Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular networks

[Mounira MSAHLI <[e-mail]>]

>> It should be the CA provider who could express that requirement.


I don’t agree with you in this point, it is up to the car manufacturer and
road operator to specify the security and privacy constraints for the
vehicle and to fix the number of pseudonyms needed in the vehicle. BTW,
there is an ETSI standard dealing with pseudonym change strategy:


https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_tr/103400_103499/103415/01.01.01_60/tr_103415v010101p.pdf


In page 27, you can find  examples of pseudonym parameters values from
C-ITS projects and normative organizations.


After the publication of this pre-study, the ec.europa published
c-its_certificate_policy-v1.1-track_changes.pdf with recommandation in
section 2.7.1:

The number of maximum number of parallel ATs which are valid in parallel
(i.e. at the same moment in time) for ITS-S shall not be more than 100.


PKI is the Public Key Infrastructure


>> In that sense, the EU commission might not be able to provide all these

>> CAs... It's the CAs themselves that provide it.


It is about one PKI for all not 1 PKI/country(without C-ITS PKI).


>> I meant to say to maybe write an Internet Draft about security and ITS.

>> It might include ethical aspects, but not sure which ones?

>> What do you think about an Internet Draft?


Yes, it could be interesting to think about an Internet Draft since we have
many security open questions. Unfortunately, I don’t have resources but we
could discuss.


Mounira



Le ven. 23 avr. 2021 à 13:14, Alexandre Petrescu <
[e-mail]> a écrit :

>
>
> Le 22/04/2021 à 19:30, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit :
> >
> >>> - must express their requirements to vehicular networks in terms
> >>> of
> > capabilities of certificates.  For example, a CA may agree to sign
> > only a number of certs (1000?) per vehicle, but no more.  Or might
> > suggest new fields in these X.509 certs that they are ready to
> > confirm (to certify).
> >
> > I think the number of used pseudonym certificates depends on the
> > strategy change of pseudonyms implemented in C-ITS station to avoid
> > tracking and to ensure privacy.
>
> I agree, it might be so.
>
> It should be the CA provider who could express that requirement.
>
> If we can invite a CA provider to express their requirements, then there
> could be advancement.
>
> >
> >>> - must sign and offer almost for free certificates for vehicular
> > networks.  It's not because the car industry makes much money that a
> >  lot has to be wasted on artificial costs.  The way for CA to make
> > money should be different than direct charging the vehicular
> > industry.
> >
> > The EU commission is providing a PKI for member states who are not
> > deploying C-ITS PKI, I think for free.
>
> I dont know which precisely PKI is one referring to?
>
> In my mind, and I might be not right, a PKI is actually the set of CAs
> that are present built-in in web browsers.  No more, no less.
>
> In that sense, the EU commission might not be able to provide all these
> CAs... It's the CAs themselves that provide it.
>
> Let me speculate on what you might be referring to when saying that the
> COmmission might be providing a PKI for member states.
>
> I suspect (not sure) that one refers to https://cpoc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
> This website is not reachable on IPv6.  That is already a huge problem
> to surpass.  When that is done, one can talk in more detail about it.
>
> For my part, I once looked at that site on IPv4, and I found files with
> ".oer" extension, presumably certificates.  I never saw that extension
> before, so I asked the website contacts about that format?  I received
> no answer.  I did not push further.  I think either they live in their
> own world seggregated, or I might be myself misunderstanding so many
> things (and hence live in my own world :-)
>
> >>> Maybe we can write a brief Internet Draft about wishes about
> >>> security, Internet, and Intelligent Transportation Systems.
> >
> > You mean ethical aspects ?
>
> I meant to say to maybe write an Internet Draft about security and ITS.
>
> It might include ethical aspects, but not sure which ones?
>
> What do you think about an Internet Draft?
>
> Maybe one saw the message from chairmanship that currently there is
> little work ongoing, and maybe a shutdown of the group is considered.
>
> Alex
>
> >
> > Kind Regards Mounira
> >
> >
> >
> > Le jeu. 22 avr. 2021 à 17:52, Alexandre Petrescu
> > <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>
> > a écrit :
> >
> > In private I was suggested a few improvements about 'commodity'
> > browsers, CABForum and federations of CAs; so here is the new wish
> > list:
> >
> > Wish list for CAs for vehicular networks
> >
> > - must be reachable on IPv6, and their website too. - must be
> > present built-in in commodity web browsers, and open source because
> > that guarantees trust built at large scale and helps spot the bugs
> > quickly for the benefit of all. - must express their requirements to
> > vehicular networks in terms of capabilities of certificates.  For
> > example, a CA may agree to sign only a number of certs (1000?) per
> > vehicle, but no more.  Or might suggest new fields in these X.509
> > certs that they are ready to confirm (to certify). - must sign and
> > offer almost for free certificates for vehicular networks.  It's not
> > because the car industry makes much money that a lot has to be
> > wasted on artificial costs.  The way for CA to make money should be
> > different than direct charging the vehicular industry.
> >
> > - there might be possibilities of considering new web browsers (other
> > than the 'commodity'). - maybe a relationship with IOTOPS WG of IETF
> > could be considered. - the CABForum outside of IETF might be
> > considered (but unreachable on IPv6, currently). - maybe new
> > federations of CAs could be considered, in which the vehicular
> > industries might built their own world, but that should not be a
> > path towards seggregating away from the Internet trust.
> >
> > - must contribute to make Internet better, and not seggregate the
> > vehicular networks from the Internet.
> >
> > Please comment on this wish list.
> >
> > Maybe we can write a brief Internet Draft about wishes about
> > security, Internet, and Intelligent Transportation Systems.
> >
> > Alex
> >
> >
> > Le 21/04/2021 à 19:43, Alexandre Petrescu a écrit :
> >> This is my list of requirements for CAs for vehicular networks: -
> >> must be reachable on IPv6, and their website too. - must be present
> >> built-in in open source web browsers. - must express their
> >> requirements to vehicular networks in terms of capabilities of
> >> certificates.  For example, a CA may agree to sign only a number of
> >> certs (1000?) per vehicle, but no more.  Or might suggest new
> >> fields in these X.509 certs that they are ready to confirm (to
> >> certify). - must sign and offer almost for free certificates for
> >> vehicular networks.  It's not because the car industry makes much
> >> money that a lot has to be wasted on artificial costs.  The way
> >> for CA to make money should be different than direct charging the
> >> vehicular industry. - must contribute to make Internet better, and
> >> not seggregate the vehicular networks from the Internet.
> >>
> >> And this below is our dicussion that helped me frame these
> >> requirements, and I thank you for the discussion.
> >>
> >> Le 20/04/2021 à 11:51, Alexandre Petrescu a écrit : [...]
> >>
> >>>> - Scoop@F http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
> > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>
> >>>> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
> > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>> :
> >>
> >> This is not reachable on IPv6.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> which is about deploying 3000 cars + 2000 km of roads
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> - InterCor https://intercor-project.eu/
> > <https://intercor-project.eu/>
> >>>> <https://intercor-project.eu/ <https://intercor-project.eu/>>,
> >>
> >> This is not reachable on IPv6.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>> - C-Roads Platform https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html
> > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>
> >>>> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html
> > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>>
> >>
> >> This is not reachable on IPv6.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> InterCor and C-Roads are about harmonising C-ITS specifications
> >>>> in Europe
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> - INDID
> >>>>
> >
> https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
> >
> >
> >
> <
> https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
> >
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> > <
> https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
> >
> >
> >
> <
> https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
> >>.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> All these projects are using ETSI TS 103 097 certificates,
> >>>> which is a profile of 1609.2 to secure C-ITS messages:
> >>>
> >>> But there are also other projects funded by the EU in the same
> >>> domain (connected automated mobility with self-driving cars) and
> >>>  where more open certificates are being used, with more open
> >>> source software.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> <
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
> >
> >>>>
> >>
> >>
> >> This is reachable on IPv6.
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> > <
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
> >
> >
> >
> <
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> As mentioned by Jerome, one use case of the RFC 8902 could be
> >>>> to sign CAM and DENM messages on facilities layer and not
> >>>> geonet as specified in ETSI.
> >>>
> >>> Yes, but has that been done?  HAs someone put CAM messages on IP
> >>> on a 4G link and signed with 1609.2 certificates?  I think not.
> >>>
> >>> It would be good if it worked, but it would need the CAs to know
> >>>  these certifiicate formats, and the CAs would need to be known
> >>> in common browsers.
> >>>
> >>>> Yes, in projects dealing with C-ITS security interoperability,
> >>>> we use MQTT to exchange C-ITS messages between many countries
> >>>> to ensure continuity of service when vehicle is crossing
> >>>> borders.
> >>>
> >>> Ok, good to know.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> We could also use the RFC for Vehicle-To-Internet simply to
> >>>> upload log of vehicle for example etc…
> >>>
> >>> Yes, but what CA would be put in the server of that log?  Would
> >>> that CA be a self-made CA with openssl (or other open source
> >>> software), or would it be a widely known CA like the CAs present
> >>> in firefox, for example?
> >>>
> >>> My guess is that you assume a self-made CAs, and I agree with it
> >>>  for experimentation.
> >>>
> >>> But for deployment there would be a need for the existing CAs in
> >>>  the browsers to implement these 1609.2 certs.  And they are
> >>> paying. I doubt it could work.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>> The reason is because the former is all open source
> >>>>>> software and freely accessible standards, whereas  1609.2
> >>>>>> are closed documents and ETSI ITS certificate software is
> >>>>>> not integrated in mainline software like openssl.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> There's a java implementation of 1609.2/103 097 here:
> >>>> https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common
> > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>
> >>>> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common
> > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>>. I already used it.
> >>
> >> This is not reachable on IPv6.  Several people who contributed to
> >> IETF also asked github support to put it on IPv6.  There is no
> >> answer since some time now.
> >>
> >> I would suggest the person who maintains that java implementation
> >> of 1609.2 to put it on another server that is reachable on IPv6. Or
> >> otherwise to ask too, like the others have, github.com
> > <http://github.com> to be on
> >> IPv6.
> >>
> >>
> >>> Yes, but the spec is paying.  That does inspire seriousness but
> >>> might inspire risk for the confidence.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>> ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the
> >>>>>> certificate are
> >>>>
> >>>> expensive.  hard to access and the certificate are expensive.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> you can get certificates from
> >>>> https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/
> > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>
> >>>> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/
> > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>>
> >>
> >> This is not reachable on IPv6.  And ISS CA (Integrated Security
> >> Services) is not in my browser either.
> >>
> >> In comparison, Microsec might provide certificates in bilateral
> >> agreements that might cost less, or almost 0.  And Microsec is
> >> reachable on IPv, and is in my browser.
> >>
> >> There is also the Let's Encrypt CA that is reachable on IPv6.  I
> >> think they might offer certificates free of charge too.
> >>
> >> These kinds of CAs (Microsec and Let's Encrypt) are good candidates
> >> to whom to propose interoperability for vehicular networks on
> >> IPv6.
> >>
> >> There might be other such CAs?
> >>
> >> So, the question is whether Microsec and Let's Encrypt (who are on
> >>  IPv6 and offer somehow very cheap or almost free certificates),
> >> offer compliance with RFC 8902?  If yes, is it with ITS
> >> Certificates (1609.2) or with X.509 certificates?
> >>
> >> Alex
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the pointer, I did not know ghsiss.  Are they paying
> >>> certificates?
> >>>
> >>> Recently I worked with Microsec and they might also propose
> >>> certificates for cheaper (free), if it is for evaluation, or for
> >>>  academia, or similar.  And Microsec CA _is_ present in the
> >>> browsers. But can Microsec sign these 1609.2 certificates and
> >>> still not ask me (end user) to pay for the certificates?
> >>>
> >>> Another thing to consider is whether or not ghsiss (and Microsec
> >>>  for that matter) are reachable on IPv6.  That is also a make kor
> >>>  break condition of use.  It is worth trying.
> >>>
> >>> Thanks for the message.
> >>>
> >>> Alex
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>> In  my personal opinion, it remains good if IPWAVE provides
> >>>>>> a guideline on how to secure IP vehicular communication,
> >>>>>> including interoperability between systems (although I have
> >>>>>> at that time limited resources to actively contribute to
> >>>>>> this), as several options are on the table and we need to
> >>>>>> guarantee the trust chain, even considering different
> >>>>>> protocol or standards being used.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> I’m also interested to work on security interoperability in
> >>>> C-ITS and we could add:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> - Misbehaving in vehicular network
> >>>>
> >>>> - Revocation management
> >>>>
> >>>> - Pseudonym management/change to avoid tracking and to ensure
> >>>> privacy
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Thank you Russ for your time on this RFC and for your valuable
> >>>>  review.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Kind regards
> >>>>
> >>>> Mounira
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message --------- De : *Alexandre
> >>>> Petrescu* <[e-mail]
> >>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
> >>>> <mailto:[e-mail]
> > <mailto:[e-mail]>>> Date: jeu. 15 avr. 2021 à
> >>>> 22:44 Subject: Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS
> >>>> Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
> >>>> To: Jérôme Härri <[e-mail]
> >>>> <mailto:[e-mail]>
> > <mailto:[e-mail]
> > <mailto:[e-mail]>>>,
> >>>> IPWAVE WG <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> > <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Le 15/04/2021 à 12:35, Jérôme Härri a écrit :
> >>>>> Dear Alex,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thanks. Indeed such discrepancies is particularly an issue
> >>>>> when it comes to merging wireless and wired (V2I). For
> >>>>> example, you send a DENM over 5G reaching a MEC. It will
> >>>>> remove the ETSI KPI and do something on its own (not fully
> >>>>> sure what exactly), or if you use MQTT type of interaction,
> >>>>> where it is even less clear (what a broker will do on a DENM
> >>>>> sent over JSON is not fully clear to keep track of any kind
> >>>>> of security/data integrity...
> >>>>>
> >>>>> For that matter, there was one effort from C-ROAD to develop
> >>>>>  something called 'Facilities' PKI, saying that the ITS KPI
> >>>>> are at facilities layer and no longer at geonet. The
> >>>>> advantage is that at least now, you do not need to remove
> >>>>> the KPI when moving and exchanging DENM (or else) in backend.
> >>>>> But I am not sure of the current status or even if this WI
> >>>>> is actually active.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Now, I do not fully agree with you with the equivalence of
> >>>>> the internet KPI and ITS KPI. Indeed, the principle is the
> >>>>> same, but in the test you mention, the trust chain is not
> >>>>> guaranteed (you edit your own root-CA for the purpose of the
> >>>>> tests, but for example in one of our cross-border deployment
> >>>>> (e.g. DE-FR), this solution does not work, as a German car
> >>>>> will not recognize the CA from a French root-CA. So, the key
> >>>>> issue I see is not really (or only) on security but on
> >>>>> Trust. The ITS KPI is one option, there might be others, but
> >>>>> 'open ssl' strategies still face the trust-chain issue.
> >>>>
> >>>> Jérôme,
> >>>>
> >>>> I agree with you.
> >>>>
> >>>> In the discussion above I think you meant 'PKI' throughout
> >>>> (Public Key Infrastructure), and not 'KPI' (Key Performance
> >>>> Indicator).
> >>>>
> >>>> That said, the question you formulate about how a car-to-server
> >>>> MQTT interaction on IP would be authenticated by certificates
> >>>> that are verified by CAs that are absent from normal browsers,
> >>>> or how the CAs that are present in normal browsers would help
> >>>> authenticating CAM messages sent on IP - is a very relevant
> >>>> question.
> >>>>
> >>>> Alex
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Best Regards,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Jérôme
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -----Original Message----- From: its <[e-mail]
> > <mailto:[e-mail]>
> >>>> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>>
> >>>> On
> > Behalf
> >>>>> Of Alexandre Petrescu Sent: Thursday, 15 April 2021 12:20 To:
> >>>>> IPWAVE WG <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> > <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> Subject:
> >>>>> [ipwave] RFC8902
> >>>> - TLS with ITS
> >>>>> Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Hi, IPWAVErs,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> A colleague pointed me to this recently issued RFC 8902 about
> >>>>> TLS with ITS Certificates.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This RFC is of an EXPERIMENTAL Category.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It might be in agreement with other IEEE standards such as
> >>>>> 1609.2.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But I must say that I think it further deepens the
> >>>>> discrepancy between what is PKI in the Internet and what is
> >>>>> the closed PKI for ITS.  That is a discrepancy that exists
> >>>>> for a long time, and I must share that - IMHO - I am
> >>>>> surprised that the IETF issues an RFC that further promotes
> >>>>> such a discrepancy.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I
> >>>>> participated, and some about I heard of, people use normal
> >>>>> PKI with openssl and normal certificates in cars, over IP, on
> >>>>> cellular links like 4G. They work fine.  The CA is a local CA
> >>>>> (not a commercial CA), but the concept _is_ compatible with
> >>>>> normal CAs.  These dont use the ETSI ITS-specific
> >>>>> certificates, neither the 1609.2 certificates.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I think there are more such trial deployments using local
> >>>>> (but standard, openssl PKIs and certificates) than there are
> >>>>>  trials using ETSI ITS certificates or 1609.2 certificates.
> >>>>> The reason is because the former is all open source software
> >>>>> and freely accessible standards, whereas 1609.2 are closed
> >>>>> documents and ETSI ITS certificate software is not integrated
> >>>>> in mainline software like openssl.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> There are many easily accessible CAs (Certificate
> >>>>> Authorities) that are integrated in the Internet and in main
> >>>>> web browsers, whereas the ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard
> >>>>> to access and the certificate are expensive.  Many strong
> >>>>> oppinions maintain that it should stay that way: cars PKI
> >>>>> different than Internet PKI.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> There should be one Internet, and that means one trust, and
> >>>>> one PKI.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Everything else should not be done at IETF, I think; hence my
> >>>>> comment about this particular RFC.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> That is my humble oppinion.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I would like to hear other oppinions?  Maybe I miss
> >>>>> something...
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Alex
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________ its mailing
> >>>>> list [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> <mailto:[e-mail]
> > <mailto:[e-mail]>>
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> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________ its mailing
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> >>>>>
> >>>>
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