Re: Improving ND security

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Fri, 31 July 2020 17:40 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: Improving ND security
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 13:40:42 -0400
In-Reply-To: <d5c245f216c3409f826f8132e532a882@boeing.com>
Cc: "Pascal Thubert (pthubert)" <pthubert=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, v6ops list <v6ops@ietf.org>, 6man <ipv6@ietf.org>
To: "Templin (US), Fred L" <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com>
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On Jul 31, 2020, at 1:35 PM, Templin (US), Fred L <Fred.L.Templin@boeing.com> wrote:
> I think as long as the network has a way of associating the key pair with another piece
> of information that accompanies the IPv6 ND message then the network would be able
> to know when the mobile node is using its (single) authorized key. So, for example, if
> the IPv6 ND message included an identity for the MN (sort of like a DHCPv6 DUID), the
> network would know when the MN is using the correct key pair – right? (BTW, I am
> not saying to use DHCPv6 DUID – that is just one example of a MN identity…)

By “NM” I think you mean “Mobile Node?” That’s not really one of the use cases we’re talking about here. Or am I missing something?

In any case, you’re presuming some kind of trust establishment for non-router nodes, right? SEND only talks about trust establishment for routers. And, let’s be frank, doesn’t actually give us enough operational guidance that we would expect what _is_ said to be generally practicable.