Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt

Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com> Thu, 25 April 2013 22:29 UTC

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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt
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Cc: "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt
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The same message isn't being encrypted with multiple GCM keys.  It is only encrypted with one key.  Indeed, the proposed change that I discussed in my earlier message to you that would enable the use of GCM with multiple recipients would only encrypt the plaintext once.  The originator and all recipients use exactly the key stream - just as you said.

                                                                -- Mike

From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2013 2:40 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt

Mike:

The same message encrypted with different GCM keys is a problem, but that is not what ought to be going on here.  I tried to explain that in my previous message.  The same GCM key is delivered to multiple recipients, perhaps using different key management techniques.  Since the originator and all of the recipients use exactly the same key stream, this XOR concern does not arise.

Russ


On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 2:48 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com<mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>> wrote:
Jim - I am surprised that you would say that my co-authors Eric Rescorla or Joe Hildebrand or the working group would advocate using AES GCM in a way that would result in severe security vulnerabilities - in particular, allowing attackers to obtain the XOR of the messages to multiple recipients encrypted using GCM - a vulnerability identified by the CFRG.

Not stating this in the document would seem to me to be highly irresponsible, given the brittleness of GCM in this regard, as identified by the CRFG.  As I said to Richard Barnes over dinner last night, while unpleasant, and possibly surprising to those who aren't familiar to how GCM actually works, as an editor, I viewed including the statement that "AES GCM MUST NOT be used when using the JWE JSON Serialization for multiple recipients, since this would result in the same Initialization Vector and Plaintext values being used for multiple GCM encryptions" as necessary, and "truth in advertising".

                                -- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
Sent: Wednesday, April 24, 2013 9:07 PM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt

Mike,

AES GCM MUST NOT be used when using the JWE JSON Serialization for
   multiple recipients, since this would result in the same
   Initialization Vector and Plaintext values being used for multiple
   GCM encryptions.

I doubt your co-authors would agree with this.
I doubt the working group with agree with this.
I know that at least one co-chair does not agree with this I can predict that the AD and IESG along with the security directorate would crucify me if I allowed this to stand in the document..

Jim



> -----Original Message-----
> From: jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org> [mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:jose-bounces@ietf.org>] On Behalf
> Of internet-drafts@ietf.org<mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:29 PM
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org<mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org>
> Cc: jose@ietf.org<mailto:jose@ietf.org>
> Subject: [jose] I-D Action: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt
>
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Javascript Object Signing and
> Encryption Working Group of the IETF.
>
>       Title           : JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
>       Author(s)       : Michael B. Jones
>                           Eric Rescorla
>                           Joe Hildebrand
>       Filename        : draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09.txt
>       Pages           : 54
>       Date            : 2013-04-23
>
> Abstract:
>    JSON Web Encryption (JWE) is a means of representing encrypted
>    content using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structures.
>    Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
>    specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
>    specification.  Related digital signature and MAC capabilities are
>    described in the separate JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-09
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-0
> 9
>
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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