated
        IP protocol ID (e.g. UDP/TCP).  A value of zero means that the
        Protocol ID field should be ignored.

     o  Port (2 octets) - Value specifying an associated port.
        A value of zero means that the Port field should be ignored.

     o  Identification Data (variable length) - Value, as indicated
        by the Identification Type.

4.6.2.1 Identification Type Values

   The following table lists the assigned values for the Identification
   Type field found in the Identification Payload.

       ID Type                             Value
       -------                             -----
       RESERVED                            0
       ID_IPV4_ADDR                        1
       ID_FQDN                             2
       ID_USER_FQDN                        3
       ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET                 4
       ID_IPV6_ADDR                        5
       ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET                 6
       ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE                  7
       ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE                  8
       ID_DER_ASN1_DN                      9
       ID_DER_ASN1_GN                      10

   The size of this field is one octet.  The values 11-248 are reserved



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   to IANA. Values 249-255 are reserved for private use.

   For types where the ID entity is variable length, the size of the ID
   entity is computed from size in the ID payload header.

4.6.2.2 ID_IPV4_ADDR

   The ID_IPV4_ADDR type specifies a single four (4) octet IPv4 address.

4.6.2.3 ID_FQDN

   The ID_FQDN type specifies a fully-qualified domain name string.  An
   example of a ID_FQDN is, "foo.bar.com".  The string should not
   contain any terminators.

4.6.2.4 ID_USER_FQDN

   The ID_USER_FQDN type specifies a fully-qualified username string, An
   example of a ID_USER_FQDN is, "piper@foo.bar.com".  The string should
   not contain any terminators.

4.6.2.5 ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET

   The ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET type specifies a range of IPv4 addresses,
   represented by two four (4) octet values.  The first value is an IPv4
   address.  The second is an IPv4 network mask.  Note that ones (1s) in
   the network mask indicate that the corresponding bit in the address
   is fixed, while zeros (0s) indicate a "wildcard" bit.

4.6.2.6 ID_IPV6_ADDR

   The ID_IPV6_ADDR type specifies a single sixteen (16) octet IPv6
   address.

4.6.2.7 ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET

   The ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET type specifies a range of IPv6 addresses,
   represented by two sixteen (16) octet values.  The first value is an
   IPv6 address.  The second is an IPv6 network mask.  Note that ones
   (1s) in the network mask indicate that the corresponding bit in the
   address is fixed, while zeros (0s) indicate a "wildcard" bit.

4.6.2.8 ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE

   The ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE type specifies a range of IPv4 addresses,
   represented by two four (4) octet values.  The first value is the
   beginning IPv4 address (inclusive) and the second value is the ending
   IPv4 address (inclusive).  All addresses falling between the two



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   specified addresses are considered to be within the list.

4.6.2.9 ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE

   The ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE type specifies a range of IPv6 addresses,
   represented by two sixteen (16) octet values.  The first value is the
   beginning IPv6 address (inclusive) and the second value is the ending
   IPv6 address (inclusive).  All addresses falling between the two
   specified addresses are considered to be within the list.

4.6.2.10 ID_DER_ASN1_DN

   The ID_DER_ASN1_DN type specifies the binary DER encoding of an ASN.1
   X.500 Distinguished Name [X.501] of the principal whose certificates
   are being exchanged to establish the SA.

4.6.2.11 ID_DER_ASN1_GN

   The ID_DER_ASN1_GN type specifies the binary DER encoding of an ASN.1
   X.500 GeneralName [X.509] of the principal whose certificates are
   being exchanged to establish the SA.

4.7 IPSEC Key Exchange Requirements

   The IPSEC DOI introduces no additional Key Exchange types.

5. Security Considerations

   This entire draft pertains to a negotiated key management protocol,
   combining Oakley ([OAKLEY]) with ISAKMP ([ISAKMP]), which negotiates
   and derives keying material for security associations in a secure and
   authenticated manner.  Specific discussion of the various security
   protocols and transforms identified in this document can be found in
   the associated base documents and in the cipher references.

Acknowledgements

   This document is derived, in part, from previous works by Douglas
   Maughan, Mark Schertler, Mark Schneider, Jeff Turner, Dan Harkins,
   and Dave Carrel.  Matt Thomas, Roy Pereira, and Greg Carter also
   contributed suggestions and, in many cases, text.

References

   [AH] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header," draft-ietf-
   ipsec-auth-05.txt.

   [ESP] Kent, S., Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload



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   (ESP)," draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-04.txt.

   [BLOW] Adams, R., "The ESP Blowfish-CBC Algorithm Using an Explicit
   IV," draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-blowfish-cbc-00.txt.

   [CAST] Pereira, R., Carter, G., "The ESP CAST128-CBC Algorithm,"
   draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-cast128-cbc-00.txt.

   [DES] Madson, C., Doraswamy, N., "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm
   With Explicit IV," draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-des-expiv-00.txt.

   [3DES] Pereira, R., Thayer, R., "The ESP 3DES-CBC Algorithm Using an
   Explicit IV," draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-3des-expiv-00.txt.

   [HMACMD5] Oehler, M., Glenn, R., "HMAC-MD5-96 IP Authentication with
   Replay Prevention," draft-ietf-ipsec-ah-hmac-md5-96-00.txt.

   [HMACSHA] Chang, S., Glenn, R., "HMAC-SHA-1-96 IP Authentication with
   Replay Prevention," draft-ietf-ipsec-ah-hmac-sha-1-96-00.txt.

   [IDEA] Adams, R., "The ESP IDEA-CBC Algorithm Using Explicit IV,"
   draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-idea-cbc-00.txt.

   [IO] Harkins, D., Carrel, D., "The Resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley,"
   draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-04.txt.

   [ISAKMP] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and Turner, J.,
   "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP),"
   draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-07.{ps,txt}.

   [OAKLEY] H. K. Orman, "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol,"
   draft-ietf-ipsec-oakley-01.txt.

   [ROADMAP] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., Glenn, R., "IP Security
   Documentation Roadmap," draft-ietf-ipsec-doc-roadmap-00.txt.

   [PFKEY] McDonald, D. L., Metz, C. W., Phan, B. G., "PF_KEY Key
   Management API, Version 2", draft-mcdonald-pf-key-v2-03.txt.

   [RC5] Pereira, R., Baldwin, R., "The ESP RC5-CBC Transform," draft-
   ietf-ipsec-ciph-rc5-cbc-00.txt.

   [X.501] ISO/IEC 9594-2, "Information Technology - Open Systems
   Interconnection - The Directory:  Models", CCITT/ITU Recommendation
   X.501, 1993.

   [X.509] ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information Technology - Open Systems
   Interconnection - The Directory:  Authentication Framework",



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   CCITT/ITU Recommendation X.509, 1993.

Author's Address:

   Derrell Piper <piper@cisco.com>
   cisco Systems
   101 Cooper St.
   Santa Cruz, California, 95060
   United States of America
   +1 408 457-5384









































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