Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

[Sean Turner <[e-mail]>]

On 3/2/11 6:43 PM, Warren Kumari wrote:
>
> On Mar 2, 2011, at 6:24 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> There is currently no evidence that SHA2-256 is unacceptably weak.
>>
>> However it is based on the same construction as MD4, MD5 and SHA1. And
>> thus the reason for the current NIST competition.
>>
>>
>> Since the NIST competition is not currently complete, there is
>> currently no viable alternative to SHA2. While there are other
>> algorithms in use, I would expect the competition to supersede those
>> as well.
>>
>> I think that what we should do here is
>>
>> 1) Make support for SHA2-256 and SHA2-384 REQUIRED
>> 2) Ensure that it is feasible to transition from use of SHA2 to a new
>> algorithm
>
> <no hats>
> Shouldn't this be much much more general? "Ensure that it is feasible to
> transition to new algorithms"? <note: I don't know how we do this, but I
> also don't see why "from SHA2" would be a special case>
>
>> 3) Deprecate use of MD2,MD4,MD5 and SHA1.
>>
>
> Um, I'm confused by number 3 -- I think that the only things we need to
> do *here* is decide what we *do* support....
> Deprecating the use of other things, while fine and good, doesn't need
> to happen *here* if we don't support them...
>
> W
> </no hats>

#3 is kind of taken care of.  MD2 and MD4 are being made historic:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-turner-md2-to-historic/
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-turner-md4-to-historic/

and the security considerations for MD5 were updated:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-turner-md5-seccon-update/

spt

>>
>> The second point is really rather important since even though it is
>> possible to emit bit strings that use SHA2 in protocols such as SSL
>> and S/MIME, it is not feasible to use them in practice because there
>> is no way to know whether the other party is one of those which is
>> capable of using them.
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 1, 2011 at 5:38 PM, Paul Hoffman <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>> On 3/1/11 1:37 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>>>
>>>> This particular topic is one on which the Security ADs and the IETF
>>>> chair have very very specific opinions on. And given their role in
>>>> trying to effect an industry wide transition to stronger algorithms, I
>>>> think that they are quite right to insist on them.
>>>
>>> If you can quote previous statements from any of them suggesting that
>>> SHA-256 is suspect, that would be more useful than you simply suggesting
>>> that they had said something. It would be useful to this discussion
>>> for each
>>> of us to speak only for ourselves and for those who have asked us to
>>> speak
>>> for them, or to quote others whom we think are authorities.
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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>
> --
> We know about as much about software quality problems as they knew about
> the Black Plague in the 1600s. We've seen the victims' agonies and
> helped burn the corpses. We don't know what causes it; we don't really
> know if there is only one disease. We just suffer -- and keep pouring
> our sewage into our water supply.
>
> -- Tom Van Vleck
>
>
>
>
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