Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC

Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net> Mon, 29 July 2013 09:19 UTC

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From: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC
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On Jul 29, 2013, at 4:54 AM, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:

> 
> Hi.
> 
> Yes I'm making a last call comment on a document I edit:-)
> 
> During discussion of another document
> )(draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table), a routing directorate review
> brought up the concern that we don't talk about time synchronization.
> Without time synchronization, the wrong keys can be selected in certain
> circumstances.
> In some cases, time synchronization is required for replay detection,
> although that is rare for routing protocols.
> 
> Those involved in the discussion of time synchronization and
> draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table believed that draft-ietf-karp-ops-model
> is a better place for a discussion of time synchronization than
> draft-ietf-karp-crypto-key-table.

I agree with this (not surprisingly :-)

> So, I'd like to propose the following text be added to security
> considerations:

I'm good with this, one nit:

s/bxegin/begin/

Thanks Sam, 

-danny