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Eric,

See response, inline [RB].

I will post an updated version tonight so that you can clear your discuss.

                               Ron



Juniper Business Use Only

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Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2024 3:16 PM
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Subject: =C9ric Vyncke's Discuss on draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-08: (with =
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Please refer to https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/about/grou=
ps/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxm=
xqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmcjnBaXmI$
for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
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n-comp-rtg-hdr/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ=
_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmcZZQBom0$



----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


# =C9ric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-08

Thank you for the work put into this document. I do like the idea of
compressing SRH-like header, but the document has room for improvements.

Please find below some blocking DISCUSS points (easy to address), some
non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated even if only =
for
my own education), and some nits.

Special thanks to Bob Hinden for the shepherd's detailed write-up including=
 the
WG consensus *but* it lacks the justification of the intended status (and I=
MHO
experimental is the right one).

I hope that this review helps to improve the document,

Regards,

-=E9ric

# DISCUSS (blocking)

As noted in https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-=
iesg-ballot-positions/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqS=
aGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmcZOFq8Vg$ , a
DISCUSS ballot is a request to have a discussion on the following topics:

## Section 5

`Decrement the IPv6 Hop Limit.` what do to when hop limit is 0 ? Is there a
deviation from RFC 8200 section 3, else why repeating this step ?

[RB] Agree. IPv6 already decrements the Hop Limit as it processes the base =
IPv6 header. So, decrementing it again would be a bad thing. I have removed=
 that step

## Section 7

It is not clear to me why this document needs to make an allowance for
intermediate nodes (sic) that verify transport layer checksums. Transport l=
ayer
checksums are expected to be verified by the Transport layer endpoints and =
not
in the network. So since when the Internet architecture has changed to take
care of `it prevents intermediate nodes from verifying transport layer
checksums`? Actual references are required for such statement. And,
explanations should be given whether this "sentence" helps RFC 7258 pervasi=
ve
monitoring perhaps in the security considerations section.

[RB] Agree. I have removed section 7 in its entirety.

## Section 11

While not a real DISCUSS criteria, I am really surprised to see an IPv4-lik=
e
notation for CRH SID.

[RB] Why not? IPv4-like is a convenient notation for 32-bit values. Is ther=
e a reason not to like it? Can you propose an alternaive?

## Section 12

As AH is end-to-end, intermediate nodes do not have the shared secret, henc=
e
`The CRH is not compatibile with AH processing at intermediate nodes.` is
useless and confusing. Please remove. Very similar to the DISCUSS about sec=
tion
7.

[RB] Agree. I have removed that sentence


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


# COMMENTS (non-blocking)

## Abstract

Can we really write `deployed` for an experimental I-D?

[RB] The purpose of any IETF experiment is to demonstrate that something ca=
n be deployed. You might want to deploy in a risk-free environment at first=
. But if you don't demonstrate deployability, why bother.

## Section 1

s/to its destination/to its destination(s)/ (think multicast/anycast). Twic=
e in
the section ;)

[RB] Done

Suggest to move the motivation to its own section.

[RB] I am going to push back on this. If we did that, the introduction woul=
d contain only one paragraph.


## Section 3

Any recommendation on when to do `The first CRH SID in the path can be omit=
ted
from the list.`?

[RB] Changed the sentence to read "The first CRH SID in the path is omitted=
 from the list unless there is some reason to preserve it."

What is the expected behavior of any CRH-aware router and final node(s) whe=
n
`the Type- specific data field MUST be padded with zeros` is not respected =
?

[RB] If it is padded with non-zero data, there should be no problem. CRH pr=
ocessing does not inspect padding values.

[RB] If it is not padded at all, IPv6 will not be able to find the beginnin=
g of the header following the CRH and the packet will be dropped.

[RB] I don't think that we need to mention this because it is generic IPv6 =
behavior and not specific to CRH.


## Section 4

Can the IPv6 address in the CRH-FIB be a link-local or multicast or can onl=
y be
a unicast ? Section 5 gives some more explanations, but an early one would =
be
better.

[RB] Added the following:

[RB]
The IPv6 address can be a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Link Local Unicas=
t address (LLU), or a
Unique Local Address (ULA). When the IPv6 address is the final address in a=
 path,
it can also be a multicast address.


## Section 5

The first bullet can probably be removed as it is the normal behavior of an=
y
IPv6 node per RFC 8200.

[RB] Done

`If Hdr Ext Len indicates that the CRH is larger than the implementation ca=
n
process, ` suggest using code 6 per
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-paramet=
ers/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml*icmpv6-parameters-codes-5__;Iw!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJ=
oms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmc25Y-Tx=
M$

[RB] Done

While wasting octets with too large CRH (i.e., larger than the minimum leng=
th)
is a bad thing, does it deserve to discard the packet on transit ? Why not
requesting the source to enforce this mimimum length?

[RB] This is defensive coding. The source may be buggy or hostile. If the C=
RH is malformed, the processing node should attempt to access bits beyond t=
he end of it. This could cause a router to crash.

`If the search does not return a CRH-FIB entry` is the code 0 the most suit=
able
code ? If not, why not creating one ? Or even using ICMPv6 code 1 'destinat=
ion
unreachable' ?

[RB] I'm going to push back on this. Destination Unreachable isn't appropri=
ate because it suggests that the destination in the base IPv6 header isn't =
reachable. That isn't the case. I could create a new code, but I don't want=
 to clutter up the registry with experimental stuff. So, parameter problem =
is good enough for now

`If Segments Left is greater than 0` this will always be the case per first
bullet `If Segments Left equals 0` ;-)

[RB] Not true. Segments left was decremented two steps above.

The reader will welcome a justification of `CRH-FIB entry contains a multic=
ast
address, discard the packet and`.

[RB] Added a parenthetic comment that this prevents packet storms.

## Section 6

I guess that this is linked to RFC 4302 (AH), so, please state this clearly=
.

[RB] Yes, RFC 4302 demands that this section is present. But do we really n=
eed another reference back to RFC 4302?

## Section 7

Is it about `Destination Address Transparency` or privacy ?

[RB] This section was deleted in response to your previous comment.

## Section 8

`Each CRH SID is processed by exactly one node.` isn't it rather "Each CRH =
SID
is processed by exactly one CRH-configured router whose one address matches=
 the
packet destination address" ?

[RB] Done

## Section 9

The title should rather be "operational considerations"

[RB] Done

What are the "representations described herein" in ` It is recommended that=
 the
experimental versions of PING use the text representations described herein=
` ?
Is it about section 11 ? Then please add a forward reference.

[RB] Done

## Section 10

This is the usual considerations about ICMP, please consider to remove this
section. Or refer for section 5 of RFC 4443.

[RB] Removed

## Section 11

Beside the above semi-DISCUSS, please state that hexadecimal should be in l=
ower
case.

[RB] Words "lower-case" added.

## Section 12

`The Source Address does not identify an interface on a trusted node.` is t=
here
any hint how this can be done ? How will it scale if all CRH-enabled router
must know all the specific address of all trusted nodes ? The same scalabil=
ity
issue for `The ACL discards packets whose source address identifies an
interface on a trusted node.`

[RB] This is one of the things that we ask the experimenters to report on. =
Some numbering plans support efficient ACLs. Others don't

[RB] SRv6 has the same problems. Maybe we should develop common text that w=
e both can use.

## Section 13

If the Wireshark/tcpdump modifications (cited in section 9) are public, the=
n
references to code will be welcome.

[RB] The citations of which I am aware are comprehensible to Wireshark/tcpd=
ump developers, but not to the general public. Do you know of any better ci=
tations.

`Interoperability among these implementations has not yet been demonstrated=
.`
should rather be in section 14 'experimental results'

[RB] Not really. Section 14 doesn't provide experimental results. It descri=
bes experimental result documents that should be written when the experimen=
t is complete.

## Section 14

I am indeed very curious to see the experimental result of
```
Mechanism used to populate the FIB
Scale of deployment

[RB] Is this comment within the scope of this document? Or are you anticipa=
ting the experimental results document?
```
even if the text states in one year after publication as an RFC, this work
started back in 2019 and was adopted in 2023, do we already have some resul=
ts ?

[RB] Again, is this comment within the scope of this document? Or are you a=
nticipating the experimental results document?

What are the possible next steps as seen by the authors / 6MAN WG is the
experiment is assumed to be successful ? And what are the criteria to decla=
re a
successful experiment ?

[RB] Section 14 describes experimental results to be reported. To the best =
of my knowledge, these results will provide a pretty good picture of whethe=
r the experiment succeeded or failed.

[RB] If the experiment fails, it fails. If it succeeds, the community will =
have a few options. Is there any outcome to which you would object.

                                  Ron

# NITS (non-blocking / cosmetic)

## Section 12

s/This is becasue /This is because/




--_000_BL0PR05MB5316FDC377FB931E50CEAA76AEF22BL0PR05MB5316namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-=
1">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Eric,</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
See response, inline [RB].</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
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nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I will post an updated version tonight so that you can clear your discuss.<=
/div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFo=
nt, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp=
; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;Ron</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontService, =
Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<br>
<p style=3D"font-family:Calibri;font-size:7pt;color:#000000;margin:15pt;fon=
t-style:normal;font-weight:normal;text-decoration:none;" align=3D"Center">
Juniper Business Use Only<br>
</p>
<hr style=3D"display: inline-block; width: 98%;">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><b>From:</b>&nbsp;=C9ric=
 Vyncke via Datatracker &lt;noreply@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b>&nbsp;Wednesday, May 29, 2024 3:16 PM<br>
<b>To:</b>&nbsp;The IESG &lt;iesg@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b>&nbsp;draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr@ietf.org &lt;draft-ietf-6man-c=
omp-rtg-hdr@ietf.org&gt;; 6man-chairs@ietf.org &lt;6man-chairs@ietf.org&gt;=
; ipv6@ietf.org &lt;ipv6@ietf.org&gt;; furry13@gmail.com &lt;furry13@gmail.=
com&gt;; bob.hinden@gmail.com &lt;bob.hinden@gmail.com&gt;; bob.hinden@gmai=
l.com
 &lt;bob.hinden@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b>&nbsp;=C9ric Vyncke's Discuss on draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hd=
r-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)</span>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[External Email. B=
e cautious of content]<br>
<br>
<br>
=C9ric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for<br>
draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-08: Discuss<br>
<br>
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<br>
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this<br>
introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Please refer to <a href=3D"https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org=
/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DV=
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mI$" id=3D"OWA8eed50cc-6ed2-04d7-d35d-952ef0ec1e71" class=3D"OWAAutoLink" d=
ata-auth=3D"NotApplicable" data-loopstyle=3D"linkonly">
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for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
<br>
<br>
The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br>
<a href=3D"https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs=
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<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
DISCUSS:<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
<br>
# =C9ric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-6man-comp-rtg-hdr-08<br>
<br>
Thank you for the work put into this document. I do like the idea of<br>
compressing SRH-like header, but the document has room for improvements.<br=
>
<br>
Please find below some blocking DISCUSS points (easy to address), some<br>
non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be appreciated even if only =
for<br>
my own education), and some nits.<br>
<br>
Special thanks to Bob Hinden for the shepherd's detailed write-up including=
 the<br>
WG consensus *but* it lacks the justification of the intended status (and I=
MHO<br>
experimental is the right one).<br>
<br>
I hope that this review helps to improve the document,<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
-=E9ric<br>
<br>
# DISCUSS (blocking)<br>
<br>
As noted in <a href=3D"https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/blo=
g/handling-iesg-ballot-positions/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHN=
jV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmcZOFq8Vg$" id=3D"OWA6dff8d5e-=
a504-5782-2f6d-4ed10a111b1e" class=3D"OWAAutoLink" data-auth=3D"NotApplicab=
le" data-loopstyle=3D"linkonly">
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/blog/handling-iesg-ballot-=
positions/__;!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG=
6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmcZOFq8Vg$</a>&nbsp;, a<br>
DISCUSS ballot is a request to have a discussion on the following topics:<b=
r>
<br>
## Section 5<br>
<br>
`Decrement the IPv6 Hop Limit.` what do to when hop limit is 0 ? Is there a=
<br>
deviation from RFC 8200 section 3, else why repeating this step ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Agree. IPv6 a=
lready decrements the Hop Limit as it processes the base IPv6 header. So, d=
ecrementing it again would be a bad thing. I have removed that step<br>
<br>
## Section 7<br>
<br>
It is not clear to me why this document needs to make an allowance for<br>
intermediate nodes (sic) that verify transport layer checksums. Transport l=
ayer<br>
checksums are expected to be verified by the Transport layer endpoints and =
not<br>
in the network. So since when the Internet architecture has changed to take=
<br>
care of `it prevents intermediate nodes from verifying transport layer<br>
checksums`? Actual references are required for such statement. And,<br>
explanations should be given whether this &quot;sentence&quot; helps RFC 72=
58 pervasive<br>
monitoring perhaps in the security considerations section.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Agree. I have=
 removed section 7 in its entirety.<br>
<br>
## Section 11<br>
<br>
While not a real DISCUSS criteria, I am really surprised to see an IPv4-lik=
e<br>
notation for CRH SID.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Why not? IPv4=
-like is a convenient notation for 32-bit values. Is there a reason not to =
like it? Can you propose an alternaive?<br>
<br>
## Section 12<br>
<br>
As AH is end-to-end, intermediate nodes do not have the shared secret, henc=
e<br>
`The CRH is not compatibile with AH processing at intermediate nodes.` is<b=
r>
useless and confusing. Please remove. Very similar to the DISCUSS about sec=
tion<br>
7.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Agree. I have=
 removed that sentence<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
COMMENT:<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
<br>
# COMMENTS (non-blocking)<br>
<br>
## Abstract<br>
<br>
Can we really write `deployed` for an experimental I-D?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] The purpose o=
f any IETF experiment is to demonstrate that something can be deployed. You=
 might want to deploy in a risk-free environment at first. But if you don't=
 demonstrate deployability, why bother.<br>
<br>
## Section 1<br>
<br>
s/to its destination/to its destination(s)/ (think multicast/anycast). Twic=
e in<br>
the section ;)</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Done<br>
<br>
Suggest to move the motivation to its own section.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0)=
;">[RB] I am going to push back on this. If we did that, the introduction w=
ould contain only one paragraph.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
<br>
## Section 3<br>
<br>
Any recommendation on when to do `The first CRH SID in the path can be omit=
ted<br>
from the list.`?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Changed the s=
entence to read &quot;<span style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont=
, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);=
">The first CRH SID in the path is omitted
 from the list unless there is some&nbsp;reason to preserve it.&quot;</span=
></div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
What is the expected behavior of any CRH-aware router and final node(s) whe=
n<br>
`the Type- specific data field MUST be padded with zeros` is not respected =
?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] If it is padd=
ed with non-zero data, there should be no problem. CRH processing does not =
inspect padding values.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] If it is not =
padded at all, IPv6 will not be able to find the beginning of the header fo=
llowing the CRH and the packet will be dropped.&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] I don't think=
 that we need to mention this because it is generic IPv6 behavior and not s=
pecific to CRH.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
<br>
## Section 4<br>
<br>
Can the IPv6 address in the CRH-FIB be a link-local or multicast or can onl=
y be<br>
a unicast ? Section 5 gives some more explanations, but an early one would =
be<br>
better.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Added the fol=
lowing:</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB]&nbsp;</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"line-height: 22px; white-space: pre;=
 font-family: Consolas, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace; font-size: 11pt=
; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
The IPv6 address can be a Global Unicast Address (GUA), a Link Local Unicas=
t address (LLU), or a
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"line-height: 22px; white-space: pre;=
 font-family: Consolas, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace; font-size: 11pt=
; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Unique Local Address (ULA). When the IPv6 address is the final address in a=
 path,
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"line-height: 22px; white-space: pre;=
 font-family: Consolas, &quot;Courier New&quot;, monospace; font-size: 11pt=
; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
it can also be a multicast address.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
## Section 5<br>
<br>
The first bullet can probably be removed as it is the normal behavior of an=
y<br>
IPv6 node per RFC 8200.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Done<br>
<br>
`If Hdr Ext Len indicates that the CRH is larger than the implementation ca=
n<br>
process, ` suggest using code 6 per<br>
<a href=3D"https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/icm=
pv6-parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml*icmpv6-parameters-codes-5__;Iw!!NEt6=
yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxmxqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7e=
FURmc25Y-TxM$" id=3D"OWAb4e378e7-bb72-2215-287a-a95b76ca5a9b" class=3D"OWAA=
utoLink" data-auth=3D"NotApplicable" data-loopstyle=3D"linkonly">https://ur=
ldefense.com/v3/__https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters/icmpv6=
-parameters.xhtml*icmpv6-parameters-codes-5__;Iw!!NEt6yMaO-gk!DVJoms2WoGvxm=
xqkffXENdtHNjV3fbIs-eqSaGApHrZ_QLRG6sy7korNjjBzml5sJ7eFURmc25Y-TxM$</a><br>
<br>
[RB] Done</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
While wasting octets with too large CRH (i.e., larger than the minimum leng=
th)<br>
is a bad thing, does it deserve to discard the packet on transit ? Why not<=
br>
requesting the source to enforce this mimimum length?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] This is defen=
sive coding. The source may be buggy or hostile. If the CRH is malformed, t=
he processing node should attempt to access bits beyond the end of it. This=
 could cause a router to crash.<br>
<br>
`If the search does not return a CRH-FIB entry` is the code 0 the most suit=
able<br>
code ? If not, why not creating one ? Or even using ICMPv6 code 1 'destinat=
ion<br>
unreachable' ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] I'm going to =
push back on this. Destination Unreachable isn't appropriate because it sug=
gests that the destination in the base IPv6 header isn't reachable. That is=
n't the case. I could create a new code,
 but I don't want to clutter up the registry with experimental stuff. So, p=
arameter problem is good enough for now<br>
<br>
`If Segments Left is greater than 0` this will always be the case per first=
<br>
bullet `If Segments Left equals 0` ;-)</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Not true. Seg=
ments left was decremented two steps above.&nbsp;<br>
<br>
The reader will welcome a justification of `CRH-FIB entry contains a multic=
ast<br>
address, discard the packet and`.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Added a paren=
thetic comment that this prevents packet storms.<br>
<br>
## Section 6<br>
<br>
I guess that this is linked to RFC 4302 (AH), so, please state this clearly=
.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Yes, RFC 4302=
 demands that this section is present. But do we really need another refere=
nce back to RFC 4302?<br>
<br>
## Section 7<br>
<br>
Is it about `Destination Address Transparency` or privacy ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] This section =
was deleted in response to your previous comment.<br>
<br>
## Section 8<br>
<br>
`Each CRH SID is processed by exactly one node.` isn't it rather &quot;Each=
 CRH SID<br>
is processed by exactly one CRH-configured router whose one address matches=
 the<br>
packet destination address&quot; ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Done<br>
<br>
## Section 9<br>
<br>
The title should rather be &quot;operational considerations&quot;</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Done<br>
<br>
What are the &quot;representations described herein&quot; in ` It is recomm=
ended that the<br>
experimental versions of PING use the text representations described herein=
` ?<br>
Is it about section 11 ? Then please add a forward reference.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Done<br>
<br>
## Section 10<br>
<br>
This is the usual considerations about ICMP, please consider to remove this=
<br>
section. Or refer for section 5 of RFC 4443.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Removed<br>
<br>
## Section 11<br>
<br>
Beside the above semi-DISCUSS, please state that hexadecimal should be in l=
ower<br>
case.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Words &quot;l=
ower-case&quot; added.<br>
<br>
## Section 12<br>
<br>
`The Source Address does not identify an interface on a trusted node.` is t=
here<br>
any hint how this can be done ? How will it scale if all CRH-enabled router=
<br>
must know all the specific address of all trusted nodes ? The same scalabil=
ity<br>
issue for `The ACL discards packets whose source address identifies an<br>
interface on a trusted node.`</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] This is one o=
f the things that we ask the experimenters to report on. Some numbering pla=
ns support efficient ACLs. Others don't</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] SRv6 has the =
same problems. Maybe we should develop common text that we both can use.<br=
>
<br>
## Section 13<br>
<br>
If the Wireshark/tcpdump modifications (cited in section 9) are public, the=
n<br>
references to code will be welcome.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] The citations=
 of which I am aware are comprehensible to Wireshark/tcpdump developers, bu=
t not to the general public. Do you know of any better citations.<br>
<br>
`Interoperability among these implementations has not yet been demonstrated=
.`<br>
should rather be in section 14 'experimental results'</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Not really. S=
ection 14 doesn't provide experimental results. It describes experimental r=
esult documents that should be written when the experiment is complete.<br>
<br>
## Section 14<br>
<br>
I am indeed very curious to see the experimental result of<br>
```<br>
Mechanism used to populate the FIB<br>
Scale of deployment</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Is this comme=
nt within the scope of this document? Or are you anticipating the experimen=
tal results document?<br>
```<br>
even if the text states in one year after publication as an RFC, this work<=
br>
started back in 2019 and was adopted in 2023, do we already have some resul=
ts ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0)=
;">[RB] Again, is this comment within the scope of this document? Or are yo=
u anticipating the experimental results document?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
What are the possible next steps as seen by the authors / 6MAN WG is the<br=
>
experiment is assumed to be successful ? And what are the criteria to decla=
re a<br>
successful experiment ?</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] Section 14 de=
scribes experimental results to be reported. To the best of my knowledge, t=
hese results will provide a pretty good picture of whether the experiment s=
ucceeded or failed.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">[RB] If the experi=
ment fails, it fails. If it succeeds, the community will have a few options=
. Is there any outcome to which you would object.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"font-size: 11pt;">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbs=
p; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Ron<br>
<br>
# NITS (non-blocking / cosmetic)<br>
<br>
## Section 12<br>
<br>
s/This is becasue /This is because/<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div>
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