Re: Questions regarding the security mechanisms//RE: CRH and RH0

"Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com> Sat, 16 May 2020 15:40 UTC

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Subject: Re: Questions regarding the security mechanisms//RE: CRH and RH0
To: "Xiejingrong (Jingrong)" <xiejingrong@huawei.com>, Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>, Ron Bonica <rbonica=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: 6man <6man@ietf.org>, Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
References: <23488ea0d4eb474c9d7155086f940dae@huawei.com> <006c01d62aa1$8c195520$a44bff60$@com> <DM6PR05MB634863122645FD4981B97F71AEBD0@DM6PR05MB6348.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> <CALx6S35thGuTgTmCFozU=3MULW8V95OwA5GdqQ7OGrA-agR7Hw@mail.gmail.com> <891ccad03b484c7386ab527d89143f8c@huawei.com>
From: "Joel M. Halpern" <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Message-ID: <f4316f15-496b-718f-2ea6-f2630eec2a8d@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 11:40:37 -0400
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Maybe I am confused, but theCRH security requirements are almost the 
same security criteria we accepted (and the Security ADs accepted) for 
SRH.  These objections would apply equally to SRH.

Yours,
Joel

On 5/16/2020 2:36 AM, Xiejingrong (Jingrong) wrote:
> <...snip the redundant text, see the in-line reply marked with [XJR]>
> Hi!
> 
> That raises an interesting question. Can a protocol specification have a normative MUST requirement for correctness or security that is dependent on completely external properties? If this is saying that the ACLs are implemented as part of the CRH datapath then tht might be reasonable, but if this is saying that ACLs must be deployed at every possible edge node outside of the CRH processing that doesn't seem like it could be a MUST in a protocol specification (and this might be coming close to the general but effectively useless requirement that the underlying network MUST be secure and correct for the protocol to be secure and correct).
> 
> [XJR] Good catch that "ACLs must be deployed at every possible edge node outside of the CRH processing" makes it difficult to deployable.
> [XJR] But If this "MUST" is weaken to any extent, I am afraid the said RFC5095 attack could be from Internet.
> 
> Also, I think you might want to mention that AH should be used to protect the routing header when security is a concern. AH is part of the protocol suite and doesn't depend on external factors other than what's happening at the end points. Normative requirements are appropriate for security via AH.
> 
> [XJR] Agreed that AH could help to ensure the Source is from a legitimate source as RFC8754 HMAC does. But there is no mandatory AH/HMAC in this draft.
> [XJR] Once an attack packet pass through the border router, there is no additional protection like the "complemented per-node protection" in RFC8754 section 5.1.
> 
> Thanks
> Jingrong
> 
> Tom
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