Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-08
Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 07 June 2022 13:06 UTC
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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2022 09:06:38 -0400
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To: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>
Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification for draft-mglt-ipsecme-diet-esp-08
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Yes, that what I then realized while reading the first email. At that point a document is needed wich could be pretty straight forward I believe. Yours, Daniel On Tue, Jun 7, 2022 at 8:50 AM Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> wrote: > > > On 6/7/22 08:43, Daniel Migault wrote: > > > > On Tue, Jun 7, 2022 at 8:14 AM Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com> > wrote: > >> Daniel, >> >> Back at it, now that ASTM is behind me... >> >> what will it take to bring this in line with SCHC. I don't know SCHC >> well enough to pick up the differences. >> >> We are basically balancing re-using a framework used / standardized by > the IETF versus defining our own framework. So it is just to remain more > aligned or coherent with what the IETF does. > > >> What will it take to add AES-GCM-12 to supported ciphers by IKE (and >> thus ESP)? For my use case, I have a hard time seeing why I need a >> 16-byte ICV. Even an 30 min operation with streaming video is a limited >> number of packets. I am going to talk to my contact at DJI to see what >> information they are willing to share... >> > > I think we do not enable compression of the signature as the security > implications are too hard to catch. When an reduced ICV is needed, there is > a need to define the transform. In your case rfc4106 seems to address your > concern with a 12 and even 8 byte ICV. > > > I was not clear. A 8750 IIV-AES-GCM-12 cipher... > > > > > > >> >> Bob >> >> On 5/16/22 16:47, Robert Moskowitz wrote: >> > Thanks, Daniel for the update. >> > >> > Now some comments. >> > >> > The necessary state is held within the IPsec Security Association >> and >> > >> > The document specifies the necessary parameters of the EHC Context to >> > allow compression of ESP and the most common included protocols, such >> > as IPv4, IPv6, UDP and TCP and the corresponding EHC Rules. >> > >> > Should any reference be made to cipher compression? At least >> > reference to 8750? Or since this is just the abs >> > >> > It also >> > defines the Diet-ESP EHC Strategy which compresses up to 32 bytes per >> > packet for traditional IPv6 VPN and up to 66 bytes for IPv6 VPN sent >> > over a single TCP or UDP session. >> > >> > >> > In UDP transport I am reducing 18 bytes (assuming cipher with zero >> > padding) to 4 bytes. Also worth noting here... >> > >> > >> > On the other hand, in IoT >> > communications, sending extra bytes can significantly impact the >> > battery life of devices and thus the life time of the device. The >> > document describes a framework that optimizes the networking overhead >> > associated to IPsec/ESP for these devices. >> > >> > >> > You say nothing about constrained comm links. This compression may >> > make ESP viable over links like LoRaWAN. >> > >> > ESP Header Compression (EHC) chooses another form of context >> > agreement, which is similar to the one defined by Static Context >> > Header Compression (SCHC). >> > >> > Reference rfc 8724. >> > >> > And more than 'similar"? Maybe "based on the one"? >> > >> > The context >> > itself can be negotiated during the key agreement, which allows only >> > minimal the changes to the actual ESP implementation. >> > >> > I don't get this. What only allows minimal changes? The key >> > agreement protocol or ECH? If the later then perhaps: >> > >> > The context >> > itself can be negotiated during the key agreement, which then needs >> > only >> > minimal the changes to the actual ESP implementation. >> > >> > More for introduction: >> > >> > Perhaps you can add that in transport mode, an SA may be for a single >> > transport/port to tune the ECH for that use and that multiple SAs >> > could be negotiated for this case. >> > >> > Question: Can a single IKE exchange produce multiple SAs? >> > >> > Here is my use case: >> > >> > Between the UA and GCS are two flows. One for Command and Control >> > (C2) the other streaming video. Both over UDP, but different ports. >> > So instead of having carry the UDP ports in all the messages, >> > negotiate separate SAs with the appropriate ECH. >> > >> > Ah, I see this in Sec 5. You should say something about this in the >> > intro. >> > >> > sec 4. >> > >> > EHC is able to compress any protocol encapsulated in ESP and ESP >> > itself. >> > >> > No really true per other claims. Does it offer compressing RTP? I >> > need that, probably, for my streaming video app. >> > >> > to compress any IP and transport protocol... >> > >> > And only TCP and UDP are shown, what about, say, SCTP? >> > >> > BTW, I note that you use 'IKEv2'. At this point is that really >> > needed? Should just IKE be enough? Has not IKEv1 been depreicated? >> > >> > 6. EHC Context >> > >> > >> > The EHC Context is defined on a per-SA basis. A context can be >> > defined for any protocol encapsulated with ESP and for ESP itself. >> > >> > Should that be "any IP or Transport protocol"? To exclude layer 5 >> > protocols (CoAP, RTP,,,)? >> > >> > Layer 5 protocols SHOULD be via standard SCHC with the SCHC Rule ID >> > included... >> > >> > Or maybe 'typically'? As some layer 5 might be easy? RTP maybe? >> > >> > So this is it for this round of comments. I am looking at Appdx A and >> > making a UDP example. Including IIV. >> > >> > Bob >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > IPsec mailing list >> > IPsec@ietf.org >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec >> >> _______________________________________________ >> IPsec mailing list >> IPsec@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec >> > > > -- > Daniel Migault > Ericsson > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing listIPsec@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > > -- Daniel Migault Ericsson
- [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-mg… Daniel Migault
- [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification for dr… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Robert Moskowitz
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Daniel Migault
- Re: [IPsec] Comments: New Version Notification fo… Paul Wouters