Re: 6man w.g. last call for <draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-11.txt>

[Fernando Gont <[e-mail]>]

On 05/13/2016 11:29 PM, Lorenzo Colitti wrote:
> On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 12:00 PM, Brian E Carpenter
> <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
> 
>     Because if someone is trying to correlate different types of my traffic,
>     let's say something sent over IPX and something sent over IPv6, the task
>     will be made easier if the lower 48 bits are the same in both types of
>     traffic. (Obviously, someone on-link can use ND to correlate MAC address
>     and IP address, so we're talking about someone observing off-link
>     packets.)
> 
> That seems extremely unlikely to happen in practice,

Yes... as was "pervasive monitoring" and others. -- C'mon...

That's not how you think security&privacy wise: either provide numbers
that show that that can't happen (which you really can't), or assume it
will happen. You have to fail on the safe side, not on the other. And
since you cannot predict the standardization of other technologies
(either) -- which might happen outside the IETF --- I'm not sure how you
can make this sort of claim.




> By contrast, here is one weakness that is pretty much mandated by this
> draft as written: because addresses have to be stable, any remote
> attacker anywhere on the Internet that ever exchanges a packet with that
> host can track it every time the host visits the same network,
> *forever*, with no recourse. Section 3 point 1.

Use RFC4941 for that -- that's why they were standardized in the first
place. And you choose how you employ your addresses.

And if you just hate the fact of having a stable address, please write a
proposal to update RFC4941, such that stable addresses (alongside
temporary addresses) are not required.


-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: [e-mail]
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