[IRTF-Announce] RFC 8391 on XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme

rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org Thu, 31 May 2018 23:47 UTC

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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 8391

        Title:      XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme 
        Author:     A. Huelsing,
                    D. Butin,
                    S. Gazdag, 
                    J. Rijneveld,
                    A. Mohaisen
        Status:     Informational
        Stream:     IRTF
        Date:       May 2018
        Mailbox:    ietf@huelsing.net, 
                    dbutin@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de, 
                    ietf@gazdag.de,
                    ietf@joostrijneveld.nl, 
                    mohaisen@ieee.org
        Pages:      74
        Characters: 155770
        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None

        I-D Tag:    draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8391

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC8391

This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a
hash-based digital signature system that is based on existing
descriptions in scientific literature.  This note specifies
Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus (WOTS+), a one-time signature
scheme; XMSS, a single-tree scheme; and XMSS^MT, a multi-tree variant
of XMSS.  Both XMSS and XMSS^MT use WOTS+ as a main building block.
XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the
conjectured hardness of mathematical problems.  Instead, it is proven
that it only relies on the properties of cryptographic hash
functions.  XMSS provides strong security guarantees and is even
secure when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function
is broken.  It is suitable for compact implementations, is relatively
simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks.
Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures can so far
withstand known attacks using quantum computers.

This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group of the IRTF.


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