Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE

"Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com> Thu, 31 January 2013 22:16 UTC

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From: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Thread-Topic: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2013 22:15:40 +0000
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Cc: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>, "jose@ietf.org" <jose@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [jose] issues with x5c in JWE
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I could also see it like the following:

{
  "kty":"RSA",
  "kid":"juliet@capulet.lit",
  "n":".....",
  "e":"AQAB",
  "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"
  // and/or "x5c":[....]
}

Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above.

Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds.


- m&m

Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
 wrote:

> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of X509
> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as many
> days.
> 
> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems like
> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to
> overcome such pity objections?
> 
> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has in
> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just a
> formality.
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> 
>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list.
>> 
>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk.
>> 
>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing.
>> 
>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a
>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to
>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key.
>> 
>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single
>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats.
>> 
>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent
>> in band.
>> 
>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing.
>> 
>> John B.
>> 
>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <mamille2@cisco.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and
>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be
>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which
>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be
>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now.
>>>> 
>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but
>> I
>>>> digress...
>>> 
>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions.
>>> 
>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be
>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key?
>>> 
>>> {
>>> "kty":"X509",
>>> "x5c": [....]
>>> }
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - m&m
>>> 
>>> Matt Miller < mamille2@cisco.com >
>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>> 
>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts
>> with a
>>>>> secret.  I would expect a kid in the header.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to
>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a
>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its
>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to
>>>>> 
>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to
>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate."
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks Brian
>>>>> 
>>>>> John B.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com
>>> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that
>> struck
>>>>> me as maybe not right.
>>>>> 
>>>>> From
>>>>> 
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9
>>>>> 
>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted
>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key
>> of
>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity
>> that
>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity.
>>>>> 
>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280]
>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm
>> missing
>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate
>> chain?
>>>>> 
>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B<
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B>of
>> [
>>>>> JWS<
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS
>>> ]
>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is
>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest.
>>>>> 
>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to
>> just
>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously,
>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html,
>> there's
>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient
>> identify its
>>>>> own key.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> jose mailing list
>>>>> jose@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
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>>> 
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>>