Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 02 March 2011 22:34 UTC

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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2011 22:35:49 +0000
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, "keyassure@ietf.org" <keyassure@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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On 2 Mar 2011, at 21:41, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote:

> 
> On Mar 2, 2011, at 1:37 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 2 Mar 2011, at 21:24, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Which is why I am arguing it is time to withdraw SHA1 from service. It
>>> is only marginally more secure than MD5.
>> 
>> "Marginally"? Evidence please? I dont think exageration helps your case.
>> 
>> S
> 
> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html

Yes, sha2 is the hash algorithm of the day. 

But where's it say there's only a marginal difference between sha1 and md5? Absent evidence that's just spreading FUD which is not a good way to argue, even for the right thing.

S

> 
>> March 15, 2006: The SHA-2 family of hash functions (i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) may be used by Federal agencies for all applications using secure hash algorithms. Federal agencies should stop using SHA-1 for digital signatures, digital time stamping and other applications that require collision resistance as soon as practical, and must use the SHA-2 family of hash functions for these applications after 2010. After 2010, Federal agencies may use SHA-1 only for the following applications: hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs); key derivation functions (KDFs); and random number generators (RNGs). Regardless of use, NIST encourages application and protocol designers to use the SHA-2 family of hash functions for all new applications and protocols.
> 
> I agree with depricating SHA-1 in DANE.
>