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Re: [jose] RSA-OAEP vs RSA-OAEP-256

Les Hazlewood <lhazlewood@gmail.com> Wed, 11 May 2022 17:49 UTC

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From: Les Hazlewood <lhazlewood@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 10:49:15 -0700
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To: Sergey Beryozkin <sberyozkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>, jose@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [jose] RSA-OAEP vs RSA-OAEP-256
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I could be wrong, but my current understanding of the `Recommended`,
`Recommended+`, etc labels is that they are a signal to implementers
(library authors) of what should be supported for completeness, not a
cryptographic theory recommendation for application developers.

- Les

On Wed, May 11, 2022 at 5:19 AM Sergey Beryozkin <sberyozkin@gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 8:40 AM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 6 May 2022, at 17:26, Sergey Beryozkin <sberyozkin@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> 
>> Hi Everyone
>>
>> I'm contributing to a project where `RSA-OAEP`  [1] is currently a
>> default key encryption algorithm for encrypting JWT claims and we've had a
>> request to replace it with `RSA-OAEP-256` because `SHA-1` is used in
>> `RSA-OAEP`.
>>
>> I'd like to ask the experts, why does `RSA-OAEP` have a `Recommended+`
>> status, while `RSA-OAEP-256` - optional, at [1] ?
>>
>> Also, while it is not a JOSE specific question, I'd appreciate some
>> comments on whether having an 'SHA-1' element in the `RSA-OAEP` encryption
>> process makes `RSA-OAEP` less secure or not. My basic understanding, based
>> on some Web search results, is that `RSA-OAEP` remains a secure algorithm.
>>
>>
>> It may be better to ask this question of CFRG. I am not aware of any
>> attacks on SHA-1 in the context of MGF1 at the current time. But that may
>> be partly because nobody is looking for them: SHA-1 has been proven
>> insecure, do cryptographers have to publicly break every individual use of
>> it before people stop using it?
>>
>>
> Thanks for your answer, it makes sense. But now I'm even more interested
> in finding out why RSA-OAEP has a  `Recommended+` status in the JOSE space
> in [1], even though the JWA spec is outdated, it was known, when it was
> created, that SHA-1 was insecure.
>
> Thanks, Sergey
>
>
>>
>> Thanks, Sergey
>>
>> [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-4.3%5BRSA-OAEP%5D
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>>
>>
>> — Neil
>>
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