Re: [jose] Deployed Code (was: Re: #23: Make crypto independent of binary encoding (base64))

[Phil Hunt <[e-mail]>]

Seems like many these days are in a rush. They call for consensus before discussing the issue. 

Isn't it up to the chair?

This isn't unique to this WG. 

Too many times the explanation for keeping an apparent 'feature/flaw' is 'because we don't want change'. Yet often the group can't explain it. Or worse, the group just says "we know the emperor has no clothes, we just don't feel the need to comment." This is where alarm bells go off for me. 

Phil

On 2013-06-13, at 7:35, Richard Barnes <[e-mail]> wrote:

> This would have been a nice discussion to have had 18 months ago, when we were getting started.
> 
> I don't think it's compatible with the IETF ethos to say "Changes to this document MUST NOT break existing code."  Otherwise, we're not doing engineering here, we're cleaning up documentation and rubber-stamping.
> 
> What would be acceptable is to say "Changes must break cleanly with existing code".  That is, it should be possible for a JWT implementation to, say, process both "legacy" JWS syntax and whatever comes out of this group.  That way, we could come to consensus on the best solution, incorporating lessons learned from earlier work without being hindered by them.
> 
> Would participants here consider it a acceptable for the output of this working group to be incompatible with existing JWT implementations, as long as it had the property that JW* objects in the new format could be clearly distinguished from "legacy" JW* objects, so that implementations could adapt their processing?
> 
> --Richard
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jun 13, 2013 at 10:24 AM, George Fletcher <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> +1
>> 
>> Breaking deployed code as raised by Brian, Naveen and others is a critical consideration.
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> George
>> 
>> On 6/13/13 10:19 AM, Mike Jones wrote:
>>> Jim and Karen, could you please do as Richard suggests and close this issue as “won’t fix”.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>                                                             Thank you,
>>> 
>>>                                                             -- Mike
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> From: Richard Barnes [mailto:[e-mail]] 
>>> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2013 1:57 PM
>>> To: [e-mail]; Mike Jones
>>> Subject: Fwd: [jose] #23: Make crypto independent of binary encoding (base64)
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> In other words: Chairs, feel free to             close/wontfix :)
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> From: Richard Barnes <[e-mail]>
>>> Date: Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 4:55 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [jose] #23: Make crypto independent of binary encoding (base64)
>>> To: "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <[e-mail]>
>>> Cc: jose issue tracker <[e-mail]>, "<[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]>, "<[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]>, "<[e-mail]>" <[e-mail]>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To be clear, I structured my message in two parts for a reason, to separate the analysis from the opinion.  I acknowledge that I am but one voice here, and I'm increasingly hearing how alone I am :)
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 4:23 PM, Richard Barnes <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> <impartial-analysis>
>>> 
>>> So just to be clear on the trade-off the WG has to make:
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On the one hand: Breaking every existing JWT implementation in the world
>>> 
>>> On the other hand: Eternally binding ourselves to base64 encoding, even if binary-safe encodings become available (CBOR, MsgPack, etc.)
>>> 
>>> </impartial-analysis >
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> <personal-opinion>
>>> 
>>> I have some sympathy with JWT implementors.  It sucks to have to refactor code.  But I think we're literally talking about something like a 5-line patch.  And early JWT implementors knew or should have known (to use a DC phrase) that they were dealing with a draft spec.  As the W3C editor's draft template says, in big bold red print, "Implementors who are not taking part in the discussions are likely to find the specification changing out from under them in incompatible ways."
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> As PHB pointed out in the other thread, it would be nice to use JWS and JWE in place of CMS one day, without the base64 hit.  We should incur the implementation pain now, and get the design right for the long run.  Base64 is a hack around JSON; we should build the system so that when we no longer need that hack, it can go away.
>>> 
>>> </personal-opinion>
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> --Richard
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 10:27 AM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I did at first find it curious why the cryptographic operations were over the base64url-enccoded values, but I was also very focused on JWE, where I think the field separation problem is less of an issue (at least now).  For JWS, this would certainly cause problems without some manner of unambiguous field parameterization.
>>> 
>>> I will note that unescaped NULL is not valid in JSON, so it could be used as a separator between the encoded header and the payload.  I do find it interesting if JOSE could more easily and efficiently support other encodings.  However, I think that                                   while this is an interesting thought experiment, it seems we're too far down the path to seriously consider it unless the current state were shown to be horribly broken.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - m&m
>>> 
>>> Matt Miller < [e-mail] >
>>> Cisco Systems, Inc.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Jun 11, 2013, at 6:01 PM, jose issue tracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> > #23: Make crypto independent                                       of binary encoding (base64)
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Comment (by [e-mail]):
>>> >
>>> > For both serializations, you already need the base64url encoded versions
>>> > of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload to preserve them in transmission, so
>>> > computing them isn't an extra burden.  In the JWS Compact Serialization,
>>> > you already need the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period
>>> > character, and the Encoded JWS Payload, so computing that                                       concatenation
>>> > isn't an extra burden.  Given you already have that quantity, computing
>>> > the signature over it is the easiest thing for developers to do, and it's
>>> > been shown to work well in practice.  There's no compelling reason to make
>>> > this change.
>>> >
>>> > Even for the JSON Serialization, the only "extra" step that's required to
>>> > compute the signature is the concatenation with the period character - to
>>> > prevent shifting of data from one field to the other, as described by Jim
>>> > Schaad in the e-mail thread.  So this step isn't actually "extra" at all -
>>> > it's necessary.  It's also highly advantageous to use exactly the same
>>> > computation for both serializations, which is currently the case.
>>> >
>>> > Since there is no compelling reason to make this change, and                                       since making
>>> > it could enable the "shifting" problem identified by Jim, it should not be
>>> > made.
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>>> > Reporter:  [e-mail]   |       Owner:  draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
>>> >     Type:  defect       |  [e-mail]
>>> > Priority:  major        |      Status:  new
>>> > Component:  json-web-    |   Milestone:
>>> >  encryption             |     Version:
>>> > Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
>>> > Keywords:               |
>>> > -------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/23#comment:2>
>>> > jose <http://tools.ietf.org/jose/>
>>> >
>>> 
>>> > _______________________________________________
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>> 
>> -- 
>> <XeC>
> 
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