Reminder, poll on header insertion closes soon

Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com> Wed, 02 November 2016 21:20 UTC

Return-Path: <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AE11512996A for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 2 Nov 2016 14:20:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.276
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.276 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_GREY=0.424] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id b2cp_V20j3ji for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 2 Nov 2016 14:20:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qt0-x233.google.com (mail-qt0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400d:c0d::233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3BF8A1298A3 for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Wed, 2 Nov 2016 14:20:15 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-qt0-x233.google.com with SMTP id w33so16934218qtc.3 for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:20:15 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc:message-id:references :to; bh=IEeCuYE08lB2/PPekSm7Pz1xHLNiB6HQ8iZAehRLYvs=; b=u1wD+sds5mi4oZzL3imAD8B4bDBHldAnfgNJVvX2+Wn4VS+0xWh05r7QO7FUV7ZzT5 8MAh2witERlYMCpRbqbWfbF61C/KnhS4c6MCetKKDIiFJYoYUO3yGoZ8tzG0Hb3Z5nNW X7Np4ujzqwv/os3BqxxIQYLIwzSbIiNc6l8lMVFc4EO/6jYHUz4lj574SEp0qh2YDyu0 ZOZziueROtWxbBJhFmyehDoH6yCZqijeOyMZ4Y/5/JMS7OI0doYWDHrsfaTYZKlEpwL9 dxVhDWGNl+nq52VX5MXaeIhuXyL0JOvwIkJOuAvJT2HzPkOShFd/lXhsUPdiUTryzPRJ PU1Q==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :message-id:references:to; bh=IEeCuYE08lB2/PPekSm7Pz1xHLNiB6HQ8iZAehRLYvs=; b=gtZy30KreUJCbVjkQyEN+NAdnxpv85rK7HYKbj+k3OsXWZoYeIfEXLkOkU+K7uR9jf yIOuAPHwfZPCmV/zD8BqGmOFt4Aya4xLXdsOXlbJcrFU0KiuOjTVDLWXQKdhDqWvLoZd NvYXp9UcReaMxp+ipYBQvfHCYuPe3UwY4LRNCu0e3k41hW2aUP1/2WY5WLYJfdKGkDDq VCtPfO4bEZMpdF4lLgPYATr7fEBwokukx6Qnhdje2dqaf4/3RdCDYxwEq+kgyjKCM0Az VmEzCoLhoofyRBjHmvfb5MBsXWPL6cFt/Xnw8RnpEyA/9boNEq0/LIgjK+8SgTfaxVQa NQJA==
X-Gm-Message-State: ABUngvcd+3FolLXENPxtD4nzhDIKV5dVP6rzVb4kAX83movJmVz3epG/A7foNGK1cjGJOg==
X-Received: by 10.200.47.110 with SMTP id k43mr4759919qta.112.1478121614279; Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:20:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [172.16.224.219] ([209.97.127.34]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g63sm2247005qkf.47.2016.11.02.14.20.12 (version=TLS1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:20:13 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_B93F8FC4-D6ED-4B78-9303-2CDC39CAE401"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha512"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 \(2104\))
Subject: Reminder, poll on header insertion closes soon
From: Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <B291E9E6-A803-423F-BFA5-87A74DCFB784@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2016 14:20:09 -0700
Message-Id: <F00C237B-F690-4CDE-A218-A16FEA9EA8A8@gmail.com>
References: <B291E9E6-A803-423F-BFA5-87A74DCFB784@gmail.com>
To: IPv6 List <ipv6@ietf.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2104)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipv6/KkksXqx_15jD6E97fKMpLkwZW1U>
Cc: Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
X-BeenThere: ipv6@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "IPv6 Maintenance Working Group \(6man\)" <ipv6.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipv6/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipv6@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2016 21:20:16 -0000

If you haven’t yet, please fill in the poll, it closes on November 4, 2016.

Thanks,
Bob


> On Oct 27, 2016, at 12:02 PM, Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> The chairs believe the bis drafts for moving the IPv6 to Internet Standard are close to being done with one exception, text in rfc2460bis on Extension Header Insertion.  This topic has been discussed extensively on the list and in working group sessions.  Prior to declaring a consensus and advancing the documents to the IESG we would like some feedback from the working group.
> 
> The current text regarding header insertion in draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-07.txt (and has been there since the -05) is:
> 
>  The insertion of Extension Headers by any node other than the source
>  of the packet breaks PMTU-discovery and can result in ICMP error
>  messages being sent to the source of the packet that did not insert
>  the header.
> 
>  The current approach to allowing a header to be inserted is to
>  encapsulate the packet using another IPv6 header and including the
>  additional extension header after the first IPv6 header, for example,
>  as defined in [RFC2473].
> 
> Based on recent face to face and mailing list discussions, we think the text could be improved as follows:
> 
>  The insertion of Extension Headers by any node other than the source
>  of the packet causes serious problems.  Two examples include breaking
>  the integrity checks provided by the Authentication Header Integrity
>  [RFC4302], and breaking Path MTU Discovery and can
>  result in ICMP error messages being sent to the source of the packet
>  that did not insert the header.
> 
>  One approach to avoid these problems is to encapsulate the packet
>  using another IPv6 header and including the additional extension header
>  after the first IPv6 header, for example, as defined in [RFC2473]
> 
> The change in the first paragraph is more accurate as it notes there is more than one problem.  The change in the second paragraph makes it clear that encapsulation isn’t necessarily the only approach.
> 
> Our current take after reviewing the discussion in Berlin and on the mailing list we think there is consensus on the first paragraph as it accurately describes the issue with header insertion.  There is a much rougher consensus on the second paragraph, but don’t see it as the real issue which is the first paragraph.
> 
> While we both think that the intent of IPv6 was not to support header insertion we don’t see there being a consensus in the working group ban it outright as was proposed in the -01 draft:
> 
>  Extension headers must never be inserted by any node other than the
>  source of the packet.  IP Encapsulation must be used to meet any
>  requirement for inserting headers, for example, as defined in
>  [RFC2473].
> 
> We think the choice before the working group at this point is to either do something like the proposed text, or to not say anything at all about this topic.  This would be no change from RFC2460.   We would like your feedback on these choices between now and 13 October.  We have created a survey so we can better gauge where the working group is.  We are hoping that by using the survey, we will get more responses then by email alone.
> 
> To summarize, we think there are three choices.
> 
> (A) Banning header insertion outright:
> 
>  Extension headers must never be inserted by any node other than the
>  source of the packet.  IP Encapsulation must be used to meet any
>  requirement for inserting headers, for example, as defined in
>  [RFC2473].
> 
> (B) Describe the problems caused by header insertion:
> 
>  The insertion of Extension Headers by any node other than the source
>  of the packet causes serious problems.  Two examples include breaking
>  the integrity checks provided by the Authentication Header Integrity
>  [RFC4302], and breaking Path MTU Discovery and can
>  result in ICMP error messages being sent to the source of the packet
>  that did not insert the header.
> 
>  One approach to avoid these problems is to encapsulate the packet
>  using another IPv6 header and including the additional extension header
>  after the first IPv6 header, for example, as defined in [RFC2473]
> 
> (C) Not say anything at all about header insertion in rfc2460bis
> 
>  [No text in rfc2460bis about header insertion]
> 
> Note: If in case (B) or (C), it might be good to write a new draft that describes the issue in depth and makes recommendations.  We could then see if we can build a consensus around a draft like that, but it would be separate from the effort to move the IPv6 specifications to Internet Standard.
> 
> Please fill in the poll at
> 
>    https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/QG5QPVR
> 
> before November 4, 2016.  The poll allows you to express you preference for each choice, with 1 being the highest preference, and 3 being the lowest.  We will publish the results after the poll closes.
> 
> Thanks,
> Bob & Ole
> 
> 
> 
>