Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls

John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Tue, 26 February 2013 09:10 UTC

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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2013 01:10:16 -0800
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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Cc: 'Richard Barnes' <rlb@ipv.sx>, 'Mike Jones' <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, jose@ietf.org, odonoghue@isoc.org
Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
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There seem to be multiple interpretations of the entire header would be available to the app.

I think Richard clarified that like CMS the only thing that would be returned to the application would be the body, and the method of accessing the header would be through JOSE plugins of some sort.

> Actually, I would expect a library not to pass on anything from the header.  OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt function doesn't provide you with any of the crypto information or protected attributes.  The only thing that gets passed through to upper layers is the protected body.

I expect that the application could take the JWE/JWS apart and extract parameters from the header before passing it to a lib, but that is sort of a hack.  

Making the info available via extensions to the lib is also posable.

Without some common understanding of what a interoperable JOSE library must implement the specifics of criticality are awkward to discuss.

John B.


On 2013-02-25, at 5:22 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> This would correspond to my expectation.  That the entire header would be available to the application.
>  
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:31 PM
> To: Richard Barnes
> Cc: Mike Jones; odonoghue@isoc.org; jose@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
>  
> We are interested in interoperable JOSE libraries.   I don't have any reason to believe from what we have in the spec that the entire header is passed on with the body after verification.
>  
> Is that your interpretation of the expected behaviour for a JOSE lib?   If that is the expected behaviour then dropping aad may make sense.
>  
> This is a bit more of a challenge without talking about expected API.
>  
> John B.
>  
> On 2013-02-25, at 3:20 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> 
> 
> You seem to be implying that an implementation is selectively stripping out header fields.  Why would you do that, instead of just passing on everything, or nothing?
> 
> 
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 6:09 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> aad allows you to signal to JOSE that the included parameters be passed through and not just discarded.  
>  
> I think it helps interoperability, simply saying header x may be ignored is a problem unless there is a rule to always pass on parameters that are not understood.. 
>  
> John B.
>  
>  
> On 2013-02-25, at 2:40 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> 
> 
> Sorry, John, no agreement on "aad"  :)
>  
> If you want integrity checking on non-critical stuff, just put it in the header and mark it as non-critical.  I'm willing to step back on what I said in my response to "B"; it can be much more easily mitigated by a signer putting something random (and not subject-controlled) before the unknown stuff in the header.
>  
>  
>  
> On Mon, Feb 25, 2013 at 5:16 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> Karen & Mike,
>  
> I think an important issue that Jim and others have tried to get at is some information in the header is intended for the JOSE library, while other header parameters are essentially additional associated data (meta-data about the body) and need to be passed on to other software layers for processing along with the body.   
>  
> An example of that was the proposed "iat" (issued at) element, which needs to be processed outside of the JOSE crypto processing to be useful.
>  
> I suspect a point of agreement might be having an "aad" header parameter that is a JSON object that MUST be ignored by the JOSE library and passed on with the body.  This would provide applications a way to pass meta-data through JOSE that is integrity protected, without JOSE having to parse it.
>  
> Once we remove a large number of the possible extension header parameters from JOSE processing, the problem gets smaller.
>  
> There is however, still the requirement that extensions for the header parameters JOSE processes be possible.
>  
> For that the list of non-critical header parameters is the best solution.  That enables a header parameter to be migrated from non-critical to critical without changing its JSON element name.
>  
> I think that a large number of people on the list favoured the single element with an array of element names that are non-critical.
>  
> My proposal is to add two new top level elements that MUST be understood:
>  
> 1 "ign":  Ignore - an array of top level elements in the envelope that an application MUST ignore if it cannot process them.
> 2 "aad": Additional Associated Data - a JSON object that MUST be provided to applications along with the body if present in a JOSE header.
>  
> All other top level header parameters MUST be understood by a JOSE library or produce a processing fault resulting in an error.
>  
> I would also not want elements listed in "ign" to be passed on to applications.  I think that would cause interoperability issues.   That is what "aad" is intended to provide.
>  
> I know James has legitimate concerns about allowing potentially user provided data to be included in the header (Or anywhere likely).  I think this is a separate issue that needs to be addressed by security considerations to add entropy to the header if such data is included.   That may require a new "ent" Entropy element that MUST be ignored.  This should be a separate discussion.
>  
> Finally, for JWK, I believe that we should just state that not-understand elements should be ignored. When including a JWK header parameter this is also allows for extension to the JWK parameter, as the MUST understand in JWE/JWS only allies to the top level parameter's, and not the sub parameters they may contain.
>  
> My proposal doesn't neatly fit into fit into one of the poll answers, but I think it may address the majority of concerns.
>  
> Regards
> John B.
> On 2013-02-25, at 7:41 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> wrote:
>  
> Thanks for sending this, Karen.  Hopefully your analysis will help the working group reach a resolution on this issue soon.  I’m writing this note primarily as an editor to help inform the working group’s discussions, rather than as an individual contributor.
>  
> First, I want to point out that while we’ve been discussing criticality of header parameters, the specs actually currently have the “MUST be understood” language in the JWK specification as well, as that’s another potential extension point.  The JWK description says “Additional members MAY be present in the JWK.  If present, they MUST be understood by implementations using them.”  The same language is present for the JWK Set.  For our resolution of the issue to be complete, it should address those uses too.  Given that a number of additional JWK fields are being discussed, I expect that extensions will occur there.
>  
> Second, if we do decide to go with your approach (1), I’ll summarize for the list what I believe the two syntax proposals on the table are for doing this.  One proposal is 2A in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01353.html (which I’ll call the FLAT SYNTAX) and the other is the syntax that Dick Hardt proposed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01457.html (which I’ll call the STRUCTURED SYNTAX).  I believe that it would be useful for the working group to discuss which of those they would prefer in parallel to discussing the questions that you asked, so that if we do go with approach (1) or something like it, we’ll know which to use.
>  
> FLAT SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":["notes"],
>      "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>     }
>  
> STRUCTURED SYNTAX:
>     {"alg":"ES256",
>      "ign":{
>        "notes":"This header field can be safely ignored"
>       }
>     }
>  
> As I see it, the advantage of the flat syntax is all header fields are in the same place.  This makes processing header fields easier and is more regular.  The disadvantage is that the list of fields that may be safely ignored repeats those field names.
>  
> As I see it, the advantage of the structured syntax is that nothing is repeated, resulting in cleaner JSON syntax.  The disadvantage is that then some header fields are in one place and some are in another, making the processing rules for header fields more complicated.
>  
> Between these two, it seems to come down to a choice between cleaner syntax or cleaner semantics.  (I’d personally lean towards the simpler processing rules resulting from the flat syntax, but I would be fine with this coming out either way.)
>  
> Finally, I’ll point out that I don’t believe that your approaches (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive.  We could conceivably leave it up to application specifications using the JOSE specs whether they require header fields to be understood by default AND provide a syntax for declaring which fields may be safely ignored for use in those application contexts where the application spec does require that header fields be normally understood.  In fact, one might consider this to fall under the “(possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs)” that you suggested below.
>  
> I hope the points above help further a productive discussion of this topic.
>  
>                                                             -- Mike
>  
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Karen O'Donoghue
> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 3:26 AM
> To: jose@ietf.org
> Subject: [jose] thoughts on header criticality from recent polls
>  
> Folks,
> 
> Thank you for your patience with me regarding the recent polls on header criticality. I realize I have taken too long to respond from a chairs perspective with some results and direction. I had hoped to provide either a decision or a clear set of choices, but after analyzing the poll results, rereading all the email traffic (multiple times), and talking to a few working group members, I find I am not quite able to do so. So, what next... 
> 
> First, what I do believe...
> 
> I think it is clear that the working group remains divided on this issue with a significant number of members feeling that an approach must be defined that safely allows for some header fields to be considered non-critical. I think there is general consensus that there must be reasonable mechanisms for extensibility, and that the approach must be generic. Based on that, I would like to ask the working group to move forward with the strategy that all headers cannot be considered critical and move on to the discussion of how to approach non-critical headers. 
> 
> In my review of the mailing list traffic (and my apologies if I missed something), I have seen a number of basic approaches proposed (summarized by Jim Schaad on 9 Oct 2012 with the response by James Manager on 10 Oct 2012). In particular, I found James' list of requirements to be very helpful, and I have repeated it here...
> 
> A. Want to be able to define messages with new semantics in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics.
> 
> B. Want to be able to *redefine* (or constrain) the semantics of *existing* fields in future, without any risk that old implementations will misinterpret them with old semantics (or without the constraints).
> 
> C. Want to prevent large blobs of ignored data appearing in messages, as similar blobs have been used to create hash collisions between legitimate & malicious certificates that use weak algorithms (eg MD5).
> 
> D. Want to strongly discourage future extensions (feature-creep), under the philosophy that even well-intentioned extensions tend to do more harm (by adding complexity that is only deployed sporadically) than the good of any new functionality they bring.
> 
> E. Loosely coupling clients and servers is generally considered a good thing; but strongly coupling them is more appropriate for a secure message format for [insert a reason here]. A possible reason is that people are too likely to choose to make an extension non-critical for short-term ease of interoperability, instead of making it critical for better long-term security.
> 
> From this list, I believe A is definitely a requirement. I am unclear regarding working group consensus on B, C, and E, and I believe D is not a requirement. 
> 
> QUESTION: Is there working group consensus on the requirements we are trying to address? Perhaps a short discussion clarifying these would help drive consensus on the overall approach. 
> 
> As for possible solutions, we appear to have evolved to the point where we are of two minds: 
> 
> 1) Define a header field that explicitly lists the fields that may be safely ignored if not understood. (Here I am assuming that we aren't going to define a separate header for non-critical elements.) 
> 
> 2) Remain silent on header criticality in the JOSE specifications and leave it up to the various application specifications (possibly providing guidance directed to those applications in the JOSE specs). 
> 
> I sense that there is more support for the first approach, but I am concerned that there is a significant minority that favor the second approach. 
> 
> QUESTION: Can the working group agree on whether to work on approach 1 or approach 2? 
> 
> In conclusion, I am asking three things in this missive: 
> 1. I am asking the working group to move forward based on a non-critical headers approach.  
> 2. I am asking the working group to clarify the requirements driving the non-critical header discussion (A, B, C, D, E, or ?). 
> 3. I am asking the working group to decide whether the right approach is to develop a specific syntax (if so, what?) or to defer to the applications with appropriate guidance (if so, what level of guidance)? To address this item, I welcome concise proposals of text. 
> 
> I realize this message is long and not as specific or prescriptive as some would like, and I apologize in advance for any mistakes and misunderstandings on my part. 
> 
> Regards,
> Karen O'Donoghue
> 
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