Re: Non-Last Small IPv6 Fragments

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Sun, 13 January 2019 20:57 UTC

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Subject: Re: Non-Last Small IPv6 Fragments
To: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Cc: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>, IPv6 List <ipv6@ietf.org>, Bob Hinden <bob.hinden@gmail.com>
References: <CAOSSMjV0Vazum5OKztWhAhJrjLjXc5w5YGxdzHgbzi7YVSk7rg@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S35KNhV2gFp9OdU+M1zy5WUuEAEvXkDXNDWWxi7uQ4e_cw@mail.gmail.com> <CAN-Dau0rTdiiF2SjByxcMG6nhPCEjUH2pYBCOeK_FSGJ_ucDQw@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S34AyV9OpvnjQhQc56n5vfeVgU5Zd3kheP0g+XvsMbBV9g@mail.gmail.com> <1b2e318e-1a9f-bb5d-75a5-04444c42ef20@si6networks.com> <CALx6S37TJr++fC=pVoeS=mrO1fHc4gL_Wtu-XkVTswzs2XxXCA@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S36V7vrVyoTP0G6+S5XeFNB3KWS5UaNnVi20xogRERdCfg@mail.gmail.com> <973A1649-55F6-4D97-A97F-CEF555A4D397@employees.org> <CALx6S34YbBe8xBod3VsWVO33TpZcdxh2uV1vaO8Z_NKnVXp66g@mail.gmail.com> <A3C3F9C0-0A07-41AF-9671-B9E486CB8246@employees.org> <AEA47E27-C0CB-4ABE-8ADE-51E9D599EF8F@gmail.com> <6aae7888-46a4-342d-1d76-10f8b50cebc4@gmail.com> <CALx6S35QKOqn_Ywh9yzm1JDA8Xnp7fLPPmXUvomvz_xOZP8bfg@mail.gmail.com> <4373c8d2-b36f-39c7-3591-1263af0f155b@foobar.org> <CALx6S34QoOwUuzht3jTP87uCyWc-0a0pyNPHTYCftpPwRQKrtQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Date: Sun, 13 Jan 2019 20:57:28 +0000
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Tom Herbert wrote on 13/01/2019 20:29:
> No legitimate host implementation would send this either. If B is
> receiving these packets, the logical conclusion is that it's under DOS
> attack and someone is spoofing A's address.

or that host A has a broken ipv6 implementation.

>> There doesn't seem to be a compelling case to change the protocol to
>> accommodate this particular corner case.  It ranks as annoyance rather
>> than a serious threat.
> 
> Maybe not changing the protocols, but I still don't see a compelling
> case to knowingly accept packets that are highly likely to be a part
> of a DOS attack.

me neither, but that's an operational decision.

Nick