Re: [Isis-wg] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04

"Alvaro Retana (aretana)" <> Fri, 07 April 2017 21:44 UTC

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From: "Alvaro Retana (aretana)" <>
To: "Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <>, Robert Sparks <>, "" <>
CC: "" <>, "" <>, "" <>
Thread-Topic: Genart last call review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04
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Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 21:44:37 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Isis-wg] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-isis-auto-conf-04
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On 4/7/17, 5:30 PM, "Les Ginsberg (ginsberg)" <> wrote:



> System-id duplication is a problem for any deployment - not just autoconfig 
> deployments. And it will be disruptive in any network until it is resolved.
> The only thing autoconfig has added is a way to resolve this w/o manual 
> intervention. This in no way increases the vulnerability nor the disruption the 
> attacker can produce. (Yes - I state that quite intentionally).

I don’t know about Robert, but that is part of the discussion I would like to see.

Yes, duplicate system-ids have always been a potential problem, but this document introduces a new de-duplication mechanism that results not just in unsync’d databases, but in restarting adjacencies – so at least the manifestation of the problem is different.

> So you are asking us to repeat a discussion which has already been held in the context of 
> RFC 5304 and RFC 5310.
> It would be more appropriate to add the normal reference to RFC 5304/5310 in the 
> Security section than what you propose.

I don’t think it hurts to add a reference to those RFCs, but they are both about adding authentication – the problem in this document is exacerbated by the fact that there’s no authentication by default.

The lower layer authentication mechanisms are quite weak, specially knowing that, if in a home environment, for example, it may be relatively easy to connect to the WiFi network.