Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-09.txt> (Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values) to Informational RFC

The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> Wed, 26 August 2015 14:00 UTC

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-09.txt> (Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values) to Informational RFC
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Sender: iesg-secretary@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20150826140047.6790.68763.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 07:00:47 -0700
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipv6/OJ3p19GLqCKHpMCGsRoNcCxgDFs>
Cc: ipv6@ietf.org
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org

The IESG has received a request from the IPv6 Maintenance WG (6man) to
consider the following document:
- 'Security Implications of Predictable Fragment Identification Values'
  <draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-09.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2015-09-09. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   IPv6 specifies the Fragment Header, which is employed for the
   fragmentation and reassembly mechanisms.  The Fragment Header
   contains an "Identification" field which, together with the IPv6
   Source Address and the IPv6 Destination Address of a packet,
   identifies fragments that correspond to the same original datagram,
   such that they can be reassembled together by the receiving host.
   The only requirement for setting the "Identification" field is that
   the corresponding value must be different than that employed for any
   other fragmented packet sent recently with the same Source Address
   and Destination Address.  Some implementations use a simple global
   counter for setting the Identification field, thus leading to
   predictable Identification values.  This document analyzes the
   security implications of predictable Identification values, and
   provides implementation guidance for selecting the Identification
   field of the Fragment Header, such that the aforementioned security
   implications are mitigated.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-… The IESG