draft-gont-6man-managing-privacy-extensions

[Fernando Gont <[e-mail]>]

Folks,

At the 6man wg meeting, the aforementioned I-D was deemed "as a very bad
idea", because of its privacy implications.

My question is: what's the trust model that leads to that conclusion?

I mean, a host doing SLAAC trusts the router about the prefix to be
configured, default route, various network parameters (Hop Count, MTU,
etc.), recursive DNS resolver, etc.

Why do folks consider that for some of this information, the router is
to be trusted, while for other (the SAG bits that our I-D specifies)
shouldn't?

That aside, if a router is deemed as possibly malicious, even without
the SAG bits it could claim that DHCPv6 is needed, and then have the
DHCP server lease an address that embeds the source link-layer address
of the DHCPv6 request...

*And*, as noted in the upcoming version that I had posted, the final
decision on which policy to apply is on de hands of the host (and not
the router).

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
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