Re: [karp] rt-dir review of draft-ietf-karp-crypto-table

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Wed, 22 May 2013 15:39 UTC

Return-Path: <kent@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: karp@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: karp@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A21A221F93B7 for <karp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 22 May 2013 08:39:36 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.000, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 83+yGMGatAGo for <karp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 22 May 2013 08:39:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB0A621F93FC for <karp@ietf.org>; Wed, 22 May 2013 08:39:27 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from dommiel.bbn.com ([192.1.122.15]:36501 helo=COMSEC.local) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <kent@bbn.com>) id 1UfB8P-000Chq-U7; Wed, 22 May 2013 11:39:26 -0400
Message-ID: <519CE6AE.3000102@bbn.com>
Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 11:39:26 -0400
From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130509 Thunderbird/17.0.6
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
References: <tslwqqswm6e.fsf@mit.edu> <519B99CA.9080307@bbn.com> <m2fvxffqp5.wl%randy@psg.com>
In-Reply-To: <m2fvxffqp5.wl%randy@psg.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] rt-dir review of draft-ietf-karp-crypto-table
X-BeenThere: karp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion list for key management for routing and transport protocols <karp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/karp>
List-Post: <mailto:karp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/karp>, <mailto:karp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 22 May 2013 15:39:36 -0000

Randy,

You're right that each BGPSEC router has a private key. However, the key 
table is
designed to manage key rollover for keys that are shared on a pairwise 
basis.
The private router key does not have that property, so it seems a bad fit.
I should have been more precise in my reply.

Steve

>> More importantly, the RPKI and BGPSEC are not relevant to the key
>> table design. The former requires no crypto operations on a
>> router. The latter deals with keys for routers, but management of
>> these keys is very different, precisely because they are public keys.
> that last clause is false.  in bgpsec, the router has at least one
> private key so that it can sign announcements.
>
> i am scratching my head on whether a karp table entry could be helpful
> in the use of bgpsec keys, and have not found a clear need.  but this
> could be my fault.
>
> randy
>