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Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 31 March 2011 05:05 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 07:07:33 +0200
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
To: mrex@sap.com
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Cc: keyassure@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Objective: Restrictive versus Supplementary Models
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On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 2:38 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:
> Martin Rex wrote:
>>
>> >
>> > I think this is an important consideration. However a relevant
>> > question for a 2119-level MUST seems to be whether we wish to have
>> > this data rejected if not DNSSEC signed.
>> > What's your view on that?
>>
>> I'm much less worried about false positives resulting in DoS, which
>> can be more easily achieved attacking at the network layer (IP, TCP).
>
> Actually, a DoS based on spoofing an DANE TLSA record with incorrect
> data and a long TTL into a DNS cache might turn out to be devastatingly
> effective when unsiged TLSA records are accepted.

How is this different from a spoofed A record with a long TTL?

-Ekr

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