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Re: [jose] RSA-OAEP vs RSA-OAEP-256

Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com> Mon, 09 May 2022 07:41 UTC

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From: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
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Date: Mon, 09 May 2022 08:40:54 +0100
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To: Sergey Beryozkin <sberyozkin@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [jose] RSA-OAEP vs RSA-OAEP-256
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> On 6 May 2022, at 17:26, Sergey Beryozkin <sberyozkin@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi Everyone
> 
> I'm contributing to a project where `RSA-OAEP`  [1] is currently a default key encryption algorithm for encrypting JWT claims and we've had a request to replace it with `RSA-OAEP-256` because `SHA-1` is used in `RSA-OAEP`.
> 
> I'd like to ask the experts, why does `RSA-OAEP` have a `Recommended+` status, while `RSA-OAEP-256` - optional, at [1] ?
> 
> Also, while it is not a JOSE specific question, I'd appreciate some comments on whether having an 'SHA-1' element in the `RSA-OAEP` encryption process makes `RSA-OAEP` less secure or not. My basic understanding, based on some Web search results, is that `RSA-OAEP` remains a secure algorithm.

It may be better to ask this question of CFRG. I am not aware of any attacks on SHA-1 in the context of MGF1 at the current time. But that may be partly because nobody is looking for them: SHA-1 has been proven insecure, do cryptographers have to publicly break every individual use of it before people stop using it?


> Thanks, Sergey
> 
> [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-4.3%5BRSA-OAEP%5D
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— Neil

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