Re: [IPsec] Comments about draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-02

Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> Thu, 10 May 2018 16:53 UTC

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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 12:53:05 -0400
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To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Cc: IPsecME WG <ipsec@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Comments about draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-02
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Hi Tero,

Thanks for the response. Version 4 of the draft has been updated with this
alternative.

Yours,
Daniel

On Thu, May 10, 2018 at 10:53 AM, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> wrote:

> Daniel Migault writes:
> > another alternative could be:
> >
> > As the IV MUST NOT repeat for one SA when Counter-Mode ciphers are
> >    used, Implicit IV as described in this document MUST NOT be used in
> >    setups with the chance that the Sequence Number overlaps for one SA.
> >    Multicast as described in [RFC5374], [RFC6407] and
> >    [I-D.yeung-g-ikev2] is a prominent example, where many senders share
> >    one secret and thus one SA.  As
> >    such, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use Implicit IV with Multicast.
>
> I would actually prefer to this. I think it is better to say don't do
> it, than provide ways it could be done before saying don't do it....
>
> I.e., if someone is interested in this then we need to write new
> specification that will specify how it is done, so there is no point
> of speculating here what it could be.
> --
> kivinen@iki.fi
>
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