Re: [karp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table-04.txt

Uma Chunduri <uma.chunduri@ericsson.com> Tue, 23 October 2012 00:46 UTC

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From: Uma Chunduri <uma.chunduri@ericsson.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Thread-Topic: [karp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table-04.txt
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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 00:46:45 +0000
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Subject: Re: [karp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table-04.txt
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Hello Russ, 


 >>>>> I have worked through the use of pairwise keys (used in just one direction or both directions)
 >>>>> as well as multicast keys.  The current table supports all of these cases. I do not understand
 >>>>> why you want two separate tables.  Clearly, you are thinking about this differently than I am.  
 >>>>> Can you explain how two tables will make implementation easier?

[Uma]:  Let's focus on only from the key life time perspective. Some IGPs do require life times in the 
        specified format to make key transition easier.  But, I don't see how to fit these 4 parameters
        for pair wise keys. For e.g. for TCP based pair-wise keys, when new master key is negotiated by 
        KMP, TCP-AO makes coordinated key transition with the peer. Not at all based on the key table 
        time entries specified. In that sense the entries defined today useful and enable protocols 
        e.g., group-key RPs, who don't have a defined way of key transition and more over do security 
        by themselves (make sense there).

        Now, I stepped back to think on how to use for pair-wise protocols and not able to connect the 
        dots here. Do you see these are operator inputs or KMP negotiated and how one would use these entries?
        
            


-- 
Uma C.