Re: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Richard Barnes <[e-mail]>]

I've removed the formatting DISCUSS point, but would like to hear back from
Jim before clearing that one.

--Richard

On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Mike Jones <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> > > > > > DISCUSS:
> > > > > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > --
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Section 6.
> > > > > > """
> > > > > > These Header Parameters MUST be integrity protected if the
> > > > > > information that they convey is to be utilized in a trust
> decision.
> > > > > > """
> > > > > > This smells really fishy to me.  What's your attack scenario?
> I'm
> > > > > > pretty certain that there's no way any of these fields can be
> > > > > > altered in such a way that (1) the signature will validate, and
> > > > > > (2) the recipient will accept a key it shouldn't.  By way of
> > > > > > contrast, CMS doesn't sign the certificate fields, and the
> > > > > > Certificate payload in TLS is only signed as a side effect of the
> > > > > > protocol's verification that the
> > > > remote end has been the same through the whole handshake (which
> > > > doesn't apply here).
> > > > >
> > > > > The attack scenario is trivial to describe.  If an attacker can
> > > > > change
> > > > information used in a trust decision, the trust decision has no
> > > > validity.  Unless the information is integrity-protected, the
> attacker
> > > > could change the non- integrity-protected portions of the JWS in an
> > > undetectable way.
> > > > >
> > > > > That's hand waving, not an attack scenario.  Allow me to elaborate
> on
> > > this:
> > > > >
> > > > > There is no possible attack scenario for the key identifiers that
> > > > > identify a *key*
> > > > (vs. a cert) -- jwk, jku, and kid.  For any given signed object,
> there
> > > > is exactly one key that can validate the signature (otherwise the
> > > > crypto is broken).  If the attacker changes the validation key, then
> > > > the signature won't validate.  So there is no need to integrity
> > > > protect these headers, since there's no point to the attacker
> changing
> > > them.  RFC 2634 actually has text to this effect:
> > There is a difference between how a key is referenced and how a key
> reference is used in a trust decision.
> >
> > This is the difference between:
> > Here is where you go to get the key, and you know the key is associated
> with the entity because you have it in your database someplace, and
> > Here is where you go to get the key, and you know the key is associated
> with the entity because the URL is parsed to get that information.
> >
> > In the first case, there is no need to sign the pointer to the key.  In
> the second case there is.  Possible attack below:
> >
> > If you use the URL:  "https://augustcellars.com/jose-signing-key" and
> you make a trust decision that the key is associated with
> augustcellars.com, then this should be signed.  If  not then it the same
> key could be published by "https://augustwest.com/jose-signing-key" (just
> a simple copy) and the jku changed to point to the new address.  In this
> case you don't know who actually signed the object, just that the key can
> be used to verify the signature successfully.
> >
> > I'm not clear on what security property you think this is violating.
> >
> > If you've made the decision to trust both augustcellars.com and
> augustwest.com to assert trusted keys, then you've trusted augustwest.com
> and there's no issue.
> > If you're using the domain name in the HTTPS URI to identify the signer,
> then all augustwest.com can do is make it look as though it signed the
> object, which it could have done anyway with a different key.  It can't
> make it look as though augustcellars.com signed the object when it didn't.
> > Still not seeing an attack here.
>
> I think Jim laid out the attack pretty clearly, but I understand that
> perceptions vary.  Given that you're asking to relax the security
> properties of the draft and Jim believes that the current language
> mitigates a real attack or attacks, I don't think that as editor I should
> relax the security properties without clear direction from the working
> group to do so, and in particular, without an agreement from Jim that the
> attack isn't real or doesn't matter.  Discussions can obviously continue on
> this, and at least as I see it, will need to unless you're willing to
> declare yourself in the rough on this, Richard.
>
>                                 Thanks again,
>                                 -- Mike
>
> > --Richard
> >
> >
> >
> > Jim
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > """
> > > > >    The first version of this attack is a simple denial of service
> attack
> > > > >    where an invalid certificate is substituted for the valid
> > > > >    certificate. This renders the message unverifiable, as the
> public key
> > > > >    in the certificate no longer matches the private key used to
> sign the
> > > > >    message.
> > > > > """
> > > >
> > > > It's not clear to me that enabling the attacker to substitute keys
> and
> > > > get the recipient to attempt to validate the signature with a key of
> > > > the attacker's choosing doesn't constitute at least a portion of a
> > > > viable attack scenario.  It may or may not (knowing for sure is
> beyond
> > > > my specific cryptographic expertise in this area) and it may not now
> > > > but may be in the future (when new attacks are created).  Requiring
> > > > these parameters to be integrity protected when used in a trust
> decision
> > > does no harm and may do substantial good.
> > > >
> > > > > With regard to the certificate identifiers ("x5u", "x5c", "x5t",
> and
> > > > > "x5t#S256"),
> > > > the risks that Jim points out [RFC2634, Section 5] are real, but only
> > > > apply in certain narrow circumstances.  Namely, the only time a risk
> > > > arises is when two certificates have been issued for the same public
> key,
> > > with different attributes.
> > > > This is exceedingly rare in practice, and all current secure
> messaging
> > > > systems get along fine without protection against this attack.  And
> it
> > > > might not even be an attack -- you could envision cases with "x5u"
> > > > where the signer purposely presents different certificates to
> different
> > > relying parties!
> > > > > So the blanket requirement that these fields MUST be integrity
> > > > > protected is not
> > > > appropriate.  It is only required for certain special situations
> using
> > > certificates.
> > > > Proposed revision:
> > > > > Delete: "These Header Parameters MUST be integrity protected if the
> > > > information that they convey is to be utilized in a trust decision."
> > > >
> > > > Researching the history a bit more, this text was added to address
> > > > issue #104
> > > > http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/104 raised by Jim
> > > > Schaad.  Unless Jim agrees that it is now somehow unnecessary, I
> don't
> > > > believe that it's reasonable for us to now remove it.  Also, see
> Jim's
> > > > related comments about trust statements and trust decisions in issue
> #74.
> > > >
> > > > > Add new paragraph: "In situations where multiple certificates with
> > > > > different
> > > > attributes may be issued over the same public key, there is a risk
> > > > that one of these certificates may be substituted for another. In
> such
> > > > situations, the creator of a JWS object MUST integrity protect the
> "x5u",
> > > "x5c", "x5t", and "x5t#S256"
> > > > attributes, if present."
> > > > >
> > > > > For what it's worth, Sean had us add language in a number of places
> > > > > that
> > > > basically said that information is only as trustworthy as its source
> > > > and the means by which it is obtained.  If I remember correctly,
> this was
> > > one of those places.
> > > > >
>