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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Jakob Schlyter <jakob@kirei.se> Tue, 08 March 2011 07:19 UTC

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From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@kirei.se>
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To: Brian Smith <bsmith@mozilla.com>
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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On 8 mar 2011, at 07.23, Brian Smith wrote:

> It would be better to have both SHA-384 mandatory for clients. Those two algorithms are already practically required because they are both required for a good implementation of TLS 1.2. Making SHA-384 mandatory for clients makes it easier for server administrators to switch from SHA-256 to SHA-384 if that would ever be helpful; that could be a real possibility considering the deployment of SHA-3 on clients is a long way off.

+1 - having two algorithms (although from the same family) from the start is better than just one. And we add SHA-3 and friends later - no need to "reserve" code points for them at this point.

	jakob

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