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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU> Wed, 02 March 2011 22:46 UTC

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From: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2011 14:47:22 -0800
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>, "keyassure@ietf.org" <keyassure@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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On Mar 2, 2011, at 2:35 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> 
> 
> On 2 Mar 2011, at 21:41, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote:
> 
>> 
>> On Mar 2, 2011, at 1:37 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2 Mar 2011, at 21:24, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Which is why I am arguing it is time to withdraw SHA1 from service. It
>>>> is only marginally more secure than MD5.
>>> 
>>> "Marginally"? Evidence please? I dont think exageration helps your case.
>>> 
>>> S
>> 
>> http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/secure_hashing.html
> 
> Yes, sha2 is the hash algorithm of the day. 
> 
> But where's it say there's only a marginal difference between sha1 and md5? Absent evidence that's just spreading FUD which is not a good way to argue, even for the right thing.

I'll take Ron Rivest's word on it: http://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2005-December/058850.html

> I'm curious as to the status of upgrading cryptographic
> hash function support in Python, now that md5 and sha1 are
> both clearly broken (in terms of collision-resistance).


If he puts the two in the same category of broken, I'd trust that judgement.

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