Re: 3484bis and privacy addresses

Ray Hunter <v6ops@globis.net> Fri, 06 April 2012 09:30 UTC

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Date: Fri, 06 Apr 2012 11:30:05 +0200
From: Ray Hunter <v6ops@globis.net>
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To: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: 3484bis and privacy addresses
References: <4F716D5C.40402@innovationslab.net> <4F71F217.7000209@globis.net> <454A16E4DA86094EB66BB2C1DBBBC0180796978B@XMB-BGL-41B.cisco.com>
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Cc: "Prashanth Patil \(praspati\)" <praspati@cisco.com>, Brian Haberman <brian@innovationslab.net>, ipv6@ietf.org
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Interesting draft. Thanks.

The elephant in the room is that DHCPv6 clients are still not deployed 
on all end nodes that would benefit from it.

Many other 6man drafts, such as draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt-03 also 
rely on DHCPv6.

Let's hope that the market now manages toquickly resolve what the IETF 
has not managed to resolve in over 10 years of discussion, and selects a 
universally available communication channel for passing configuration 
hints between the network and end nodes that move between networks.

Otherwise changing default behavior (like being discussed in the update 
from 3484 to 3484bis), or implementing new features in 6man, will likely 
make migration to IPv6 duringdual stack operation harder, or break 
existing stuff, or both.

regards,
RayH

> Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy) <mailto:tireddy@cisco.com>
> 5 April 2012 08:59
>
> Firewall policies are moving towards identity (user, user-group) + 
> context (location, Bring your Own Device (BYOD)) attributes to enforce 
> appropriate policies. In enterprises hosts with EAP kind of 
> supplicants can be tracked even when the IP changes but for guests, 
> BYOD without such supplicants IP address based authentication is still 
> required and for such users, switches acting as DHCP relay agent can 
> influence the DHCP server not to assign temporary addresses 
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-mif-dhcpv6-precedence-ops-00)
>
> Regards
>
> Tiru.
>
> *From:*ipv6-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipv6-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf 
> Of *Ray Hunter
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 27, 2012 10:30 PM
> *To:* Brian Haberman
> *Cc:* ipv6@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: 3484bis and privacy addresses
>
> From the corporate World: option A as default, with local user 
> controlled option to override.
>
> RFC3484 (which references RFC3041) "Temporary addresses" are a menace 
> to fault finding, audit, logging, firewall rules, filtering, QoS 
> matching, conformance: anywhere where an ACL or stable address is used 
> today. Sure we shouldn't use fixed/stable IP literals, but we do. And 
> in many cases there aren't any practical alternatives in today's 
> products, so the IP address is the lowest common denominator used to 
> identify a machine (and dare I say even "a user" in some circumstances).
>
> Also not sure if any DHCPv6 server implementations actually provide 
> DHCPv6 assigned temporary addresses in practice.
>
> My take on this is that a set of a few hundred individual persons who 
> are worried about privacy are more likely to be able to control their 
> own particular machines to correctly override the "default off" 
> setting than a single corporate network manager is to be able to 
> guarantee overriding a "default on" setting on 100% of 10000 machines 
> attached to their network.
>
> regards,
> RayH
>
> Brian Haberman wrote:
>
> <div class="moz-text-flowed">All,
>      The chairs would like to get a sense of the working group on 
> changing the current (defined 3484) model of preferring public 
> addresses over privacy addresses during the address selection 
> process.  RFC 3484 prefers public addresses with the ability (MAY) of 
> an implementation to reverse the preference.  The suggestion has been 
> made to reverse that preference in 3484bis (prefer privacy addresses 
> over public ones). Regardless, the document will allow 
> implementers/users to reverse the default preference.
>
>      Please state your preference for one of the following default 
> options :
>
> A. Prefer public addresses over privacy addresses
>
> B. Prefer privacy addresses over public addresses
>
> Regards,
> Brian, Bob, & Ole
>
> </div>
>
> -- 
>
> Ray Hunter <mailto:Ray.Hunter@globis.net>
> 27 March 2012 19:00
> From the corporate World: option A as default, with local user 
> controlled option to override.
>
> RFC3484 (which references RFC3041) "Temporary addresses" are a menace 
> to fault finding, audit, logging, firewall rules, filtering, QoS 
> matching, conformance: anywhere where an ACL or stable address is used 
> today. Sure we shouldn't use fixed/stable IP literals, but we do. And 
> in many cases there aren't any practical alternatives in today's 
> products, so the IP address is the lowest common denominator used to 
> identify a machine (and dare I say even "a user" in some circumstances).
>
> Also not sure if any DHCPv6 server implementations actually provide 
> DHCPv6 assigned temporary addresses in practice.
>
> My take on this is that a set of a few hundred individual persons who 
> are worried about privacy are more likely to be able to control their 
> own particular machines to correctly override the "default off" 
> setting than a single corporate network manager is to be able to 
> guarantee overriding a "default on" setting on 100% of 10000 machines 
> attached to their network.
>
> regards,
> RayH
>
>