Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet

[Alexandre Petrescu <[e-mail]>]

Hi, Mounira,

Le 22/04/2021 à 17:52, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit :
> 
> 
> Hi Alex,
> 
> 
>>> But there are also other projects funded by the EU in the same 
>>> domain (connected automated mobility with self-driving cars) and
>>>  where more open certificates are being used, with more open 
>>> source software.
> 
> 
> We are 19 member states in C-ROADS Platform. I did co-chair of TF1 
> C-Roads platform in 2018, dealing with security aspects and its 
> interoperability in C-ITS. The common certificate data structure 
> standard is ETSI TS 103 097 ( version 1.3.1 which is a profile of 
> 1609.2).

It is good to know.

I would like to ask: can one implement ETSI TS 103 097 completely
independently of having the 1609.2 document?  This is very important for
an implementer with low ressources, because the ETSI TS document is free
access whereas the 1609.2 is paying.

>>> Yes, but has that been done?  HAs someone put CAM messages on IP
>>>  on a 4G link and signed with 1609.2 certificates?  I think not.
> 
> 
> Why not? I did not get the point of the common browsers but it was 
> tested on hybrid communication ITS-G5 and 5G.

The point is the following: if one puts a CAM message on 4G on IP, and
signed with a 1609.2 certificate, then that message would need to be
verified in a browser.  That browser would need a CA in its built-in
list.  That CA should be understanding the 1609.2 format.

It is ok to send CAM messages on ITS-G5 and signed with 1609.2
certificates, because that is not IP, and it is in closed domains where
one also puts a CA manually (not built in in browsers downloaded from
the Internet).

But even if there is trust on ITS-G5 relying on self-made CAs, that same
trust can not be extended to 4G.  The trust on 4G is the Internet trust,
i.e. built-in CAs in browsers.

A commodity PC receiving a CAM message in the car will never trust it if
it arrived via a 4G interface.  If that CAM arrived on an ITS-G5
interface, then there might be some trust (the ITS-G5 forwarding
computer might have CAs certs), but that is not 'end-to-end' trust.

>>> Yes, but what CA would be put in the server of that log?  Would 
>>> that CA
> 
> be a self-made CA with openssl (or other open source software), or 
> would it be a widely known CA like the CAs present in firefox, for 
> example?
> 
> 
> My guess is that you assume a self-made CAs, and I agree with it for
>  experimentation.

YEs - this is what all demonstrators of cars I have seen in Europe do:
self-made certificates and self-made CAs.

>>> But for deployment there would be a need for the existing CAs in
>>>  the browsers to implement these 1609.2 certs.  And they are 
>>> paying.  I doubt it could work.
> 
> 
> The case of TLS Client Using the ITS Certificate and TLS Server Uses 
> the X.509 Certificate is already covered by the RFC 8902.

First, I fully disagree with that RFC, but that is a personal oppinion.

It is an EXPERIMENTAL RFC, so I can live with it.

It has some problems that we can discuss about separately.

> 
> 
>>> Recently I worked with Microsec and they might also propose 
>>> certificates for cheaper (free), if it is for evaluation, or for 
>>> academia, or similar.  And Microsec CA _is_ present in the 
>>> browsers.  But can Microsec sign these 1609.2 certificates and
>>> still not ask me (end  user) to pay for the certificates?
> 
> 
> I find that Microsec cert are compliant to standards below:

'compliant', but does it work in practice?

If yes, then it is great!

> IEEE Std 1609.2 (IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular 
> Environments);
> 
> • ETSI TS 102 940 (ITS-S security (PKI) architecture and application 
> groups);
> 
> • ETSI TS 102 941 (Trust and Privacy Management)
> 
> ETSI TS 103 097 (Certificate and message structure definitions for 
> C2CPKI).
> 
> 
> So if you have end user micros cert, you can use it to sign C-ITS 
> messages.

Good to know.

> 
> 
>>> And Microsec CA _is_ present in the browsers
> 
> 
> You mean the certificate authority. You want to sign CAM with 
> certificate authority ?

I meant to say that Microsec might provide me certificates for cars, for 
almost free.  I hope these certs have the right format.

Microsec CA is already present built in in the browsers.

So, I suspect that I could send CAM messages over IP over 4G, signed 
with these certificates that Microsec provided.

I must say that I dont know precisely how to sign IP messages by using 
certificates, but I do know how to send CAM messages on IP on 4G.  One 
woule be using the asn1.c open source to build the message, and BSD 
sockets to send them.

I suspect (dont know?) that signing an IP message might be a matter of 
calling a C function from the openssl open source package.

> 
> 
> I did not get the point could you clarify more please.
> 
> 
> 
>>> http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>> :
> 
> 
>>> This is not reachable on IPv6.
> 
> 
> You mean the web page of the project or the PKI of the project ?

Yes, I mean that URL is not reachable on IPv6.  That says a lot about it.

There is one thing to talk about IPv6 and another thing to do it.

There is one thing to say that all vehicular communications must be on 
IPv6 and there is another thing to actually do it.

> Scoop + Intercor projects are already finished in December 2019.

Great, I think they were a great success.  I heard very good things 
about their advancements and demonstrations.

> Any way the business model of C-ITS PKI, in all mentioned project is 
> SaaS. If you want to get access to this service via IPv6, you can ask
> the PKI.

I think there is indeed a business model for PKIs used for vehicular 
networks.  But that business model should approach more the existing 
business models of the large CAs that are built-in in browsers, rather 
than the business models of vehicular manufacturers.

It is the business model of vehicular manufacturers (their 'digitizing') 
that should be adapted, and not vice-versa.

In this advancement of the business model, the most important criterion 
is the trust.  Without trust there can be no money made.

One cant build two alternate trusts: one for the Internet, and one for 
Internet of cars.  They must be together one trust.

Alex

> 
> 
> 
> Best Regards
> 
> Mounira
> 
> 
> Le mar. 20 avr. 2021 à 11:51, Alexandre Petrescu 
> <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> 
> a écrit :
> 
> Hi, Mounira,
> 
> Le 16/04/2021 à 14:13, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit :
>> 
>> Dear all, Dear Russ, Dear Jerome, Dear Alex,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I’m sorry for the delay. I would like to provide some 
>> clarificationsconcerning:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I 
>>>> participated, and
>> 
>> some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with openssl and
> normal
>> 
>> certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like 4G.
> They work
>> 
>> fine.
>> 
>> 
>> But, I want to highlight that the European commission are
> funding
>> several Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) deployment projects such as:
>> 
>> 
>> - Scoop@F http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>
>> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/
> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>> :
>> 
>> 
>> which is about deploying 3000 cars + 2000 km of roads
>> 
>> 
>> - InterCor https://intercor-project.eu/
> <https://intercor-project.eu/>
>> <https://intercor-project.eu/ <https://intercor-project.eu/>>,
>> 
>> - C-Roads Platform https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html
> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>
>> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html
> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>>
>> 
>> 
>> InterCor and C-Roads are about harmonising C-ITS
> specifications in
>> Europe
>> 
>> 
>> - INDID
>> 
> https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
<https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html>
>> 
>> 
> <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
<https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html>>.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> All these projects are using ETSI TS 103 097 certificates,
> which is a
>> profile of 1609.2 to secure C-ITS messages:
> 
> But there are also other projects funded by the EU in the same
> domain (connected automated mobility with self-driving cars) and
> where more open certificates are being used, with more open source
> software.
> 
>> 
>> 
> https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf>
>> 
>> 
> <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf>>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As mentioned by Jerome, one use case of the RFC 8902 could be
> to sign
>> CAM and DENM messages on facilities layer and not geonet as 
>> specified in ETSI.
> 
> Yes, but has that been done?  HAs someone put CAM messages on IP on a
> 4G link and signed with 1609.2 certificates?  I think not.
> 
> It would be good if it worked, but it would need the CAs to know 
> these certifiicate formats, and the CAs would need to be known in 
> common browsers.
> 
>> Yes, in projects dealing with C-ITS security interoperability, we 
>> use MQTT to exchange C-ITS messages
> between many
>> countries to ensure continuity of service when vehicle is
> crossing
>> borders.
> 
> Ok, good to know.
> 
>> 
>> 
>> We could also use the RFC for Vehicle-To-Internet simply to
> upload
>> log of vehicle for example etc…
> 
> Yes, but what CA would be put in the server of that log?  Would that
>  CA be a self-made CA with openssl (or other open source software),
> or would it be a widely known CA like the CAs present in firefox,
> for example?
> 
> My guess is that you assume a self-made CAs, and I agree with it for 
> experimentation.
> 
> But for deployment there would be a need for the existing CAs in the 
> browsers to implement these 1609.2 certs.  And they are paying. I 
> doubt it could work.
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> The reason is because the former is all open source
> software and
>>>> freely accessible standards, whereas  1609.2 are closed
> documents
>>>> and ETSI ITS certificate software is not integrated in
>>>> mainline software like openssl.
>> 
>> 
>> There's a java implementation of 1609.2/103 097 here: 
>> https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common
> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>
>> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common
> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>>. I already used it.
> 
> Yes, but the spec is paying.  That does inspire seriousness but
> might inspire risk for the confidence.
> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the
>>>> certificate are
>> 
>> expensive.  hard to access and the certificate are expensive.
>> 
>> 
>> you can get certificates from 
>> https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/
> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>
>> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/
> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>>
> 
> Thanks for the pointer, I did not know ghsiss.  Are they paying 
> certificates?
> 
> Recently I worked with Microsec and they might also propose 
> certificates for cheaper (free), if it is for evaluation, or for 
> academia, or similar.  And Microsec CA _is_ present in the browsers.
>  But can Microsec sign these 1609.2 certificates and still not ask
> me (end user) to pay for the certificates?
> 
> Another thing to consider is whether or not ghsiss (and Microsec for 
> that matter) are reachable on IPv6.  That is also a make kor break 
> condition of use.  It is worth trying.
> 
> Thanks for the message.
> 
> Alex
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>> In  my personal opinion, it remains good if IPWAVE provides a 
>>>> guideline on how to secure IP vehicular communication,
> including
>>>> interoperability between systems (although I have at that time 
>>>> limited resources to actively contribute to this), as several 
>>>> options are on the table and we need to guarantee the trust 
>>>> chain, even considering different protocol or standards being 
>>>> used.
>> 
>> 
>> I’m also interested to work on security interoperability in
> C-ITS and
>> we could add:
>> 
>> 
>> - Misbehaving in vehicular network
>> 
>> - Revocation management
>> 
>> - Pseudonym management/change to avoid tracking and to ensure 
>> privacy
>> 
>> 
>> Thank you Russ for your time on this RFC and for your valuable 
>> review.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Kind regards
>> 
>> Mounira
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> ---------- Forwarded message --------- De : *Alexandre Petrescu* 
>> <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]> 
> <mailto:[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>>>
>> Date: jeu. 15 avr. 2021 à 22:44 Subject: Re: [ipwave] RFC8902
> - TLS
>> with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one 
>> Internet To: Jérôme Härri <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> <mailto:[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>>>, IPWAVE WG <[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Le 15/04/2021 à 12:35, Jérôme Härri a écrit :
>>> Dear Alex,
>>> 
>>> Thanks. Indeed such discrepancies is particularly an issue
> when it
>>> comes to merging wireless and wired (V2I). For example, you
> send a
>>> DENM over 5G reaching a MEC. It will remove the ETSI KPI and do 
>>> something on its own (not fully sure what exactly), or if
> you use
>>> MQTT type of interaction, where it is even less clear (what a 
>>> broker will do on a DENM sent over JSON is not fully clear
> to keep
>>> track of any kind of security/data integrity...
>>> 
>>> For that matter, there was one effort from C-ROAD to develop 
>>> something called 'Facilities' PKI, saying that the ITS KPI
> are at
>>> facilities layer and no longer at geonet. The advantage is
> that at
>>> least now, you do not need to remove the KPI when moving and 
>>> exchanging DENM (or else) in backend. But I am not sure of the 
>>> current status or even if this WI is actually active.
>>> 
>>> Now, I do not fully agree with you with the equivalence of the 
>>> internet KPI and ITS KPI. Indeed, the principle is the same, but 
>>> in the test you mention, the trust chain is not guaranteed (you 
>>> edit your own root-CA for the purpose of the tests, but for
> example
>>> in one of our cross-border deployment (e.g. DE-FR), this
> solution
>>> does not work, as a German car will not recognize the CA from a 
>>> French root-CA. So, the key issue I see is not really (or
> only) on
>>> security but on Trust. The ITS KPI is one option, there might be 
>>> others, but 'open ssl' strategies still face the trust-chain 
>>> issue.
>> 
>> Jérôme,
>> 
>> I agree with you.
>> 
>> In the discussion above I think you meant 'PKI' throughout
> (Public
>> Key Infrastructure), and not 'KPI' (Key Performance Indicator).
>> 
>> That said, the question you formulate about how a
> car-to-server MQTT
>> interaction on IP would be authenticated by certificates that
> are
>> verified by CAs that are absent from normal browsers, or how
> the CAs
>> that are present in normal browsers would help authenticating
> CAM
>> messages sent on IP - is a very relevant question.
>> 
>> Alex
>>> 
>>> Best Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jérôme
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message----- From: its <[e-mail]
> <mailto:[e-mail]>
>> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>>
> On Behalf
>>> Of Alexandre Petrescu Sent: Thursday, 15 April 2021 12:20 To: 
>>> IPWAVE WG <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> <mailto:[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>>> Subject: [ipwave]
>>> RFC8902
>> - TLS with ITS
>>> Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
>>> 
>>> Hi, IPWAVErs,
>>> 
>>> A colleague pointed me to this recently issued RFC 8902
> about TLS
>>> with ITS Certificates.
>>> 
>>> This RFC is of an EXPERIMENTAL Category.
>>> 
>>> It might be in agreement with other IEEE standards such as
> 1609.2.
>>> 
>>> But I must say that I think it further deepens the discrepancy 
>>> between what is PKI in the Internet and what is the closed
> PKI for
>>> ITS.  That is a discrepancy that exists for a long time, and I 
>>> must share that - IMHO - I am surprised that the IETF issues
> an RFC
>>> that further promotes such a discrepancy.
>>> 
>>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I
> participated,
>>> and some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with
> openssl and
>>> normal certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like
> 4G.
>>> They work fine.  The CA is a local CA (not a commercial CA), but 
>>> the concept _is_ compatible with normal CAs.  These dont use the 
>>> ETSI ITS-specific certificates, neither the 1609.2 certificates.
>>> 
>>> I think there are more such trial deployments using local (but 
>>> standard, openssl PKIs and certificates) than there are trials 
>>> using ETSI ITS certificates or 1609.2 certificates.  The
> reason is
>>> because the former is all open source software and freely 
>>> accessible standards, whereas 1609.2 are closed documents
> and ETSI
>>> ITS certificate software is not integrated in mainline software 
>>> like openssl.
>>> 
>>> There are many easily accessible CAs (Certificate Authorities) 
>>> that are integrated in the Internet and in main web browsers, 
>>> whereas the ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the 
>>> certificate are expensive.  Many strong oppinions maintain
> that it
>>> should stay that way: cars PKI different than Internet PKI.
>>> 
>>> There should be one Internet, and that means one trust, and one 
>>> PKI.
>>> 
>>> Everything else should not be done at IETF, I think; hence my 
>>> comment about this particular RFC.
>>> 
>>> That is my humble oppinion.
>>> 
>>> I would like to hear other oppinions?  Maybe I miss something...
>>> 
>>> Alex
>>> 
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