Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
Alexandre Petrescu <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com> Mon, 26 April 2021 10:15 UTC
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To: Mounira MSAHLI <msahli1717@gmail.com>
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From: Alexandre Petrescu <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
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Le 25/04/2021 à 12:08, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit : > > Hi Alex > > > >>> I would like to ask: can one implement ETSI TS 103 097 completely >>> independently of having >> the 1609.2 document? This is very >>> important for an implementer with low ressources, because the >>> ETSI TS document is free access whereas the 1609.2 is paying. > > > You can find the ASN1 structure of IEEE 1609.2 certificate and > signature in the annex of ETSI TS 103 097 v 1.3.1 Yes, thanks for the pointer. But that ASN1 structure says this: > IMPORTS Ieee1609Dot2Data, ExplicitCertificate FROM IEEE1609dot2 That means that an implementer must have "IEEE1609dot2" in order to implement it. That is a paying document. (it's the same situation with SPAT-EM and SPAT (one imports the other, and hence must pay); but it is not the case with CAM and BSM (one does not import the other, and hence one must not pay)). >>> A commodity PC receiving a CAM message in the car will never >>> trust it if it arrived via a 4G interface. If that CAM arrived >>> on an ITS-G5 interface, then there might be some trust (the >>> ITS-G5 forwarding computer might have CAs certs), but that is not >>> 'end-to-end' trust. > > > If the message is signed with a valid certificate with a valid trust > chain, we can trust it regardless the transmission channel if it is > short range and long range. The question that might be raised is what is a 'valid certificate'. In order to be sure a certificate is valid, often times the commodity PC relies on a CA certificate that is built-in into the browser, or in the operating system. Without such a CA built-in one should some times manually install CAs in the PCs. That works ok in small demonstration pilots, but it is not well adapted for large scale deployments. By that I do not mean the 'Large Scale Pilots' but I mean widespread adoption by the public at large. >>> First, I fully disagree with that RFC, but that is a personal >>> oppinion. It is an EXPERIMENTAL RFC, so I can live with it. It >>> has some problems that we can discuss about separately. > > > You disagree with the form of the document but not the content. The form: not few would disagree with its ToC. I also disagree with some aspects in its content. I can write about it separately. I am not sure though that there is interest in progressing it beyond being an EXPERIMENTAL RFC. This is a contradiction that I learned to live with: some RFCs are called Requests for Comments, but they dont really need comments. If there were a need to discuss that RFC then it would have been discussed publicly when it was an I-D. This is not a negative remark, and all RFCs that go through detailed reviews, as this one has, are useful. Better have an RFC on the topic rather than silence. > It was reviewed by many IETF specialists on TLS and security so it is > ready to be tested in deployment project. YEs, good to know. Alex > > > > > Mounira > > > Le ven. 23 avr. 2021 à 12:58, Alexandre Petrescu > <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>> > a écrit : > > Hi, Mounira, > > Le 22/04/2021 à 17:52, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit : >> >> >> Hi Alex, >> >> >>>> But there are also other projects funded by the EU in the same >>>> domain (connected automated mobility with self-driving cars) >>>> and where more open certificates are being used, with more >>>> open source software. >> >> >> We are 19 member states in C-ROADS Platform. I did co-chair of TF1 >> C-Roads platform in 2018, dealing with security aspects and its >> interoperability in C-ITS. The common certificate data structure >> standard is ETSI TS 103 097 ( version 1.3.1 which is a profile of >> 1609.2). > > It is good to know. > > I would like to ask: can one implement ETSI TS 103 097 completely > independently of having the 1609.2 document? This is very important > for an implementer with low ressources, because the ETSI TS document > is free access whereas the 1609.2 is paying. > >>>> Yes, but has that been done? HAs someone put CAM messages on >>>> IP on a 4G link and signed with 1609.2 certificates? I think >>>> not. >> >> >> Why not? I did not get the point of the common browsers but it was >> tested on hybrid communication ITS-G5 and 5G. > > The point is the following: if one puts a CAM message on 4G on IP, > and signed with a 1609.2 certificate, then that message would need to > be verified in a browser. That browser would need a CA in its > built-in list. That CA should be understanding the 1609.2 format. > > It is ok to send CAM messages on ITS-G5 and signed with 1609.2 > certificates, because that is not IP, and it is in closed domains > where one also puts a CA manually (not built in in browsers > downloaded from the Internet). > > But even if there is trust on ITS-G5 relying on self-made CAs, that > same trust can not be extended to 4G. The trust on 4G is the > Internet trust, i.e. built-in CAs in browsers. > > A commodity PC receiving a CAM message in the car will never trust it > if it arrived via a 4G interface. If that CAM arrived on an ITS-G5 > interface, then there might be some trust (the ITS-G5 forwarding > computer might have CAs certs), but that is not 'end-to-end' trust. > >>>> Yes, but what CA would be put in the server of that log? Would >>>> that CA >> >> be a self-made CA with openssl (or other open source software), or >> would it be a widely known CA like the CAs present in firefox, for >> example? >> >> >> My guess is that you assume a self-made CAs, and I agree with it >> for experimentation. > > YEs - this is what all demonstrators of cars I have seen in Europe > do: self-made certificates and self-made CAs. > >>>> But for deployment there would be a need for the existing CAs >>>> in the browsers to implement these 1609.2 certs. And they are >>>> paying. I doubt it could work. >> >> >> The case of TLS Client Using the ITS Certificate and TLS Server >> Uses the X.509 Certificate is already covered by the RFC 8902. > > First, I fully disagree with that RFC, but that is a personal > oppinion. > > It is an EXPERIMENTAL RFC, so I can live with it. > > It has some problems that we can discuss about separately. > >> >> >>>> Recently I worked with Microsec and they might also propose >>>> certificates for cheaper (free), if it is for evaluation, or >>>> for academia, or similar. And Microsec CA _is_ present in the >>>> browsers. But can Microsec sign these 1609.2 certificates and >>>> still not ask me (end user) to pay for the certificates? >> >> >> I find that Microsec cert are compliant to standards below: > > 'compliant', but does it work in practice? > > If yes, then it is great! > >> IEEE Std 1609.2 (IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular >> Environments); >> >> • ETSI TS 102 940 (ITS-S security (PKI) architecture and >> application groups); >> >> • ETSI TS 102 941 (Trust and Privacy Management) >> >> ETSI TS 103 097 (Certificate and message structure definitions for >> C2CPKI). >> >> >> So if you have end user micros cert, you can use it to sign C-ITS >> messages. > > Good to know. > >> >> >>>> And Microsec CA _is_ present in the browsers >> >> >> You mean the certificate authority. You want to sign CAM with >> certificate authority ? > > I meant to say that Microsec might provide me certificates for cars, > for almost free. I hope these certs have the right format. > > Microsec CA is already present built in in the browsers. > > So, I suspect that I could send CAM messages over IP over 4G, signed > with these certificates that Microsec provided. > > I must say that I dont know precisely how to sign IP messages by > using certificates, but I do know how to send CAM messages on IP on > 4G. One woule be using the asn1.c open source to build the message, > and BSD sockets to send them. > > I suspect (dont know?) that signing an IP message might be a matter > of calling a C function from the openssl open source package. > >> >> >> I did not get the point could you clarify more please. >> >> >> >>>> http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/> >> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>>> : >> >> >>>> This is not reachable on IPv6. >> >> >> You mean the web page of the project or the PKI of the project ? > > Yes, I mean that URL is not reachable on IPv6. That says a lot about > it. > > There is one thing to talk about IPv6 and another thing to do it. > > There is one thing to say that all vehicular communications must be > on IPv6 and there is another thing to actually do it. > >> Scoop + Intercor projects are already finished in December 2019. > > Great, I think they were a great success. I heard very good things > about their advancements and demonstrations. > >> Any way the business model of C-ITS PKI, in all mentioned project >> is SaaS. If you want to get access to this service via IPv6, you >> can ask the PKI. > > I think there is indeed a business model for PKIs used for vehicular > networks. But that business model should approach more the existing > business models of the large CAs that are built-in in browsers, > rather than the business models of vehicular manufacturers. > > It is the business model of vehicular manufacturers (their > 'digitizing') that should be adapted, and not vice-versa. > > In this advancement of the business model, the most important > criterion is the trust. Without trust there can be no money made. > > One cant build two alternate trusts: one for the Internet, and one > for Internet of cars. They must be together one trust. > > Alex > >> >> >> >> Best Regards >> >> Mounira >> >> >> Le mar. 20 avr. 2021 à 11:51, Alexandre Petrescu >> <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com> > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>>> >> a écrit : >> >> Hi, Mounira, >> >> Le 16/04/2021 à 14:13, Mounira MSAHLI a écrit : >>> >>> Dear all, Dear Russ, Dear Jerome, Dear Alex, >>> >>> >>> >>> I’m sorry for the delay. I would like to provide some >>> clarificationsconcerning: >>> >>> >>> >>>>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I >>>>> participated, and >>> >>> some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with openssl and >> normal >>> >>> certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like 4G. >> They work >>> >>> fine. >>> >>> >>> But, I want to highlight that the European commission are >> funding >>> several Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) deployment projects such as: >>> >>> >>> - Scoop@F http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/> >> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>> >>> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/> >> <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ > <http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/>>> : >>> >>> >>> which is about deploying 3000 cars + 2000 km of roads >>> >>> >>> - InterCor https://intercor-project.eu/ > <https://intercor-project.eu/> >> <https://intercor-project.eu/ <https://intercor-project.eu/>> >>> <https://intercor-project.eu/ <https://intercor-project.eu/> > <https://intercor-project.eu/ <https://intercor-project.eu/>>>, >>> >>> - C-Roads Platform https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html> >> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>> >>> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html> >> <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html > <https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html>>> >>> >>> >>> InterCor and C-Roads are about harmonising C-ITS >> specifications in >>> Europe >>> >>> >>> - INDID >>> >> > https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html > > > > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html > > > > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html>> >>> >>> >> > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html > > > > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html > > > > <https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html>>>. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> All these projects are using ETSI TS 103 097 certificates, >> which is a >>> profile of 1609.2 to secure C-ITS messages: >> >> But there are also other projects funded by the EU in the same >> domain (connected automated mobility with self-driving cars) and >> where more open certificates are being used, with more open source >> software. >> >>> >>> >> > https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf > > > > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf > > > > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf>> >>> >>> >> > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf > > > > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf > > > > <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> As mentioned by Jerome, one use case of the RFC 8902 could be >> to sign >>> CAM and DENM messages on facilities layer and not geonet as >>> specified in ETSI. >> >> Yes, but has that been done? HAs someone put CAM messages on IP on >> a 4G link and signed with 1609.2 certificates? I think not. >> >> It would be good if it worked, but it would need the CAs to know >> these certifiicate formats, and the CAs would need to be known in >> common browsers. >> >>> Yes, in projects dealing with C-ITS security interoperability, >>> we use MQTT to exchange C-ITS messages >> between many >>> countries to ensure continuity of service when vehicle is >> crossing >>> borders. >> >> Ok, good to know. >> >>> >>> >>> We could also use the RFC for Vehicle-To-Internet simply to >> upload >>> log of vehicle for example etc… >> >> Yes, but what CA would be put in the server of that log? Would >> that CA be a self-made CA with openssl (or other open source >> software), or would it be a widely known CA like the CAs present in >> firefox, for example? >> >> My guess is that you assume a self-made CAs, and I agree with it >> for experimentation. >> >> But for deployment there would be a need for the existing CAs in >> the browsers to implement these 1609.2 certs. And they are paying. >> I doubt it could work. >> >>> >>> >>> >>>>> The reason is because the former is all open source >> software and >>>>> freely accessible standards, whereas 1609.2 are closed >> documents >>>>> and ETSI ITS certificate software is not integrated in >>>>> mainline software like openssl. >>> >>> >>> There's a java implementation of 1609.2/103 097 here: >>> https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common> >> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>> >>> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common> >> <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common > <https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common>>>. I already used it. >> >> Yes, but the spec is paying. That does inspire seriousness but >> might inspire risk for the confidence. >> >>> >>> >>>>> ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the >>>>> certificate are >>> >>> expensive. hard to access and the certificate are expensive. >>> >>> >>> you can get certificates from >>> https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/ > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/> >> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/ > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>> >>> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/ > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/> >> <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/ > <https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/>>> >> >> Thanks for the pointer, I did not know ghsiss. Are they paying >> certificates? >> >> Recently I worked with Microsec and they might also propose >> certificates for cheaper (free), if it is for evaluation, or for >> academia, or similar. And Microsec CA _is_ present in the >> browsers. But can Microsec sign these 1609.2 certificates and still >> not ask me (end user) to pay for the certificates? >> >> Another thing to consider is whether or not ghsiss (and Microsec >> for that matter) are reachable on IPv6. That is also a make kor >> break condition of use. It is worth trying. >> >> Thanks for the message. >> >> Alex >> >>> >>> >>> >>>>> In my personal opinion, it remains good if IPWAVE provides >>>>> a guideline on how to secure IP vehicular communication, >> including >>>>> interoperability between systems (although I have at that >>>>> time limited resources to actively contribute to this), as >>>>> several options are on the table and we need to guarantee the >>>>> trust chain, even considering different protocol or standards >>>>> being used. >>> >>> >>> I’m also interested to work on security interoperability in >> C-ITS and >>> we could add: >>> >>> >>> - Misbehaving in vehicular network >>> >>> - Revocation management >>> >>> - Pseudonym management/change to avoid tracking and to ensure >>> privacy >>> >>> >>> Thank you Russ for your time on this RFC and for your valuable >>> review. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kind regards >>> >>> Mounira >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message --------- De : *Alexandre Petrescu* >>> <alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com >>> <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com> >> <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>> >> <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com> >> <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com > <mailto:alexandre.petrescu@gmail.com>>>> >>> Date: jeu. 15 avr. 2021 à 22:44 Subject: Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 >> - TLS >>> with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one >>> Internet To: Jérôme Härri <Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr > <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr> >> <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr >> <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr>> >>> <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr >>> <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr> >> <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr > <mailto:Jerome.Haerri@eurecom.fr>>>>, IPWAVE WG <its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org> >> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>> >>> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Le 15/04/2021 à 12:35, Jérôme Härri a écrit : >>>> Dear Alex, >>>> >>>> Thanks. Indeed such discrepancies is particularly an issue >> when it >>>> comes to merging wireless and wired (V2I). For example, you >> send a >>>> DENM over 5G reaching a MEC. It will remove the ETSI KPI and >>>> do something on its own (not fully sure what exactly), or if >> you use >>>> MQTT type of interaction, where it is even less clear (what a >>>> broker will do on a DENM sent over JSON is not fully clear >> to keep >>>> track of any kind of security/data integrity... >>>> >>>> For that matter, there was one effort from C-ROAD to develop >>>> something called 'Facilities' PKI, saying that the ITS KPI >> are at >>>> facilities layer and no longer at geonet. The advantage is >> that at >>>> least now, you do not need to remove the KPI when moving and >>>> exchanging DENM (or else) in backend. But I am not sure of the >>>> current status or even if this WI is actually active. >>>> >>>> Now, I do not fully agree with you with the equivalence of the >>>> internet KPI and ITS KPI. Indeed, the principle is the same, >>>> but in the test you mention, the trust chain is not guaranteed >>>> (you edit your own root-CA for the purpose of the tests, but >>>> for >> example >>>> in one of our cross-border deployment (e.g. DE-FR), this >> solution >>>> does not work, as a German car will not recognize the CA from >>>> a French root-CA. So, the key issue I see is not really (or >> only) on >>>> security but on Trust. The ITS KPI is one option, there might >>>> be others, but 'open ssl' strategies still face the >>>> trust-chain issue. >>> >>> Jérôme, >>> >>> I agree with you. >>> >>> In the discussion above I think you meant 'PKI' throughout >> (Public >>> Key Infrastructure), and not 'KPI' (Key Performance Indicator). >>> >>> That said, the question you formulate about how a >> car-to-server MQTT >>> interaction on IP would be authenticated by certificates that >> are >>> verified by CAs that are absent from normal browsers, or how >> the CAs >>> that are present in normal browsers would help authenticating >> CAM >>> messages sent on IP - is a very relevant question. >>> >>> Alex >>>> >>>> Best Regards, >>>> >>>> Jérôme >>>> >>>> -----Original Message----- From: its <its-bounces@ietf.org > <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org> >> <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org>> >>> <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org> > <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:its-bounces@ietf.org>>>> >> On Behalf >>>> Of Alexandre Petrescu Sent: Thursday, 15 April 2021 12:20 To: >>>> IPWAVE WG <its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> > <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>> >> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>>>> Subject: [ipwave] >>>> RFC8902 >>> - TLS with ITS >>>> Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet >>>> >>>> Hi, IPWAVErs, >>>> >>>> A colleague pointed me to this recently issued RFC 8902 >> about TLS >>>> with ITS Certificates. >>>> >>>> This RFC is of an EXPERIMENTAL Category. >>>> >>>> It might be in agreement with other IEEE standards such as >> 1609.2. >>>> >>>> But I must say that I think it further deepens the discrepancy >>>> between what is PKI in the Internet and what is the closed >> PKI for >>>> ITS. That is a discrepancy that exists for a long time, and I >>>> must share that - IMHO - I am surprised that the IETF issues >> an RFC >>>> that further promotes such a discrepancy. >>>> >>>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I >> participated, >>>> and some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with >> openssl and >>>> normal certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like >> 4G. >>>> They work fine. The CA is a local CA (not a commercial CA), >>>> but the concept _is_ compatible with normal CAs. These dont >>>> use the ETSI ITS-specific certificates, neither the 1609.2 >>>> certificates. >>>> >>>> I think there are more such trial deployments using local (but >>>> standard, openssl PKIs and certificates) than there are trials >>>> using ETSI ITS certificates or 1609.2 certificates. The >> reason is >>>> because the former is all open source software and freely >>>> accessible standards, whereas 1609.2 are closed documents >> and ETSI >>>> ITS certificate software is not integrated in mainline >>>> software like openssl. >>>> >>>> There are many easily accessible CAs (Certificate Authorities) >>>> that are integrated in the Internet and in main web browsers, >>>> whereas the ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the >>>> certificate are expensive. Many strong oppinions maintain >> that it >>>> should stay that way: cars PKI different than Internet PKI. >>>> >>>> There should be one Internet, and that means one trust, and >>>> one PKI. >>>> >>>> Everything else should not be done at IETF, I think; hence my >>>> comment about this particular RFC. >>>> >>>> That is my humble oppinion. >>>> >>>> I would like to hear other oppinions? Maybe I miss >>>> something... >>>> >>>> Alex >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ its mailing >> list >>>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> >> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>> >>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ its mailing >> list >>>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> >> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>> >>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ its mailing list >>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> >> <mailto:its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>> >>> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ its mailing list >>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ its mailing list >> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org> <mailto:its@ietf.org > <mailto:its@ietf.org>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its> >> <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its > <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its>> >> >
- [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXP… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Jérôme Härri
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Russ Housley
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Jérôme Härri
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Russ Housley
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] requirements for CAs for vehicular n… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Mounira MSAHLI
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… William Whyte
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… William Whyte
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… William Whyte
- Re: [ipwave] wish list for CAs for vehicular netw… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates,… Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] permission Alexandre Petrescu
- Re: [ipwave] permission Jérôme Härri
- Re: [ipwave] permission Alexandre Petrescu