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Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto

bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com Tue, 08 March 2011 18:06 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 Mar 2011 18:05:16 +0000
From: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
To: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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Cc: keyassure@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [keyassure] Opening issue #21: "Need to specify which crypto
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On Tue, Mar 08, 2011 at 05:57:34PM +0100, Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> It fosters on the premise that SHA-1 is completely and throroughly
> broken and SHA-256 impaired by more serious attacks than currently
> known for SHA-1 _long_ before a SHA-3 finalist is selected.
> 
> 
> -Martin

	my working analog here is that you don't shoot at a moving
	target - you shoot ahead of it.

	given the pace of the IETF processes, I fully expect there will
	be a SHA-3 finalist selected before this spec lands.  (YMMV of course)

--bill

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