Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Mon, 29 July 2013 09:36 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Danny McPherson <danny@tcb.net>
References: <20130729063557.22039.63212.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <tsltxjdwxtv.fsf@mit.edu> <21DC453F-A434-463F-9F69-D036675507FB@tcb.net>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 05:35:31 -0400
In-Reply-To: <21DC453F-A434-463F-9F69-D036675507FB@tcb.net> (Danny McPherson's message of "Mon, 29 Jul 2013 05:31:00 -0400")
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Cc: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, ietf@ietf.org, karp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [karp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07.txt> (Operations Model for Router Keying) to Informational RFC
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Danny sent me private text that he believes is better than what I
proposed.


I like your text below except that signing is the wrong word.
How about generation of integrity-protected messages?

These messages are almost never digitally signed.

Proposed text:

> Routers need to
>      have tight enough time synchronization that receivers permit a key
>      to be utilized for validation prior to the first use of that key for signing or
>      availability will be impacted.