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Re: [jose] [Cfrg] RFC Draft: PASETO - Platform-Agnotic SEcurity TOkens

Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com> Fri, 20 April 2018 11:14 UTC

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From: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>
Organization: Connect2id Ltd.
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Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 14:14:44 +0300
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Subject: Re: [jose] [Cfrg] RFC Draft: PASETO - Platform-Agnotic SEcurity TOkens
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On 20/04/18 01:03, Neil Madden wrote:
> 2. Moving the “alg” and “enc” headers out of JWE/JWS and instead into JWK so that is the key that determines the algorithm not the message.
Developers letting the "alg" header alone drive JWS / JWE processing is
the most glaring mistake I keep seeing. JOSE library maintainers can
possibly help here, by hiding the "alg" header from developers :)

We took a similar measure with "alg":"none", by giving those JOSE
objects a different class than JWS (for type safety) which cannot be
validated.

Vladimir

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